Problems of Communism

JANUARY–FEBRUARY 1977



COMMUNISM IN EUROPE

Eurocommunism
Kevin Devlin

Portugal
Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon

Greece
Dimitri Kitsikis

Book Reviews
Lowell Dittmer
Andrzej Brzeski
Roger E. Kanet
Harriet Fast Scott
Henry W. Morton
Robert Gerald Livingston

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JAN-FEB 1977 VOL XXVI

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Cover: Enrico Berlinguer (left), Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party, and Georges Marchais, Secretary-General of the French Communist Party, applaud the crowd at a mass demonstration of PCI-PCF solidarity in Paris on June 3, 1976. Photo by Benoit Gysembergh/Camera Press.

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Communism in Europe

EDITORS' NOTE—Over the last two decades, considerable diversity has emerged in European communism. In Western Europe particularly, a number of parties have attempted to adjust their policies to the local circumstances of their polities and societies, and this effort has produced substantial variety in the overall European picture. The following articles address themselves to some aspects of this process. Mr. Devlin describes the events that culminated in the "institutionalization of diversity" at the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties held in East Berlin in June 1976. Mr. Mujal-Leon looks at the responses of the Portuguese Communist Party to the changing situation in Portugal since the military coup of April 30, 1974. Mr. Kitsikis examines the strategy and tactics of the newly legalized Greek Communist forces against the background of their behavior during prior years and in the context of the reestablishment of parliamentary democracy in Greece.

The Challenge of Eurocommunism

By Kevin Devlin

For years, Moscow . . . was our Rome. We spoke of the Great October Socialist Revolution as if it were our Christmas. That was the period of our infancy. Today we have grown up.

—Santiago Carrillo at the East Berlin Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties, June 29, 1976.

The first pan-European conference of Communist parties was held in Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia, in April 1967; the second took place in East Berlin in June 1976. A brief comparison of the two offers one measure of the changes that have come about in European communism—East, West, and East-West—over the past decade.*

By 1967, the monolithic unity of European communism was already a thing of the past, due largely to the disruptive impact of the Sino-Soviet conflict and the wave of "revisionist" adaptation to environmental realities that affected many West European parties, to varying degrees, in the early 1960's. The clearest proof of this was the list of absentees: the Karlovy Vary conference was boycotted by the Albanian, Yugoslav, and Romanian parties from the East, and by the Dutch, Icelandic, and Norwegian parties from the West, while the Swedes sent only an observer. Nevertheless, those that did attend maintained the tradition of unanimous solidarity under the exemplary leadership of the CPSU. So the project went through expeditiously, if not altogether smooth-

Mr. Devlin is a political analyst for Radio Free Europe in Munich. He has published widely on Europe's Communist parties and is currently engaged in a collective research project for a volume to be entitled Imperium und Ideologie *(Empire and Ideology).*

* The complete names and initial designations of the European Communist parties mentioned in this article are listed below in alphabetical order: Albanian Party of Labor (*Partia e Punes e Shqiperise*—APL or PPSh); Bulgarian Communist Party (*Bulgarska Komunisticheska Partiya*—BKP); Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (*Komunisticka Strana Ceskoslovenska*—KSC); Communist Party of Denmark (*Danmarks Kommunistiske Parti*—KPD); Communist Party *(continued on p. 2)*

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

Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev (left) and CPSU Secretary and Candidate Member of the Politburo Boris N. Ponomarëv pictured at the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties in Berlin on June 30, 1976.

—Alain Nogues/Sygma.

ly. The call for a pan-European conference came from the loyalist French and Polish parties in January 1967; the only preparatory meeting was held in Warsaw in February; and in April, the conference itself unanimously adopted a collective document calling in general terms for a long-range effort to exploit détente but suggesting by its very generality the already divergent political interests of both East and West European Communist leaderships.[1]

The contrast with the second European conference is striking, not least with regard to the time and effort consumed in bringing the latter about. The first calls for another pan-European meeting—and for a world conference to follow—came from pro-Soviet party leaders (West German, Hungarian, and Bulgarian) in November 1973. A 28-party consultative meeting took place in Warsaw nearly a year later, in October 1974, after months of secret interparty negotiations —the first of many preliminary events in a long preparatory process. The conference itself did not take place until late June 1976, a full year behind schedule—and then, as we shall see, it was not the kind of

of Great Britain (CPGB or BCP); Communist Party of Norway (*Norges Kommunistiske Parti*—NKP); Communist Party of the Soviet Union (*Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza*—CPSU or KPSS); Communist Party of Spain (*Partido Comunista de España*—PCE); French Communist Party (*Parti Communiste Français*—PCF); German Communist Party (*Deutsche Kommunistische Partei*—DKP), West Germany; Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart*—HSWP or MSzMP); Italian Communist Party (*Partito Comunista Italiano*—PCI); League of Communists of Yugoslavia (*Savez Komunista Jugoslavije*—LCY or SKJ); Left Party—Communists (*Vansterpartiet Kommunisterna*—VPK), Sweden; The Netherlands Communist Party (*Communistische Partij van Nederland*— CPN); People's Alliance (*Altydubandalagid*—PA), Iceland; Polish United Workers' Party (*Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza*—PZPR); Portuguese Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Português*—PCP); Romanian Communist Party (*Partidul Comunist Roman*—PCR); Socialist Unity Party of Germany (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*—SED), East Germany; Turkish Communist Party (*Turkiye Komunist Partisi*—TKP).—Eds.

[1] The divergence of political interests was dramatically emphasized 16 months later by the reaction of most West European parties to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces. In speeches at a PCI Central Committee plenum on Aug. 27 and 29, 1968, Secretary-General Luigi Longo criticized the failure of "some socialist countries" to pursue the strategy of détente set forth in the Karlovy Vary document, owing (he suggested) to preoccupation with the subversive effect of "ideological aggression."

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conference that the Soviets and their supporters had wanted, but instead one that marked the "institutionalization of diversity" in the European Communist movement.

The "scenario" adumbrated in the Kremlin seems fairly clear. The conference of Communist parties—addressed to "the struggle for peace, security, cooperation, and social progress in Europe"—was to be held in East Berlin "no later than mid-1975"; it was to be linked primarily with the international Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe scheduled for Helsinki in the summer of 1975, and secondarily with the 30th anniversary of the victory of the anti-Fascist alliance in World War II. By producing a collective ideological interpretation of détente in Europe, the conference hopefully would lessen the effect of the concessions that the East Europeans would have to make in Helsinki with regard to "Basket 3" (the freer movement of information, ideas, and persons); at the same time, it would at least implicity reaffirm the status of the CPSU as *primus inter pares* (or *impares*) in the European Communist movement.

In retrospect, it appears that the Soviet leadership made a fundamental miscalculation in seeking to obtain the participation of as many parties as possible—and more specifically, to bring in the Yugoslavs and Romanians, who had boycotted the Karlovy Vary conference. One concession upon which the Yugoslavs, backed by other independent parties, insisted proved to be of crucial importance. This was the new procedural principle of "decision-making by consensus," adopted at the start of the Warsaw meeting. Indeed, the prolonged preparatory process which followed—involving at least 16 meetings over 20 months—could be described as the story of repeated and ultimately largely fruitless efforts by the loyalist majority to reduce the effect of that initial concession.

After the Warsaw meeting and the first preparatory session proper, held in Budapest in mid-December 1974, a curtain of official secrecy descended over the proceedings, but the outlines of the confrontation over the character and content of the conference document were clear enough.[2] For the independent parties—notably, the Yugoslav, Romanian, Italian, Spanish, British, and Swedish CP's, later joined at least on some issues by the French—it was a matter of resisting repeated attempts (made through the East Germans, who as hosts were charged with producing the successive draft texts) to secure the adoption by the European Communist parties of something like a "general line," expressed in ideological terms. Against this pressure the independent parties stood by their demands: If there was to be a collective document at all,[3] it must be based upon genuine consensus; it must emphasize the principles of autonomy, equality, and noninterference in interparty relations (with the important corollary that no special status should be accorded to the CPSU); it must contain no criticism of any party, present or absent (*e.g.*, the Chinese); it must deal with political action, not with ideology; and in any case it was not to be binding upon any party.



Santiago Carrillo, Secretary-General of the Spanish Communist Party, a prominent proponent of efforts by national Communist parties to assert their independence from Moscow.

—AFP via Pictorial.

[2] For an analysis of the early stages of the preparatory process (up to May 1975), see Kevin Devlin, "The Interparty Drama," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1975, pp. 18-34.

[3] At different times, spokesmen for the Yugoslav, Romanian, Italian, and Spanish parties expressed the view that the conference need not adopt any document—presumably as a bargaining position to strengthen the demand for *their* kind of document.

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The early stages of this debate took place at sessions of the so-called "working group,"[4] which met in East Berlin in mid-February and again in early April 1975. This phase ended in deadlock. At the April session, the East Germans produced a first draft which a Yugoslav party source described as calling for "a joint stand of all Communist parties in their actions and ideology";[5] it was rejected by the independent parties.

Deepening Differences

At this point, an attempt was made to find a way out of the impasse by handing the problem over to a balanced "subgroup" of eight parties—four independent ones (Yugoslavia, Romania, Italy, and Spain) and four loyalist ones (the Soviet Union, East Germany, France, and Denmark). The subgroup met three times—in mid-May, early July, and mid-July 1975[6]—but failed to reach agreement: a second draft text, produced by the East Germans in July, was no more acceptable to the independent parties than the first had been. In an interview given at the end of August, Sergio Segre of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) said that "only a few small steps forward" had been made, and that both East German drafts "contained statements of political and ideological principle that were frankly unacceptable—and not only to the PCI." He went on to provide some useful details:

On the concept of détente, agreement is general, but we risk running aground on the first and third chapters of the document. The first chapter consists of an analysis of Western capitalism and contains a series of assessments of the function of the Socialist and Social Democratic parties. The third . . . concerns the strategy of the Communist parties, and here it is said that they play a vanguard role, pursue identical objectives, and are guided by a single ideology. We believe, and we are not the only ones, that these parts of the document do not reflect the reality of the Communist movement and the orientations that were expressed by its components on various subjects—for example, Portugal.[7]

Segre's reference to Portugal was a timely reminder that events themselves—and particularly the ferment of change affecting all of the Southern European countries in different ways—were making it more and more difficult for the European Communist parties to adopt a collective analysis of the continental situation. During the spring and early summer of 1975, the corner-cutting pursuit of power by the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), in alliance with the leftist military and in conflict with Mário Soares' Socialist Party (PS), became a source of deepening disunity and even polemics.[8] The Italian and Spanish CP's, whose domestic fortunes were directly and negatively affected by the Portuguese drama, openly criticized PCP policies and made their sympathy for the PS equally clear (while the more reticent Yugoslav and Romanian party presses made much the same point by giving favorable publicity to Soares and not the "Muscovite" Alvaro Cunhal).[9] On the other hand, the independent British and Swedish CP's went along with most other Communist parties in giving fraternal support to the PCP. But it was the French party (PCF) which distinguished itself above all others by its systematic and vociferous support of Cunhal, even though the latter's undisguised contempt for constitutional democracy (most memorably expressed in an interview with Oriana Fallacci[10]) was in conflict with principles proclaimed domestically by the PCF—for example, in the impressive "Declaration of Liberties" published in May 1975.[11]

While the PCF's stand on Portugal involved it in counterproductive polemics with its French Socialist ally/rival, the PCI repeatedly linked its criticism of the PCP with its strategic emphasis on a multiparty, gradualist approach to a pluralistic socialist order in which "bourgeois" liberties would be guaranteed and

[4] The "working group" consisted of as many delegations as chose to attend a particular editorial session (*e.g.*, 16 in February 1975 and 20 in April). In this connection, nomenclature was significant: when the delegation later met as the "Editorial Commission"—as in November 1975 and May-June 1976—it was a signal that consensual agreement was in sight.

[5] See "The Interparty Drama," *loc. cit.*, p. 32. Giancarlo Pajetta of the PCI reportedly described this first draft as having been "written in German, but translated from the Old Russian—of the Cominform era." See "Great and Unclear Divergencies Among the PC's of Europe," *Il Manifesto* (Rome), May 17, 1975.

[6] During a private conversation in September 1976, Sergio Segre of the PCI told the writer that one of these subgroup sessions (presumably the last one) had lasted eight days.

[7] *L'Espresso* (Rome), Aug. 31, 1975. In a later *L'Espresso* interview, in mid-October, Segre said that after the last eight-party meeting, "the margin of disagreement was so wide that some even thought it impossible to reach a settlement."

[8] See K. S. Karol, "The Portuguese Obsession," *Le Nouvel observateur* (Paris), June 2, 1975.

[9] In late 1974, Yugoslav and Romanian delegations attended a congress of the Portuguese Socialist Party in Lisbon—but not one of the Communist Party.

[10] This interview was published in *L'Europeo* (Milan), June 15, 1975.

[11] See *L'Humanité* (Paris), May 16, 1975.

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extended—a perspective which it applied not only to Italy but to advanced Western societies in general.[12] The interparty debate over Portuguese developments therefore raised issues of regional significance (while making it more difficult to achieve consensus on them); these included "national paths," the nexus between socialism and democracy, the "vanguard role" of the national Communist party, and—not least—relations between Communist and Social Democratic parties.[13]

The debate was not confined to the Western parties. Until August 1975, Soviet comment on Portuguese events and the issues raised by them was relatively restrained, probably because of preoccupation with the Helsinki conference. Once the East-West summit was over, however, Soviet and East European commentaries on Portugal and on the "ideology of transition" in general became more outspoken and more hard-line.[14]

Of particular significance was an article which Konstantin Zarodov, editor-in-chief of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (Prague), published in *Pravda* (Moscow) on August 6.[15] Commemorating a 70-year-old work by V. I. Lenin, Zarodov insisted on the unchanged necessity for "a revolutionary democratic dictatorship of the proletariat," led "from above" by the Communist party, and stressed that it should be based on a "political" majority not an "arithmetical" one. The rebuke to "modern conciliators" (*i.e.*, Communist parties seeking electoral progress through broad political alliances) was clear: "This Leninist idea . . . completely debunks the still fashionable opportunistic conceptions which make out that possession of the levers of power should be . . . the results of some kind of nationwide referendum."

The Zarodov article (and a series of similar, earlier ones by Boris Ponomarëv, Aleksandr Sobolev, and others) could be viewed as an effort by a more conservative element in the Soviet leadership to "balance" the strategic emphasis on détente by reasserting the CPSU's revolutionary legitimacy. Yet it also involved reasserting the CPSU's magistral right to impart ideological and political lessons to other CP's.

Most Western CP's ignored the article, but there were strong reactions from the Italian,[16] British,[17] and French parties. Of these, the last was the most significant. In an initial response, Secretary-General Georges Marchais emphasized at a press conference on August 8 that "PCF policy in all spheres is determined in Paris and not in Moscow," and that his party's attitude toward "the future of democracy and personal and collective freedoms . . . does not stem from any existing model or models." Four weeks later (and the delay added weight to the riposte), the PCF unexpectedly returned to the attack with a front-page *L'Humanité* article by Central Committee member Jacques Chambaz, who criticized Zarodov for presenting the conclusions that Lenin drew from the Tsarist Russian situation in 1905 as being "valid everywhere and always, and hence also in France." In particular, the PCF's goal of an "advanced democracy" was "incompatible with the idea of scholastic distinctions setting an arithmetical majority against a political majority."[18] This considered rejection of

[12] As Piero Pieralli of the PCI Secretariat put it: "We affirm once more that all we have done and said, all we shall do or say, with regard to Portugal, is based on what we consider to be questions of principle—on the way in which we think the essential, crucial issues of the struggle for democracy and socialism in Western Europe must be tackled." "A Pig-headed Demand," *Rinascita* (Rome), Aug. 20, 1975.

[13] The importance of Communist-Socialist relations in Southern European countries and of the disunity among Communist parties on this subject were demonstrated by reactions to Soares' proposal in late August 1975 for a conference of Socialist and Communist leaders of Portugal, Spain, France, and Italy to discuss "the transition toward socialism in society while preserving democracy." The Italian and Spanish CP's promptly joined the Socialist parties concerned in accepting the proposal; the Portuguese CP rejected it; and the French CP eventually expressed a heavily qualified and polemical acceptance which amounted to a rejection. (See "The Response of Georges Marchais to Mário Soares," *L'Humanité*, Oct. 23, 1975.

[14] A good example is Ivan Hlivka's article in *Pravda* (Bratislava), Aug. 26, 1975: "Unfortunately from time to time it happens in our movement that certain comrades, under the fabricated pretext that they want to win the broadest possible circles of allies for their party, criticize the socialist countries and particularly the Soviet Union at any price. And often they also criticize those revolutionary movements that follow a path of revolution reminiscent of the victorious path followed by fraternal socialist countries up to now. Such a practice objectively harms the revolutionaries and the revolution." In this article, Hlivka also denounced "any neutrality toward the current policy of China"; again, the relevance to the struggle over the conference document was obvious.

[15] Was it a coincidence that Zarodov's article appeared on the day that a PCI delegation headed by Pajetta arrived in Moscow to discuss "questions concerning the international situation and the international Communist movement"? The Communist-line daily *Paese sera* (Rome) of Aug. 11 had no doubt that the circumstances made the article "a severe doctrinal warning" addressed to the PCI and other parties taking "pluralistic and autonomous paths."

[16] The *Pravda* article was critized in *L'Unità* (Rome) statements of Aug. 9 and 12. The latter said: "The attempt to dictate rigid and general rules is groundless. . . . The relationship between democracy and socialism is understood by us in an extremely different fashion from the way in which it is outlined in the doctrinaire thinking of Zarodov."

[17] A British CP spokesman, George Matthews, commented: "The policy of the British Communist Party is independently decided by our party and by no other. The time has long since passed when Communist parties subscribed to a single political center." *Morning Star* (London), Aug. 14, 1975.

[18] *L'Humanité*, Aug. 9 and Sept. 4, 1975.

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Soviet ideological arguments can now be seen to have heralded much more significant changes in PCF-CPSU relations.

It was against this background of rumbling polemics and divergent political interests that the eight-party subgroup failed, both in regular sessions and in a series of bilateral talks that continued through September, to end the deadlock over the conference document. The confrontation would have to be transferred back to the wider forum.

Meanwhile, the Spanish CP (PCE) struck a weighty blow for the independent grouping by adopting, at its Second National Conference in early September 1975, a resolution detailing its position on the pan-European conference.[19] This stated that "the differences existing among the Communist parties of Europe on essential questions, such as that of the democratic way to socialism," were such that "it would be negative to seek through ambiguous formulations to convey an impression of false unanimity." In the PCE's view, the conference "could have a positive outcome even without a final document"; but, if there was to be one, it could only cover questions on which there was consensual agreement. In any case, "the PCE could not approve a document of a programmatic and ideological type which could [even] appear obligatory for all the parties."

Moscow's Vacillations

At this point came the first of several successive, dramatic shifts in Soviet attitudes toward the conference project. It was signaled by the British CP's announcement in late September that a delegation would attend a meeting in Berlin on October 9-10 "to consider the next stage in the preparations for for the conference." The fact that the independent British party was able to add that it would "continue to work for the successful holding of the conference before the end of this year"[20] suggested that "the next stage" would involve concessions by the conservative majority to the independent minority.

And so it proved. The meeting of October 9-10, with 27 delegations present (the San Marino CP having excused itself), was confronted with a third East German draft that was evidently very different from the first two: it seems to have been essentially devoted to the uncontroversial subject of post-Helsinki détente, covered in the original second chapter. Commenting with satisfaction on the outcome, *L'Unità* (October 11) said that, while the latest "synthesis" still required further "elaboration and clarification," it had been agreed that it could be "taken as a basis for discussion with the aim of arriving at a document that can receive the agreement of all the parties." It was further agreed that, on the basis of the discussions of October 9-10 "and of the observations and proposals that can be put forward by all the participating parties," the full Editorial Commission would meet some time in November to draw up the final draft "on the basis of the agreement of all the parties."[21]

The apparent victory of the consensus principle and the concomitant agreement to refer the synthesized result back to all the central committees for approval seemed to mark the institutionalized recognition—in a new way and on a new level—of the principle of the autonomy of each Communist party. It also meant that the lowest common denominator would be very low indeed.

One party which accepted this with notably bad grace was the PCF, as Jean Kanapa made clear in an address at the session and in interviews afterwards.[22] In his speech, he complained that as the months passed, "the political content of the document has been reduced, impoverished. That has not been our doing." On the demand of "numerous parties," the text would now be limited to the post-Helsinki "strug-

[19] The writer has been unable to obtain the text of the PCE's resolution. This account is synthetically based upon reports in *L'Unità* of Sept. 25, 1975; *Il Manifesto* of Sept. 20; Frane Barbieri's article in *Il Giornale* (Milan) of Sept. 23; and a six-point summary given by Manuel Azcárate of the PCE Executive Committee during a private meeting in October 1975.

[20] *Morning Star*, Sept. 27, 1975.

[21] In his speech at the session of October 9-10 (text in *L'Unità*, Oct. 14, 1975) and in a later Central Committee report (*ibid.*, Oct. 30, 1975), Pajetta expressed the PCI's wary satisfaction over the way things now appeared to be going. His CC report stressed that the conference would be "based on the principle of consensus insofar as it relates to the drawing up of a joint document and full freedom of debate. This signifies not only the full and explicit recognition of every party's equality and independence but also the renunciation of any organizational bond and the rejection of directives which could represent an obligation not arising from direct responsibility to the workers' movement and people of one's own country." Of the PCI's role in the preparatory process, he said: "We were faced with a complex document which in our opinion tried to cover too many issues, for which we thought the process of joint research and agreement was not yet ripe. We asked for brevity in the formulations and a reduction in the number of subjects covered, even at the cost of a conclusion which might seem too succinct and too limited in subject matter." See also Pajetta's interview, "No Common Strategy," *Le Nouvel observateur*, Oct. 19-25, 1975.

[22] Text of speech in *France nouvelle* (Paris), Oct. 20, 1975; interviews in Agence France-Presse (AFP) dispatch of Oct. 11, 1975, and *L'Humanité*, Oct. 13, 1975.

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Jean Kanapa, Member of the Central Committee of the French Communist Party and participant in the protracted interparty negotiations leading to the East Berlin gathering in June 1976.

—Robert Cohen/AGIP via Pictorial.

gle for détente, peaceful coexistence, disarmament, and cooperation." His party regretted this limitation and in particular the failure to produce a collective analysis of "the grave crisis affecting the capitalist countries, the workers' struggles for democracy and socialism, and the possibilities for a broad union of democratic forces." The PCF therefore demanded that the document should at least note that, since peaceful coexistence "does not in any way signify the social and political status quo, each Communist party pursues its class struggle . . . in full independence and without outside interference."

At this juncture, however, the Soviet position unexpectedly changed again—"zig" being followed by "zag," so to speak. For when the 28-party Editorial Commission met on November 17-19, the outcome was very different from what had clearly been anticipated in October. The meeting did not adopt a revised draft or set a date for the conference. Instead (the British *Morning Star* reported on November 20), it decided that an "editorial group" open to all parties would meet in December "to continue work on the draft, taking into account the points brought up"; the Editorial Commission would meet again in January to discuss the result and "consider" setting a date for the conference.

The postponement (and the reversion from "Editorial Commission" to "editorial group") showed that something had happened to block the consensual agreement that was in sight a few weeks earlier. And it was a last-minute development. Only a few days before that mid-November session a Yugoslav spokesman had declared: "Barring the unexpected, we are on the way to creating a [conference] document, a political communiqué, which will suit everyone." [23]

What had happened? Later statements by Spanish, British, Italian, and Yugoslav party spokesmen cast some light on the matter. In an interview published in the PCE organ *Mundo obrero* immediately after the November session, the leader of the Spanish delegation, Manuel Azcárate answered the editorial question "What is the reason for the postponement of the conference?" He said:

Let us recall that from the start of the preparatory process there was manifested a tendency to present to the conference a document which would be a sort of "general line" for all European parties. Various parties, including the Spanish CP, declared roundly that that was impossible. Considerable progress had in fact been made toward a concrete document limited to certain themes on which the parties, each acting in full independence, were in agreement. If that path had been followed, perhaps the recent meeting would have brought the preparatory work to a close.

That was not the way it happened. The tendency to press for a document of what may be called an "ideological type" reasserted itself. Faced with this, the position of a certain number of parties was maintained very firmly.

The only solution lies in continuing the discussion. On the other hand (and I do not think that this is a coincidence), my impression is that certain parties which plan to hold their conferences [sic[24]] in the

[23] Jure Bilic, Secretary of the LCY Executive Committee, in an interview with the fortnightly publication *Oko* (Zagreb), reported by the Yugoslav Telegraph Agency (TANJUG), Nov. 13, 1975.

[24] Pending congresses included those of the French, Soviet, Polish, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak parties; but it seems obvious that Azcárate was referring primarily to the 25th CPSU Congress, scheduled for late February 1976.

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near future, and which earlier had shown interest in having an early conference, now prefer to have it postponed. . . .

In any case, as far as we are concerned, this process of preparation is helping to reemphasize, in a new form, a very important principle: the independence of the Communist parties.[25]

A later statement by the British delegate Reuben Falber substantially confirmed Azcárate's account. He indicated that the basic confrontation had all along been between the parties pressing for "a document which could be interpreted as laying down a general line" and those opposed to such a pronunciamento. At the October session "agreement appeared to have been reached . . . providing for a final document which would be limited in scope and [which would] primarily deal with united action in carrying forward the struggle for peace and détente in Europe." The British delegation therefore went to the November session "hopeful that the final draft would then be agreed and the date fixed for an early conference. The whole character of the document, however, was again called into question. Some wanted it shortened and still more limited in scope, while others favored a more extensive and basic document." [26]

There were other, less direct allusions to the reverses at the November session. In an interview in *L'Unità* of November 23, Giancarlo Pajetta elaborated on the PCI's known positions, saying of the November meeting only that it had not had "a positive result" and that there was still "a long way to go." A statement by the Yugoslav chief delegate Aleksandar Grlickov was significant precisely because it ignored the November session. Without referring to the clearly controversial draft text submitted to the session by the East Germans—their fourth such effort—Grlickov noted that the *third* East German draft, produced at the October meeting, had "for the first time provided a working basis for all participants . . . since the chief element of discord was eliminated. This element was the discussion of issues—which, after all, are not part of the agenda and which refer to ideological problems in the Communist movement—that are more or less known to be issues in dispute." The fact that the preparatory process had been so prolonged, he suggested, "is in itself proof of the efforts being made to express the interests, concepts, and policies of all parties." [27] This studied optimism was the more striking because of the contrast with the stand taken



Vadim Zagladin, a Candidate Member of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, who represented the CPSU in the final stage of preparations for the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties.

—Sven Simon via Katherine Young.

[25] "Conference of the Communist Parties of Europe: A Declaration by M. Azcárate," *Mundo obrero* (no place of publication given), Nov. 25, 1975. The Dec. 2 issue of the British CP daily, *Morning Star*, published almost the complete text of Azcárate's statement; no other East or West European party newspaper seems to have mentioned it.

[26] *Morning Star*, Dec. 19, 1975.

[27] Interview with the editorial staff of *Komunist* (Belgrade), reported by TANJUG, Nov. 30, 1975. Grlickov serenely took it for granted that interparty differences were now such that the elaboration of "joint strategy and tactics for Communist parties—and even the very idea of harmonizing their foreign policies—is today an anachronism."

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by less official Yugoslav commentators.[28] The Yugoslavs, it seemed, had decided to treat the November draft as a merely temporary deviation from a consensus-paved path to which the pro-Soviet majority would be obliged to return because of the unyielding stand of the independent parties.

This confidence was not groundless. In December, there occurred another shift in Soviet position, back toward a "softer" line. These successive shifts, indicative of uncertainty in the Kremlin, could be connected with changes in the CPSU delegation: at the October meeting, the chief delegate had been Boris Ponomarëv; in November, he was replaced by Konstantin Katushev; and in December, the latter was in turn replaced by an ascendant protégé of Brezhnev, Vadim Zagladin. A few days before the December 16-19 session of the "editorial group," Zagladin flew to Rome for what appears to have been a "turning point" meeting with leaders of the PCI. "Informed" reports from various capitals subsequently indicated that in these talks Zagladin expressed the CPSU's willingness to drop controversial ("programmatic") sections of the November draft and to reconsider passages dealing with certain debatable issues (*e.g.*, the relationship between the blocs, an analysis of the situation in Western Europe, and the Communist parties' relations with other forces).[29]

Even on this basis, however, progress toward a consensual document would be slow (a "marathon" editorial session on January 13-22, 1976, evidently brought agreement on much of the text, but left major issues unsettled).[30]

The Emergence of Eurocommunism

In the meantime the prolonged confrontation over the conference document had helped to develop among the major Western Communist leaderships an increased awareness of convergent interests—and of their ability to band together in defense of those interests. Of special importance here was the dramatic change which took place in the positions of the traditionally loyalist French CP in late 1975 and early 1976. The shift was marked by a more emphatic commitment to pluralistic democracy and civic liberties—and by a consequent, sometimes almost ostentatious, readiness to criticize the Soviet regime, which led to unprecedented polemical exchanges between the PCF and the CPSU.

The change in the French Communists' posture took place within the framework of preparations for their 22nd Congress (scheduled for February 4-8, 1976) and was accompanied by the emergence of a strategic alliance between the French, Italian, and Spanish CP's. This alliance was formalized by the adoption of bilateral communiqués proclaiming the parties' commitment to the pluralistic-libertarian ideals of what was soon to be known as "Eurocommunism."[31] The PCI-PCF statement, which Berlinguer and Marchais issued in mid-November 1975 after talks in Rome, could justly be termed a manifesto of Eurocommunism. It committed the two CP's to support "for the plurality of political parties, for the right to existence and activity of opposition parties, and for democratic alternation between the majority and the minority." The eventual building of a socialist order in Italy and France would be characterized by "a continued democratization of economic, social, and political life," while existing bourgeois liberties would be "guaranteed and developed." The statement went on: "This goes for freedom of thought and expression, of the press, of assembly and association, of demonstration, for free circulation of persons at home and abroad, for inviolability of private life, for religious freedom." It also pledged "complete freedom of expression for

[28] For example, in a Radio Zagreb broadcast on Dec. 15, 1975, Milika Sundic charged that "some parties want the end of the conference to be accompanied by the publication of a 'strong' communiqué containing some obligations for all parties," and called this "a deviation from what had been agreed on at the beginning of the preparations." In an earlier broadcast of Dec. 10, Sundic was even more direct: criticizing Leonid Brezhnev by name, he assailed the CPSU's insistence that "there is only one way to socialism and only one acceptable prescription for cooperation, particularly for the socialist countries."

[29] Reporting "the new Soviet *volte-face*" in a dispatch from Moscow published in *Le Monde* (Paris), Dec. 30, 1975, Jacques Amalric said of the harder-line November draft: "Moscow demanded in effect that the document . . . solemnly condemn 'the hegemonic pretensions of the United States over Western Europe' and denounce 'the dangers that NATO poses for the European socialist community.' The Soviet Union also demanded that the final document give a very restrictive definition of the leftist alliances in which the Western Communists could take part."

[30] After the ten-day January session, the Yugoslav delegate Grlickov told Austrian journalists that there had been no agreement yet on the principles of interparty relations, the role of nonaligned countries, relations between Communist and Social Democratic parties, disarmament, and the assessment of "the crisis of modern capitalism" (Reuters and AFP reports from Vienna, Feb. 1, 1976). The list could obviously have been extended—*e.g.*, to the assessment of NATO and the EEC, or to such concepts as "anti-Sovietism" and "proletarian internationalism."

[31] The November 1975 communiqué (PCI-PCF) was preceded by a similar PCI-PCE statement in July 1975, and followed by a PCF-PCE communiqué later in November.

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all currents of philosophical, cultural, and artistic opinion." Within a regional and not merely national context, the two parties vowed to promote "the common action of the Communist and Socialist parties, of all the democratic and progressive forces of [Western] Europe." [32]

The sincerity of these pluralistic/libertarian commitments could be questioned (and was widely questioned, particularly in France). The present point, however, is that the PCF-PCI manifesto represented an implicit challenge to the East European regimes—and one which the PCF soon made explicit. The French Communists were already embarked on a course of cautious criticism of the Soviet handling of internal dissidence. On November 1, *L'Humanité* expressed editorial concern over the fate of the Soviet dissident Leonid Plyusch, reportedly interned in a psychiatric clinic; if this were true, the editorial intoned, the PCF would register "total disapproval." [33] On November 12, PCF Politburo member Jean Kanapa indicated disagreement in *L'Humanité*'s pages with the Soviet refusal to grant Andrey Sakharov an exit visa to collect his Nobel Peace Prize: "Liberties are indivisible, and include in particular freedom of movement as well as freedom to publish all writings." A more decisive step toward criticism of Soviet repressive policies came on December 12, when the PCF Politburo issued a statement expressing its "most formal reprobation" of Soviet labor camps, as depicted in a television documentary film which the Politburo clearly accepted as genuine.[34]

Other issues, notably the PCF's abandonment of the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat, added fuel to the polemical flames, but the PCF obviously relied on recurrent criticism of Soviet repression as the most crucial tactic in its image-building campaign to sell "socialism in French colors." "Socialism is synonymous with liberty," Marchais told an interviewer on January 7. "This idea is valid in all countries, under all circumstances. . . . There is a divergence between us and the CPSU with regard to socialist democracy." [35] Despite taunts from the French Socialists, the Communists would not, however, go a logical step further to conclude that where liberty was violated, as in the USSR, true socialism did not exist.[36] The new look had its limitations.

The new posture of demonstrative independence was emphasized at the 22nd PCF Congress in early February, when Marchais explicitly criticized Soviet repression in his opening speech. Referring to "certain developments in the Soviet Union," he said:

We cannot admit that the Communist ideal . . . should be stained by unjust and unjustifiable acts. . . . This is why we express our disagreement when violations of human rights occur in a country that made its socialist revolution 58 years ago.[37]

Events at the CPSU Congress

A few weeks later, the 25th Congress of the CPSU gave Marchais another chance to draw attention to the widening gap between the two parties—by declining to attend in person. In a radio interview on February 27, he said that he had made this unprecedented decision "because there is a divergence between our two parties on the problems of socialist democracy . . . [and also] on the evaluation of French foreign policy." Then, when asked about the prospect of a meeting between himself and Brezhnev, he went significantly further: "The conditions for such a meeting do not exist today, and for the moment there is no question of it." [38]

In place of Marchais, PCF Politburo member Gaston Plissonnier headed the French delegation to

[32] *L'Humanité* and *L'Unità*, Nov. 18, 1975. The pattern of bilateral "Eurocommunist" communiqués was later extended to several minor West European parties (e.g., the British), as well as to the distant Japanese CP. At its congress in July 1976, the JCP went further along the road of doctrinal deviation than any West European party by eschewing not only the dictatorship of the proletariat but also "Marxism-Leninism"—the latter being replaced by "scientific socialism."

[33] In January 1976, after Georges Marchais had intervened with the Kremlin, Plyusch was released and allowed to go to Paris.

[34] *L'Humanité*, Dec. 13, 1975. Noting that "there have in fact been in the Soviet Union trials of citizens prosecuted for their political stands," the Politburo said that it was "against all repression affecting the rights of man, and notably the freedom of opinion, expression, and publication."

[35] *Le Monde*, Jan. 9, 1976.

[36] In a report on the "evolution" of the PCF issued in late January 1976, a national secretary of the Socialist Party, Lionel Jospin, said that condemnation of Soviet labor camps did not constitute a "real turning point" in PCF-CPSU relations: this would come only if French Communist leaders were to "draw the logical conclusions from what they are affirming" and state that "since freedom is synonymous with socialism, there is no socialism where there is no freedom." *Ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1976.

[37] *L'Humanité*, Feb. 6, 1976. The same day's issue of the Czechoslovak organ *Rude pravo* (Prague) carried an editorial which, without mentioning the PCF, denounced the rejection of the doctrine of the dictatorship of the proletariat as "rightist revisionism," saying that those who disavowed the doctrine could not be called socialists.

[38] *L'Humanité*, Feb. 28, 1976.

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An exchange of views between the Italian and Soviet CP's in Moscow at the time of the 25th Congress. From the left: Boris N. Ponomarëv, CPSU Secretary and Candidate Member of the Politburo; CPSU General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev; Enrico Berlinguer, Secretary-General of the Italian Communist Party; and Mikhail A. Suslov, CPSU Secretary and Politburo Member.

—V. Musaelyan/TASS via Sovfoto.

the Soviet congress. His address—delivered February 28—was unprovocative, but it was followed by a rather theatrical challenge. After speaking to the congress, Plissonnier led his delegation to the Kremlin press center to give a press conference at which he declared:

The abandonment of the notion of the dictatorship of the proletariat [by the PCF] is not negotiable. . . . We have not come to Moscow to negotiate. . . . As for proletarian internationalism, if this is reduced to a mere identity of views among Communist parties, it would be better to finish quickly with this rudimentary form. . . . The PCF does not share Leonid Brezhnev's assessment of French foreign policy.[39]

The other two major Eurocommunist parties also used the 25th Congress, in instructively different ways, to reaffirm their positions. Like Marchais, Santiago Carrillo of the Spanish CP did not attend the congress (in his place the aged President Dolores Ibárruri, resident in Moscow, delivered an unprovocative speech). Instead, he went to Rome with a delegation of other Spanish opposition leaders for talks with Italian politicians, serenely explaining that this was "more important." While in Rome, he gave the Milan newspaper *Corriere della sera* an interview in which he expressed very outspoken views about the Soviet regime and its relations with the Western parties.[40] Soviet socialism, Carrillo said, was "in the primitive stage," and Western socialism, when it came, would have to be profoundly different: "In the West we can have socialism only if the democratic and pluralistic systems are respected, and if it is based on majority consensus, with a readiness to give up power if this majority ceases to exist." Asked if he did not fear that this idea of communism would be condemned by Moscow, he replied: "By what right could they condemn us? They can criticize us, as we criticize them. Condemnation is excommunication from a church, and the Communist movement was a church but now no longer is one."

Berlinguer of the PCI, on the other hand, did attend the congress—and used the occasion to present the PCI's Eurocommunist positions, offering some very challenging formulations (without, how-

[39] *Le Monde*, March 2, 1976. It may be noted that these provocative remarks were not reported in *L'Humanité* in the covering dispatch of March 1, which merely said that Plissonnier and Kanapa had again put forward the views of the PCF at the Moscow press conference.

[40] Giovanni Russo, "The Eurocommunism of Santiago Carrillo," *Corriere della sera* (Milan), Feb. 26, 1976.

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ever, criticizing his hosts).[41] Subsequently, Berlinguer met Brezhnev, Mikhail Suslov, and Ponomarëv for an "exchange of opinions" on the Communist movement, *inter alia*. The joint communiqué was unrevealing, but the key sentence bore an "Italian" stamp: "The common wish was expressed to continue broadening internationalist cooperation between the two parties on the basis of fraternal friendship and reciprocal respect for their independence"—no mention of proletarian internationalism.[42] While the French seemed to feel the need to draw repeated attention to a newly-assumed posture of independence, the Italians could strengthen a substantive independence gradually developed over two decades by acting *suaviter in modo, fortiter in re*.

On the Soviet side, Ponomarëv and especially Suslov must have signed the PCI-CPSU communiqué with more reluctance than Brezhnev; for by this time, there was growing evidence of difference and uncertainty in the Kremlin over how to deal with the conference project and the related challenge posed by Eurocommunist ideas. A survey of the congress speeches strengthened this impression.[43]

Continuing Confrontations

The developing debate between loyalists and Eurocommunists found more explicit expression before and after the 25th Congress in statements and articles by regime spokesmen—notably, Soviet, East German, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak[44]—and in Western Communist reactions. The debate generally concerned such doctrinal issues as proletarian internationalism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, and "general laws" for the building of socialism. Another controversial question was the extent to which Western Communist parties should seek political progress through alliances with other forces. But behind these lay a more basic issue: the challenge to Soviet authority posed by major Western parties increasingly determined to give priority to their own political interests over those of the Kremlin and to reinforce their claim to independence by selective criticism of Soviet policies. This challenge was the more significant in that it came at a time when the Soviets were making obvious efforts to strengthen integration among the East European regimes in many areas—a fact that had much to do with the vigorous Yugoslav interventions in the debate on the side of the independent Western parties.[45]

Against this background of generally indirect ideological polemics, preparations for the pan-European summit made fitful headway in the early months of 1976. After the ten-day editorial session in January, when the fifth East German draft was discussed, there was growing evidence that the tide was now flowing in favor of the independent parties. In a *Rinascita* article of early February, the Italian delegate Antonio Rubbi claimed that agreement had been reached on "the fundamental lines" of the document, although "there still remain questions to be clarified and discussed." [46] He pointed to one of these questions in criticizing Soviet and East German spokesmen who saw in solidarity with the USSR/

[41] Berlinguer—whose speech was published in full in *Pravda* (Moscow)—said that his party was working for an Italian foreign policy "which, *within the framework of the international alliances of our country (i.e.,* NATO and the EEC), would make an active contribution to détente and firmly defend the sovereignty of the Italian people against *any foreign interference* in our internal affairs"; the PCI, he added, was struggling to achieve a "pluralistic and democratic" socialist society which would guarantee "all the individual and collective liberties, [including] religious liberties and freedom of culture, the arts, and science," *L'Unità*, Feb. 28, 1976. Emphasis added.

[42] *Ibid.*, March 2, 1976.

[43] Brezhnev himself was unabrasive in his emphasis on "proletarian internationalism" and "general laws" and in his veiled warnings against "concessions to opportunism" *(Pravda,* Feb. 25, 1976); but other Soviet speakers were more direct in their attacks on "right-wing opportunism" and on "attempts to 'modernize' Marxism . . . and to cut it up into national slices" (P. Masherov, alternate Politburo member, quoted in *ibid.*, Feb. 26). On the other hand, as the congress opened, *Novoye vremya* (Moscow) published an article in which Vadim Zagladin spoke approvingly of the diversity of ways to socialism as being advantageous to the USSR; his only stipulation was that "one must not throw away the baby with the bathwater, and socialism, notwithstanding all its diversity, must remain socialism." Reported in *L'Unità*, Feb. 28, 1976.

[44] Czechoslovak CC Secretary Josef Kempny was particularly outspoken in a speech criticizing "the transformation of Marxist-Leninist parties into opportunistic parties of a Social-Democratic nature." *Nova svoboda* (Ostrava), March 15, 1976.

[45] One interesting example of the Yugoslav-Eurocommunist alliance may be noted. In mid-March 1976 a booklet attacking "revisionism" and "opportunism" was published in Moscow. The author was one Venyamin Midtsev, an obscure "collaborator" of the foreign affairs section of the CC-CPSU, who made his target clear by devoting a third of the work to criticism of the PCI ideologist Luciano Gruppi. An editorial in *L'Unità* (March 19, 1976) scornfully refuted Midtsev's "aberrant" dogmatism. But the Yugoslav reaction was even more vigorous: on March 23, commentaries on Radio Zagreb and Radio Belgrade denounced the booklet as an attempt to impose on other Communist parties "the theory of limited sovereignty."

[46] A. Rubbi, "Interpretations and Reality," *Rinascita*, Feb. 6, 1976. A few days earlier, in an interview in *Le Nouvel observateur* of Feb. 2, Giancarlo Pajetta had said that the draft document was "now ready," and that "nothing has been decided that is contrary to our preoccupations or to what we judge it necessary to affirm through such a conference."

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CPSU the essence of proletarian internationalism, or held that the European conference should declare that "there cannot be an anti-Soviet communism or a communism turned against existing socialism, against the Warsaw Pact, against Comecon and the community of socialist countries" (quoted by Rubbi from an article by V. Korionov in *Pravda* of January 24, 1976). Rubbi put forward a compromise formula (which would be substantially adopted in the final document), stressing the need to distinguish between the "*a priori* anticommunism" of imperialists and reactionaries and "criticism of individual aspects and particular or even fundamental choices of the socialist countries."

A more revealing account was given by Sergio Segre in his report to a PCI Central Committee commission in mid-February. Segre said that, although work still remained to be done, "the agreement that now seems to be taking shape on the draft document agreed upon at the Berlin meetings of December and January is consistent with the stand defended from the first by the PCI." This stand, he went on, "had as a premise the fact that a document acceptable to all could only be one that identified the points of convergence, without claiming to delineate general lines and strategies, to take on a binding character, or to tackle themes—such as ideological [issues]—on which there exist diverse and divergent positions." [47]

Another preparatory meeting took place on March 16-18, and ended with the announcement that the results would be "discussed at a session of the Editorial Commission." The change in nomenclature indicated again (as it had, deceptively, in October-November 1975) that considerable progress had been made toward an agreed text.

Shortly afterward, however, there came reports that such progress had been put in question by a new development—a memorandum presented by the French delegation at the mid-March session. The reports from Belgrade, Moscow, and Paris all told substantially the same story.[48] The memorandum reportedly criticized the current draft for its lack of a "class analysis": it demanded a more militant document, with particular reference to the "crisis of capitalism" and its consequences for Western Communist parties. The reports also linked the memorandum with the PCF's current criticism of Soviet attitudes on French foreign policy. Finally, the memorandum warned (and the PCF later confirmed) that the French had not yet decided whether to attend the conference.

As these plausible reports indicated, the lines of confrontation on various issues had become more complex as the unprecedented debate developed, often cutting across the familiar division into "centralizers" and "autonomists." Thus, if the French now joined the Italians, Spanish, and Yugoslavs in emphasizing independence, they strongly disagreed with them on other important questions—notably, on NATO.

Nevertheless, the central issue was still whether the new rule of consensus would prevail. In a three-part interview in a Yugoslav newspaper at the end of April, Grlickov was officially confident that it would; because of the progress made, he said, there now existed "realistic possibilities for the conference to be held in June." [49]

At the Editorial Commission session on May 4-6, the ironing-out of remaining differences continued: the communiqué said that the "final" meeting of the commission would be in early June and that the conference itself could take place "in the near future." But there were still clouds around the summit. On May 12, Grlickov reported to the LCY Executive Committee that "an important step forward" had been made in coordinating views on certain parts of the draft through "satisfactory formulations," but that the questions on which agreement had *not* been reached were mainly "issues of principled and fundamental significance." [50] A few days before, he had expressed the hope that the remaining problems would be "solved" at the session in early June—adding that in this connection he expected "other parties to take the LCY's position into account, *and to accept it.*" [51]

[47] *L'Unità*, Feb. 14, 1976. Another indication of concessions being made to the independent parties came from Jean Terfve of the Belgian CP. In an interview about the 25th CPSU Congress, he said that the Soviets accepted "without great difficulty" the idea that Western CPs could develop a "unitary strategy," adding: "This is, by the way, said explicity, with the agreement of all, in the document drawn up in the course of the preparations for the conference. . . . As to whether [the Soviets] accept this strategy with enthusiasm, that is another question." *Le Drapeau rouge* (Brussels), March 12, 1976.

[48] See AFP dispatch from Belgrade, March 23, 1976; Paolo Garimberti's report from Moscow in *La Stampa* (Turin), March 27, 1976; Jacques Amalric's report from Moscow in *Le Monde*, March 28-29, 1976. It should be noted, however, that some weeks later a PCF Politburo statement (of May 21, 1976) denied an AFP report that the French party had proposed certain "tough" amendments to the conference document, calling the report "entirely imaginary."

[49] *Nova Makedonija* (Skopje), April 30, May 1 and 2, 1976.

[50] *Borba* (Belgrade), May 13, 1976. Grlickov was presumably referring primarily to the continuing dispute over proletarian internationalism and "anti-Sovietism," but perhaps also to the difficulties posed by the PCF's stand.

[51] *Politika* (Belgrade), May 8, 1976. Emphasis added.

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In late May, the last act of the long drama was heralded by a flurry of interparty diplomacy, involving bilateral communiqués by the independent parties and Soviet visits to Bucharest and Belgrade. Of decisive importance were the talks which Katushev had in Belgrade with LCY Secretary Stane Dolanc at the beginning of June. According to a Yugoslav source, "Brezhnev's messenger ended by unexpectedly accepting all the demands which until that moment the Soviets had opposed." [52] On the eve of the conference, Grlickov confirmed that at the May session the LCY presented "seven decisive amendments . . . on which we particularly insisted," implying that they had eventually been accepted. One, dealing with proletarian internationalism, "was concerned with whether it was possible to describe any one country as a major factor, or the main force";[53] the implicit reference to the Soviet Union was obvious.

The final session of the Editorial Commission adopted the consensual text (produced by Soviet acceptance of the Yugoslav demands) on June10-11, before adjourning until June 24. This last interval was allowed to let the individual party leaderships give formal approval to the final draft—but perhaps also to await the outcome of the Italian parliamentary election of June 20, which clearly could have affected the timing of the conference had the results propelled the PCI into negotiations to participate in a coalition government. While this did not come about, the PCI got an unprecedented 33.7 percent of the popular vote in the elections, only narrowly failing to overtake the Christian Democrats, and this near victory was an important factor in strengthening the positions of the independent parties vis-à-vis the Moscow loyalists. During the campaign preceding the election, the PCI was more outspoken than ever in proclaiming its autonomy and differentiating its stance from that of the loyalist parties. In a mid-June interview, for example, Berlinguer said that he had no fear of meeting the "unjust" fate of Dubcek because "we are in another area of the world"; and, asked whether NATO could constitute a "useful shield" for the construction of socialism in liberty, he readily agreed: "I feel more secure being on this side." Again, on the eve of the elections *L'Unità* (June 18) published a letter which unidentified leaders of the Prague Spring had sent to the PCI, praising its commitment to a socialist order based on pluralistic democracy, and saying that its positions helped East Europeans who wanted "a socialistic society in which there no longer exist inequalities, privileges, and injustices"—a reminder of the relevance of Eurocommunist ideas for the "socialist opposition" in the East.

[52] Quoted in Frane Barbieri's dispatch from Belgrade, published in *Il Giornale*, June 20, 1976. See also François Fejtö's report from Belgrade in *ibid.*, July 17, 1976, giving what are said to be extracts from the protocol of the talks.

[53] Radio Belgrade television interview, June 26, 1976. In a conversation with the author in September 1976, Sergio Segre of the PCI accepted the suggestion that Katushev's visit to Belgrade was "the final turning-point."

At Last, the Conference

When the delegates reassembled on June 24, it was to announce that the conference would take place on June 29-30. On the eve of the opening, Brezhnev and Tito held private talks in East Berlin. There was an irony of history here, for that day was the 28th anniversary of the Cominform's "excommunication" of Yugoslavia. Now the great heretic had returned to "conciliar communism" essentially on his own terms. After nearly two years of complex interparty confrontations, the newly promoted Marshal Brezhnev had been outmaneuvered by that indomitable veteran, Marshal Tito.

Yugoslavia's Tito and the Soviet Union's Brezhnev confer on June 28, 1976, in East Berlin on the eve of the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties, the first such gathering attended by Tito since his break with Moscow in 1948.

—Alain Nogues/Sygma.

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Consensus, of course, involved concessions on both sides; nevertheless, it seems indisputable that, with regard to the conference document, the independent parties had their way on almost every major point.[54] It was a lowest-common-denominator text based on the new principle of consensus, itself a formal recognition of the equality and autonomy of all Communist parties; it contained no criticism of the Chinese and no praise of the Soviets; it dealt with political action and not with ideology; and it was not binding upon the participants (in fact, it was not even signed by any of them). The victory of the independent parties on these central issues was emphasized by the unexpected arrival of a 29th delegation, that of the independent Dutch party, which had boycotted all the preparatory meetings. Thus, in the end the only absentees were the isolationist Icelanders and the intransigent Albanians.

The document was more important for what it did not say than for what it did say. Most striking was the fact that the sacrosanct formula, "proletarian internationalism," was omitted and replaced by a distinctly "Italian" formulation:

[Communist parties] will develop their internationalist, comradely and voluntary *cooperation and solidarity on the basis of the great ideas of Marx, Engels, and Lenin, strictly adhering to the principles of equality and the sovereign independence of each party, noninterference in internal affairs, and respect for their* free choice of different roads *in the struggle for* social change of a progressive nature *and for socialism.* (Emphasis added.)

Again, no special status was accorded the CPSU or the USSR. The only minor concession to tradition here was a reference to campaigns by imperialist and reactionary forces "against the Communist parties and the socialist countries, beginning with the Soviet Union"; and even this was qualified by a prior sentence with the Italian stamp: "The Communist parties do not consider all those who are not in agreement with their policies or who take a critical attitude toward their activity as being anti-Communists."[55] Also of note was the "Western" emphasis on Communist parties' dialogue and collaboration with "all other democratic forces, each of these forces fully retaining its identity and independence." Finally, for the first time in a collective Communist document, there was recognition of "the movement of nonaligned countries . . . [as] one of the most important factors in world politics"—an important point for the Yugoslavs.

It is true that the long list of political objectives was broadly in harmony with Soviet foreign policy goals. Still, one should remember that the differences between independent and conservative Communist parties are generally concerned not with foreign policy but with ideology, domestic policies, and interparty relations.[56]

The main interest of the conference, however, lay not in this largely anodyne text but in the "institutionalized diversity" of positions manifested in the speeches. Thus, loyalist speakers, having reluctantly agreed to the dropping of proletarian internationalism and the abandonment of special status for the CPSU/USSR, proceeded to insist on the continued validity of both. In this regard, Brezhnev himself was more subtle and flexible than, say, Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria or Yoldas Bilen of Turkey; and his performance at the conference could be viewed as, in part, a reassertion of his authority over ideological hardliners like Suslov.

At the other end of the spectrum, non-Communist journalists found their liveliest "copy" in the speeches of the Eurocommunist trio of Berlinguer, Marchais, and Carrillo.[57] The most provocative, to loyalist ears, was Carrillo: he explicitly rejected Soviet authority, made an obvious reference to former Soviet support for Enrique Lister's splinter party, and suggested that socialist states should set an example by withdrawing their troops from foreign countries.

The most complete statement of Eurocommunist positions came from Berlinguer, who called on all present to accept the qualitative change in interparty relations: "Methods which are now outdated

[54] The text of the document is published in *New Times* (Moscow), No. 28, July 1976, pp. 17-32.

[55] This formulation was significantly reminiscent of that used by Antonio Rubbi of the PCI in his *Rinascita* article of Feb. 6, 1976. Note that, while it apparently refers primarily to non-Communist criticism of Communist parties, it could also be taken to justify Western Communist criticism of East European regimes.

[56] For an interesting "balance sheet" of the conference, drawing broadly similar conclusions, see Heinz Timmermann, *Die Konferenz der europäischen Kommunisten in Ost-Berlin: Ergebnisse und Perspektiven* (The Conference of the European Communists in East Berlin: Result and Perspectives), Cologne, Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, No. 28, 1976.

[57] The 800-odd journalists covering the conference were able to follow the entire proceedings through closed-circuit television and to interview delegates, the holding of an "open" conference having been another basic demand of the independent parties.

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[must] be abandoned." The new methods he proposed included the free confrontation of ideas in open debate, with the consequent right of criticism (in this connection, he made the only public reference at the conference to the invasion of Czechoslovakia—a disappointing result for the former Prague Spring leaders who, like a group of Soviet dissidents, sent an open letter to the delegations protesting against regime repression).[58] Stressing that the Italian road to socialism lay "within the framework of the international alliances to which our country belongs" (*i.e.*, NATO and the EEC), he noted that other West European Communist parties now shared the PCI's perspective of a socialist society based upon "the principles of the secular, non-ideological nature of the state and its democratic organization; the plurality of political parties and the possibility of alternation of government majorities; the autonomy of trade unions; religious freedom; freedom of expression, of culture, and of the arts and sciences." [59]

If such an open display of radical divergences made the East Berlin conference the first of its kind, Marchais of the PCF suggested that it was also likely to be the last of its kind. "Conferences like this one do not appear to us to correspond any longer to the needs of our time," he said. "Since any elaboration of a strategy common to all our parties is henceforth absolutely ruled out, it seems opportune to seek new forms of collective encounters, more lively, flexible, and effective," which could produce frank discussion of topical problems, and would "not always end with the adoption of a document." [60] The French and the other independent parties made clear, too, their opposition to loyalist plans for a world Communist conference, which the Kremlin had obviously envisaged as a sequel to the European one.[61]

[58] Reported in *L'Unità*, June 30, 1976.

[59] *Ibid.*, July 1, 1976.

[60] *L'Humanité*, July 1, 1976.

[61] In September 1976, Sergio Segre of the PCI told the author that he thought the precedents established at the European conference (*e.g.*, consensus) would also apply to any future world meeting, adding that he believed the Soviets, as "realists," would quietly drop the world conference project since they knew that the major West European parties would not attend.

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The first day of the Conference of European Communist and Workers' Parties, June 29, 1976, in the Stadt Berlin Hotel of East Berlin. The two-day gathering was finally convened after two and a half years of complex negotiations. Delegations from 29 European Communist parties attended.

—Koard/ADN-Zentralbild via Eastfoto.

On balance, those observers who evaluated the conference as a victory for the independent parties were undoubtedly correct. But it is important not to overestimate the scope of that victory—as, for example, the dissident East German intellectual Robert Havemann did when he declared:

The great significance of the Berlin conference for European communism lies in this—that an end has been put to hegemonic efforts by one party. This hegemony of the CPSU has been removed not only from the parties of the capitalist West but from all parties, including those of the East.[62]

A first indication of the limitations of the autonomists' "victory" was provided by the blatant censorship which East European media applied—particularly with respect to Western Communist speakers—in their coverage of the conference[63] (the only exception was *Neues Deutschland*, which as "host organ" was obliged to publish all the speeches in full, as *Pravda* had at the Moscow international conference of 1969).

At the same time, these media, with Soviet journals in the lead, opened a campaign to present the conference in triumphal terms, as having strengthened the unity and cohesion of the Communist movement on the basis of proletarian internationalism; the Bulgarians were particularly zealous in arguing the corollary that the USSR "inevitably serves as the universal model for other socialist revolutions." [64]

The Yugoslavs reacted with polemical vigor to this "falsification of the consensus reached in Berlin," [65] but Western parties at first generally ignored signs of recidivism (although one PCI spokesman com-

[62] *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 5, 1976.

[63] See J. L. Kerr, "The Media and the European CP Conference: A Study in Selective Reporting," *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), RAD Report 171, Aug. 11, 1976.

[64] CC member N. Iribadzakov in *Rabotnichesko delo* (Sofia), Aug. 11, 1976.

[65] Vlado Teslic in *Borba* (Belgrade), Aug. 14, 1976. See Zdenko Antic, "Belgrade Attacks East European Views on Berlin CP Conference," *Radio Free Europe Research*, RAD Report 180, Aug. 18, 1976.

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plained about "partial and sometimes distorted interpretations" [66]).

However, as the clearly regime-inspired polemics continued, with criticism of "opportunism," "bourgeois democracy," and "anti-Sovietism," and a corresponding insistence on "general laws," the French CP launched a counterattack. In mid-October, it sent Pierre Juquin to a rally demanding the release of several political prisoners in the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Latin America; speaking for the party, he declared: "We shall never accept that methods in violation of human rights should be used in any country in the name of socialism." [67] And when Hungarian Politburo member Deso Nemes argued that any socialist regime, "irrespective of the national form it assumes," must perform "the historic function of the dictatorship of the proletariat," Jean Kanapa of the PCF rejected the East European model as irrelevant to French conditions and did so in offensive terms:

If one considers that in order to install socialism in France it is necessary to have recourse to the dictatorship of the proletariat, as was done in Hungary (and also in the Soviet Union and elsewhere), [then] it is necessary to state that one must ban opposition parties, establish censorship, deprive part of the population of the freedoms of expression, association, demonstration, etc., and one must tell the French workers, "This is one of the consequences of what the Communists propose to you," because the dictatorship of the proletariat, no matter what its form, is exactly (not entirely, but exactly) this.[68]

The divergence of political interests that lay behind such polemical exchanges was clear enough. On the French side of the Kanapa-Nemes clash, there was an obvious effort to build up the PCF's electoral credibility by dissociating it from unpopular practices of the Communist regimes, and also to strengthen its position vis-à-vis its Socialist ally/rival. On the East European side, a factor of growing importance was the obvious concern of authoritarian regimes over the "subversive" effect of Western Communist ideas on their populations. That effect was already being evidenced in the welcome given to Eurocommunist ideas and positions by East European dissidents in a position to do so—*e.g.*, Andrey Sakharov and Roy Medvedev of the USSR, Robert Havemann and Wolf Biermann of the GDR, or Edward Lipinski and Adam Michnik of Poland. The only Communist leader, East or West, who has spoken forthrightly about this important but sensitive factor is Carrillo of the Spanish CP. In an interview given (provocatively) to the Italian dissident-Communist daily, *Il Manifesto,* he said there should be no illusions about the fact that the USSR would "view with concern" the emergence in Western Europe of pluralistic socialist regimes "not dependent upon the USSR itself, and [with] a political structure different from that of the peoples' democracies. There is no doubt that the latter will look more and more toward [West] European models of socialism, if we reach that point." [69]

A Challenge with Limits

The challenge which Western Communist ideas pose to Soviet authority and to Soviet interests is therefore obvious enough. But this challenge has limitations which it is also important to recognize.

First, if Eurocommunism is a regional phenomenon of sociopolitical adaptation which affects virtually all West European CP's to some degree—as evidenced by the Brussels conference of 18 West European parties in January 1974 and by the frequent thematic conferences which have been taking place since late 1973—the explicit challenge comes from a handful of parties, and mainly from the "Big Three" of Italy, France, and Spain. Other Western parties do not go so far.[70]

Secondly, even the most independent and "revisionist" of the Western parties are concerned—as they seek *alliances de convenance* with Social Democratic forces—to maintain their identity as *Communist* parties, as national components of the inter-

[66] A. Rubbi, "Berlin, Beyond the Polemics," *Rinascita,* July 30, 1976.

[67] *L'Humanité,* Oct. 22, 1976. The rally at which Juquin spoke was organized by a committee of French mathematicians campaigning specifically for the liberation of two Soviet, one Czech, and three Latin American political prisoners. Rejecting Soviet and Czechoslovak criticism of Juquin's participation in "this dirty enterprise" (TASS), the PCF reprinted 7 million copies of his speech.

[68] *France nouvelle,* Oct. 5, 1976. Kanapa was replying to Nemes' article in *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (September 1976) on the "lessons" that Western Communists should draw from Hungarian experience.

[69] *Il Manifesto,* Nov. 1, 1975.

[70] For example, the Danish CP dropped the formula of the dictatorship of the proletariat at its congress in September 1976, as the Portuguese CP had done two years earlier—but neither would think of making this a ground for disputes with the ruling parties, as the French have.

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national revolutionary movement. While endeavoring to extend their autonomy, they want to avoid anything like an open break with Moscow;[71] and this, in turn, sets limits on their critical independence. Dissident Communists like Roger Garaudy and Pierre Daix of France, or Franz Marek of Austria, may urge the Western CP's to undertake thoroughgoing analyses of the Eastern regimes and to draw the conclusion that the latter are *not* socialist—but they urge in vain.[72] Again, the differentiated character of the criticism by the Western CP's weakens the claim that it is principled: contrast the PCI's championing of imprisoned leaders of the Prague Spring with its embarrassed reaction to the shooting of an Italian Communist truck driver at the Berlin Wall in July 1976, or the PCF's criticism of Soviet treatment of political prisoners with its failure to respond to the persecution of Polish workers after the Ursus-Radom riots of June 1976. It is to be noted, too, that the most thoroughgoing criticism directed at the regimes concerns not the present but the past, and especially the Stalinist past.[73]

Furthermore, as noted earlier, the independent Western CP's generally support the USSR on issues of foreign policy; and this is of importance to a Soviet leadership that fairly obviously puts *raison d'état* before *raison d'idéologie*. On this level, however, some significant departures from the pattern are to be noted. The line of the Italian and Spanish parties on NATO and the EEC is now strikingly deviant. Since its 14th Congress in March 1975, the PCI has officially opposed any "unilateral change" in the East-West power—a stipulation which is explicitly applied not only to Italy's membership in NATO but also to Yugoslavia's nonalignment. As for the Spanish CP, its foreign affairs spokesman, Manuel Azcárate, has said that "the problem of the US bases [in Spain] can be solved only in the process of overcoming the blocs," and that entry into the EEC is the "only alternative" for a democratic Spain.[74] Finally, the PCF now publicly criticizes the Kremlin on one key issue—its benign attitude toward President Giscard d'Estaing's foreign policies. In all three instances, the element of political opportunism is obvious—as is the fact that on most foreign policy issues the three parties habitually support the Soviet line[75]—but then, Eurocommunism might be described as the tendency for Western CP's to give priority to their own political interests in the course of adaptation to their sociopolitical environments.

It is precisely because of this tendency that the major West European parties—with the exception of the deeply-divided Finnish CP, coping with its internal conflict in the geopolitical shadow of the Soviet regime—seek to maintain and if possible extend their freedom of maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow. This was recently demonstrated by their reactions to the death of Mao Tse-tung. Both *L'Unità* and *L'Humanité* devoted four pages to the passing of what Marchais called "one of the greatest figures in history."[76] The French Communist tributes were particularly significant in that the PCF's attitude to Maoism had been, until shortly before Mao's death, one of vigorous criticism.[77] Now the French were concerned not only to play down this past hostility but to indicate a readiness for rapprochement with the Chinese—a move the Spanish and Italian parties had already made.[78] "We profoundly regretted that

[71] Exceptions are the Dutch and Icelandic CP's, which for years have in effect had no relations with the CPSU and other ruling parties.

[72] It is significant that the most radical indictment of the East European regimes produced by the PCI's publishing house was written by a dissident Polish Communist (in exile). See Wlodzimierz Brus, *Sistema politico e proprietà sociale nel socialismo* (The Political System and Social Characteristics of Socialism), Rome, Editori Riuniti, 1974.

[73] Of some interest, Italian and French Communist writers have recently produced notably objective histories of the Soviet Union under Stalin. See Giuseppe Boffa, *Storia dell'Unione Sovietica* (The History of the Soviet Union), Rome, Mondadori, 1976; Jean Elleinstein, *Histoire du phénomène stalinien* (History of the Stalinist Phenomenon), Paris, Grasset, 1975, and his four-volume *Histoire de l'U.R.S.S.* (History of the USSR), 2nd ed., Paris, Editions sociales, 1972-75.

[74] Statements made at a private meeting of poitical scientists and politicians in Cologne in October 1975, at which the writer was present. It may be noted that Spanish-Italian-Yugoslav resistance was probably responsible for the omission from the European conference document of the customary attacks on the US and NATO.

[75] In conversations with "leading PCI policymakers" Michael Ledeen recently "asked them to describe the conflicts, if any, between their party and the Soviet Union in the area of foreign policy. They answered with a single voice: no such conflicts exist." See his "The Soviet Connection," *Commentary* (New York), November 1976, pp. 51-54.

[76] See issues of Sept. 10, 1976.

[77] At the 22nd PCF Congress in February 1976, Marchais—while stressing the party's new independence of the Kremlin and criticizing Soviet repression—was still denouncing the "profoundly reactionary . . . senseless and dangerous" policies of Peking. *L'Humanité*, Feb. 5, 1976.

[78] In September 1971 Secretary-General Carrillo led a PCE delegation to Peking in a not very successful attempt to resume normal relations with the Chinese CP. A month before Mao's death, Giancarlo Pajetta revealed that on that occasion Carrillo took with him a message from the PCI, "to let them know that we desired meetings with leaders of the Chinese CP, in Italy or in China" (*L'Unità*, Aug. 11, 1976). The offer was ignored—as were other Italian Communist approaches to Peking, made through the Romanians and the Vietnamese—but Pajetta made clear that it still stood.

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these divergences changed our relations," said the PCF Central Committee's message of condolences to Peking. "This was not our doing, and it is not our desire." [79]

Equally significant was the mild reaction of the PCI and PCF, particularly the latter, to the Chinese rejection of their condolence messages. Jean Kanapa said that this would not change the PCF's "deep-rooted conviction that, no matter how grave our divergences may be, they should not result in a deterioration of relations . . . and that in future another form of relations between our parties can be established—relaxed, comprehensive, and friendly." [80] This benign response strengthened the impression that the Franco-Italian "signals" to Peking were primarily prompted not by the hope of renewing relations with the Chinese but by the desire to affirm PCI-PCF autonomy vis-à-vis the Soviets—in short, less a move toward Peking than a move away from Moscow. Thus, when Sergio Segre was questioned about the affair, he dismissed the suggestion that the PCI still kept up "a special, or at least preferential, relationship with Moscow," and added: "If there is a priority in the development of our relationships, today this clearly applies to parties in the geographical area facing problems similar to those of Italy—not only Communist parties but also Socialist and Social Democratic parties." [81]

Political developments in Italy, France, and Spain will surely continue to strengthen this tendency; accordingly, one may also expect a continuation of intermittent polemics between the major Western CP's and Eastern regimes, whether on ideological questions or through Western Communist reactions to image-harming events in the East. But the Eurocommunist parties, as argued earlier, have no interest in severing relations with the ruling parties. It is therefore most unlikely that they will go beyond sporadic, dissociating criticism to anything like a thoroughgoing analysis of the failings of the Eastern regimes.[82]

On the other hand, the CPSU, while clearly concerned about the destabilizing influence of Western Communist ideas on the East European bloc, would also seem to have no interest in a serious deterioration of relations with these parties—the more so since the challenge of Eurocommunism is not posed only, or even primarily, to Soviet authority.[83] For its developing role in strategically important countries of Southern Europe has made Eurocommunism a factor of growing, if still largely potential, importance in what the Kremlin may hope will eventually lead to the controlled destabilization of the adversary NATO alliance. But that is another story.

[79] *L'Humanité*, Sept. 10, 1976.

[80] *Le Monde*, Sept. 17, 1976.

[81] *Corriere della sera*, Sept. 15, 1976. Cf. Santiago Carrillo's statement in an interview in *La Stampa* of Dec. 14, 1975: "Contacts with the state parties of the East can remain; there can be cooperative relations; but the priority lies in the West."

[82] The small British CP has perhaps come nearest to encouraging open debate on these regimes. In January 1975 its monthly organ, *Marxism Today* (London), carried a 27-page anti-Stalinist article by former General Secretary John Gollan, and "discussion contributions" by readers were invited. The debate opened in the March issue and was still going on in November—generally with a monthly "ration" of two letters criticizing the Soviet regime and one defending it.

[83] See Heinz Timmermann, "Eurocommunism—A Challenge for East and West," *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), December 1976, pp. 1276-98.

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The PCP and the Portuguese Revolution

By Eusebio M. Mujal-Leon

On April 25, 1974, following the military coup d'état which overthrew the regime of Marcello Caetano, the Portuguese Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Português*—PCP) emerged from nearly 50 years of clandestinity. For almost two years thereafter, the PCP and its allies, operating with a strategy premised on the viability of revolutionary Leninist politics, were near the fulcrum of power. Since the failure of a leftist coup attempt in November 1975, however, the party's fortunes have been in decline, the election of António Ramalho Eanes as President of the second Portuguese republic in June 1976 and his subsequent designation of Socialist Party Secretary-General Mário Soares to head the first constitutional government being the latest major defeats the PCP has suffered. With the prospects for a West European-style parliamentary democracy in Portugal clearly better now than they have been at any time in the last 2 to 3 years, it is an appropriate moment to stand back and assess the recent course of Portuguese communism and to discuss its possible future direction.[1]

Accordingly, this essay will explore in some detail how the Portuguese Communists adapted to the political and social reality that they encountered after April 1974. A concluding section will look at possible future patterns of PCP participation in Portugal's political process and consider what the prospects are for a shift in the party's orientation, away from the avowedly Leninist approach to politics that the party has followed so far and toward a more accommodating, pluralistic, and consensual stance typical of other major West European Communist parties.

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The Legacy of Clandestinity

The PCP entered the post-April 1974 period with a long history of underground activity, having experienced harsh repression at the hands of Portuguese authorities. Nearly 50 years of internal exile (the PCP was legal only five years, from its founding in 1921 until 1926) had a profound impact on the Portuguese Communists and their attitudes, reinforcing the view that only an organization which was cohesive, unyielding (particularly in doctrinal matters), and well-disciplined—one which gave life to Lenin's steel-fist metaphor—could lead the working class to socialism. This comes through vividly in an article entitled "The Moral Superiority of Communists" which PCP Secretary-General Alvaro Cunhal published in early 1974.[2] Cunhal's repeated references to "moral strength" and his exhortations to "moral endurance" reveal the almost religious intensity with which he (and we may presume his party) held it the Communists' duty to be not only "the revolutionary political vanguard of the proletariat" but also its "moral vanguard." Even the

[1] For an earlier assessment of the PCP, see Arnold Hottinger, "The Rise of Portugal's Communists," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), July-August 1975, pp. 1-17. See also George W. Grayson, "Portugal and the Armed Forces Movement," *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1975, pp. 335-78, and Kenneth Maxwell, "The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), January 1976, pp. 250-70.

[2] The title is translated from the Portuguese text, which was published in Lisbon by Ediçoes Avante, 1975. When published in *World Marxist Review* (Toronto), January 1974, pp. 25-35, the article bore the more neutral title "Communist Ethics." All quotes are from the latter version.

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

Alvaro Cunhal, Secretary-General of the Portuguese Communist Party.

—Sygma.

slightest deviation from the classical Leninist code, Cunhal stressed, would have a "demoralizing" effect on all aspects of the party's work and therefore be an obstacle to the fulfillment of its historical mission.

This perspective affected the PCP's relations with other organizations and the types of alliances into which it was willing to enter and indeed had a greater influence on how the Communists viewed others on the Portuguese political scene than did the party's "Soviet connection." In this regard, it should be underscored that the generally accepted interpretation of the relationship between the PCP and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—which emphasizes the latter's role in determining the radical cast of Portuguese Communist policies after April 1974 and particularly in the summer of 1975—is incorrect on both factual and interpretative grounds. To begin with, the Soviet Union never developed a cohesive and unified policy toward Portugal.[3] Events in Portugal sparked lengthy and complex debates not only within the Soviet foreign policy establishment (about the compatibility of encouraging structural change in Europe and maintaining détente with the United States) but also between the CPSU and most West European Communist parties (about the continued viability of Leninist methods of reaching power on the continent). These debates could only have constrained whatever efforts the Soviets might have wanted to make to influence the Portuguese Communists.[4] More important from our point of view, seeing the PCP as essentially a tool of the Kremlin ignores an important dimension of the situation: that unswerving fidelity to the Soviet Union was the foreign

[3] On this point, see Joan Barth Urban's "Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on Revolution in the West," *Orbis*, Winter 1976, pp. 1359-402.

[4] The PCP, it should also be noted, enjoyed a considerable latitude for action because it served as a bridge between Moscow and the various national liberation movements in southern Africa. To the latter, the Portuguese Communists' revolutionary intransigence was quite appealing.

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policy expression of the tough, sectarian outlook on politics which the PCP had developed during the clandestine period. In the minds of the Portuguese Communist leadership, the domestic and foreign policy components of its strategy became inextricably linked. Thus, it can be argued that there has been a domestic imperative governing the relationship with the CPSU, and that the PCP's policies, present and future, can best be examined by focusing not on that relationship but on the party's response to its immediate environment.

The PCP's overt Leninism, aggressive drive for power, sectarian posture, and disdain for bourgeois political parties and institutions in the months after April 1974 led many to conclude that the Portuguese Communists, out of touch with Portuguese reality, moved prematurely to seize power because of Soviet directives. But was a strategy predicated on a forceful seizure of power in fact an outlandish and unreasonable option after the overthrow of Marcello Caetano? Not at all. First, the overthrow of Caetano's regime was the work not of political parties, but of a small number of Portuguese military officers—some generals like António de Spínola and Francisco da Costa Gomes and some younger majors and captains who had organized themselves into the Armed Forces Movement (*Movimento das Forças Armadas*—MFA).[5] The latter had been profoundly affected by the disastrous experience of fighting to uphold the Salazarian dreams of Lusitanian empire, and in the months after the takeover, they came to look on the MFA as a sort of movement for national liberation whose principal task was to play a vanguard role in the promotion of social change. Moreover, they assumed a preponderant role in the affairs of the country and wasted little time in evidencing a profound distrust of traditional electoral parties.

Second, the political and social Center, which constituted the logical constituency base for the traditional electoral parties, was weak, ineffective, and demoralized. A noted student of authoritarian regimes has observed that such regimes characteristically produce weak moderate and liberal elements.[6] By discouraging political mobilization and involvement and by periodically undertaking feeble efforts at internal liberalization and reform, the Portuguese regime had managed in fact to neutralize and/or coopt most oppositionists. Opposition, clandestine by force of circumstance, had easily come under the influence of the most radical and well-organized group, the Communists.

Thus, when the revolution took place, the Portuguese Communists emerged from clandestinity with not only the aura of the resistance but also a solid organization and the strongest influence among the most combative sectors of the society—the industrial workers of the Lisbon-Setúbal region and the agricultural laborers of the Alentejo. In the situation of political instability (at times bordering on anarchy) that confronted the PCP in the aftermath of the coup, its continued reliance on the Leninist political style that it had developed during the clandestine period was indeed a viable choice.

How this style was reflected in practice after April 1974 can best be analyzed by distinguishing four distinct phases: from April 1974 to March 1975, from March to August 1975, from August to November 1975, and from November 1975 to the present. In what follows, we shall examine in some detail how the Communist leadership perceived the political situation in each of these periods and how they shaped their party's policies as a result of these perceptions.

A Period of Caution

For almost a year after the overthrow of Marcello Caetano, that is, until the March 1975 flight of General Spínola, the PCP acted as a force for order and moderation. Unsure of the configuration of power in Portugal, the Communists were cautious in their commitments, whether to the MFA or other political parties. Although the threat from the Right seemed eased by the resignation of Spínola from leadership of the supreme revolutionary authority, the Junta of National Salvation (*Junta de Salvação Nacional*—JSN), in September 1974, it was only his final departure from the scene in March 1975 that convinced the PCP that the time was ripe for a more aggressive tack.

A wariness of Portugal's new military rulers and an uncertainty as to whether the Communist Party would be accorded immediate legal recognition served to temper the exuberance with which the

[5] The best historical account of the events leading to the April 1974 coup is in Avelino Rodrigues, Cesáric Borga, and Mário Cardoso, *O movimento dos capitães e o 25 de abril* (The Captains' Movement and April 25th), Lisbon, Moraes Editores, 1974.

[6] See Juan Linz, "Opposition in and under an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of Spain," in Robert A. Dahl, Ed., *Regimes and Oppositions*, New Haven, CT, and London, Yale University Press, 1973, pp. 188 ff. See also Linz, "The Sources of Radicalism in the Iberian Peninsula," mimeograph, February 1975.

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Premier Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves pictured in January 1975 with four Ministers without Portfolio in his Provisional Government. From the left are: Mário Soares of the Socialist Party, Magalhães Mota of the Popular Democratic Party, Premier Gonçalves, Alvaro Cunhal of the Communist Party, and Francisco de Moura of the Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission.

—AEI via Keystone.

Communists greeted the overthrow of Marcello Caetano. The day after the coup, the party's Central Committee issued a document that warned: "the legalization of the PCP will be the criterion for assessing whether democratic liberties have been instituted in Portugal." [7] As the only opposition group to have previously devoted much attention to organizing in the armed forces, the Communists may quite possibly have known that a coup was imminent. But, while they were certainly aware that anti-Caetano feeling was on the rise in the military, there is little evidence that the PCP was closer to or exercised greater influence on the MFA conspirators than other political groups. For that matter, many in the MFA seemed rather vague as to the role they expected the Communists to play in the revolution. In fact, when General Spínola (in his capacity as head of the JSN) extended to the Communists an invitation to join the first Provisional Government, offering PCP Secretary-General Cunhal a seat as Minister without Portfolio and another leading Communist, Avelino Gonçalves, the sensitive post of Labor Minister, the action, if we are to believe the testimony of Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, surprised many in the MFA.[8]

Spínola evidently expected that Communist entry into the government not only would significantly lessen the party's ability to maneuver but also would give the government leverage (through the PCP) on the increasingly restive labor movement. The Communists, for their part, were keenly aware of the dangers involved, particularly as the decision would leave the party open to sniping from the Left, but they apparently felt that the recognition and legitimacy afforded them was well worth the risk. Certainly, the PCP leadership had never entertained any illusions about Spínola and his attitudes. For example, when his book, *Portugal e o futuro* (Portugal and the Future), first appeared in February 1974, advocating a federative solution to Portugal's colonial problems, the Communists warned that the Caetano regime's "second line of defense was being prepared." [9] But so long as Spínola appeared able to put

[7] See *Comunicados de CC de PCP* (Communiqués of the PCP CC), Lisbon, Ediçoes Avante, 1975, p. 19.

[8] Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho, *Cinco meses mudaram Portugal* (Five Months That Changed Portugal), Lisbon, Portugalia Editore, 1975, p. 17.

[9] See the broadcast by Radio Free Portugal, the PCP's transmitting station, on March 2, 1974, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Western Europe* (Washington, DC), March 6, 1974, pp. X1-X2.

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off a final break with the MFA, the PCP leadership refrained from openly attacking him. The MFA had not yet attained a preponderant influence within the armed forces, and bodies such as the JSN and the Provisional Government still were potential rival centers of power.

In such a setting, the Communists pursued a dual strategy—on the one hand, reinforcing their ties with the MFA; on the other, vehemently insisting on the importance of unity with other parties and groups. Of course, the PCP has always insisted on the need for unity, but here one should distinguish between the offensive and defensive uses of the threat of fascism and reaction. In this first stage, in contrast to what became the case after March 1975, the party used appeals for unity against the threat of reaction for essentially defensive purposes. Thus, the PCP adopted an entirely moderate and accommodating stance toward parties like the Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista*—PS) and the Popular Democratic Party *(Partido Popular Democrático—PPD):* the PCP's Cunhal could call such parties "partners in the struggle" (*companheros de luta*).[10] In the realm of social policy, the party urged restraint, arguing not only that profound reform of social and economic structures was outside the scope of the MFA program, but also that the key to holding back the "reactionary offensive" was to avoid the intensification of social conflict.[11]

Despite this moderate line, the PCP moved deftly to consolidate its own positions. For example, the party used its control of the Labor Ministry (although Avelino Gonçalves resigned in July 1974, his successor as Minister, José Inacio da Costa Martins of the MFA, was close to the Communists, and they retained and expanded their influence—particularly at the subsecretary level) to assure its control over the fledgling labor movement and the trade union

[10] Alvaro Cunhal, *Discursos politicos* (Political Discourses), Lisbon, Ediçoes Avante, 1975, p. 79.
[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 53-59.

A July 1974 meeting to elect an administrative commission in the village of Charneca near Lisbon. The Portuguese Democratic Movement (Movimento Democrática Portguês—*MDP) actively promoted leftist elements in such meetings throughout the country.*

—Pohl/ADN-Zentralbild via Eastfoto.

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vehicle known as *Intersindical*. The PCP also worked through the unitary opposition coalition known as the Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission (*Movimento Democrático Português/Commissão Democrática Eleitoral*—MDP/CDE). During this phase that organization proved a particularly useful instrument not only for insuring Communist influence at the municipal and provincial administration level but (especially as long as the fiction of the MDP/CDE's independence could be maintained) as an instrument for mobilizing sectors of the Portuguese population which were "more difficult to reach through socially and politically advanced slogans." [12]

PART OF THE reason for the Communists' restraint disappeared in September 1974 when the simmering conflict between Spínola and the MFA finally reached crisis proportions. After granting permission for a "silent majority" march on Lisbon, Spínola found himself obliged on September 28 to step down as head of the JSN. Moreover, in the aftermath of his resignation, it became particularly evident that if the Armed Forces Movement had ever had any intention of returning to the barracks and turning power over to the civilians, this was growing to be less and less the case. Increasingly attracted to the Peruvian and Algerian models of military intervention in the developmental process, the most radical in the MFA began to envision their organization playing a role quite similar to that of the national liberation fronts against which they had fought in Africa and to see it their duty to liberate the Portuguese people. "We go to the people," said one young officer when asked the purpose of the cultural dynamization campaign initiated by the MFA after September 1974, "to help them escape from the long night of ignorance." [13]

The implications of these developments were not lost on the Communists. For one, the PCP sensed the possibilities for an even greater leftward shift in the not too distant future. This was apparent at the Seventh PCP Congress in late October. To be sure, press coverage of the one-day extraordinary session tended to emphasize the approval of a generally moderate Emergency Platform and revisions of the 1965 party program which muted criticism of Portuguese participation in the NATO alliance and eliminated the phrase "the dictatorship of the proletariat" from the Portuguese Communist lexicon.[14] *The Guardian* (Manchester), to cite but one prominent example, declared that the results of the Congress should "allay fears in Washington and Europe about a 'Red Menace' in Portugal." [15] However, while the Congress indeed revealed the party's ambivalence as to the course to follow in the months ahead, the broader significance of Alvaro Cunhal's principal report to the delegates lay in its indication that the party leadership had begun to consider seriously the medium-term prospects for radicalization.[16]

Cunhal's assessment of the September events was highly positive:

It will remain a date of transcendent importance in the history of Portugal's democratic revolution. Since then political power has gained a greater homogeneity and a greater capacity to act; the state apparatus has consolidated; the MFA and the democratic forces have become strengthened; the alliance between the popular movement and the military has been confirmed as the political axis around which the democratic changes revolve. It is still too early to measure the full import of the counterrevolution's defeat at the end of September. If the progressive forces prove capable of adopting adequate measures for exploiting their victory in depth, it may then be claimed that the construction of democracy in Portugal is an irreversible process.

The irreversibility of the revolution, he went on to argue, depended on resolving the split between economic and political power that had existed in Portugal after the 25th of April. "Political power" had been in the hands of "democratic forces" since that date, but "economic power remained in the hands of the monopolists and latifundists." That situation, he continued, could not go on much longer: "Either the monopolies and the latifundia take over political power, installing a new dictatorship, or the democratic forces—in order to construct a new Portugal—

[12] See the interview with PCP Central Committee member Aldo Noguiera, *Rinascita* (Rome), Dec. 13, 1974.

[13] See *L'Express* (Paris), Feb. 10-16, 1975, p. 40.

[14] The Emergency Platform, it is true, did refrain from advocating radical measures such as nationalization of major enterprises and banks. At the same time, it urged "the strengthening of the democratic state" through a purge of the governmental bureaucracy and a reorganization of the paramilitary forces. The Platform and the 1974 party program can be found in *VII Congresso (Extraordinário) de PCP* (The Seventh Congress [Extraordinary] of the PCP), Lisbon, Ediçoes Avante, 1974. The program approved in 1965 at the Sixth PCP Congress was republished in a third edition in the spring of 1974 by Ediçoes Avante.

[15] *The Guardian* (Manchester), Oct. 28, 1974.

[16] See Cunhal's address to the Congress in *VII Congresso*, pp. 21-48. All quotes in the following paragraph are from that speech.

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put an end to [the former's] economic power." Prior to September 1974, the PCP had repeatedly stressed that the MFA program—notable in any case for its vagueness and variety of possible readings—did not foresee any radical economic changes, and up to then the party had raised the possibility of nationalization and expropriation only in the case of enterprises guilty of economic sabotage. Now Cunhal emphasized the need for antimonopoly measures in the near future. His analysis implicitly presented stark alternatives. There was to be no place for a West European-style political system in Portugal; the country's social structure could not support capitalist economic concentration and broad political democracy at the same time, for the Portuguese bourgeoisie, in the Communist view, was not strong enough to ensure its domination without resorting to violence and the establishment of a new fascist dictatorship.

Posing the alternatives so harshly would eventually serve to dramatically narrow the options open to the PCP, and make it become more responsive to radicals within and outside the military. For the moment, however, the Communists were hesitant to commit themselves irrevocably to a fight they were still not confident they could win. They therefore continued to foster ties with the broad spectrum of moderates and leftists within the MFA and Provisional Government by harping on the specter of a right-wing coup.

In order to counter this putative threat, the Communist leadership throughout the period attempted to forge a broad alliance of social forces based on the working class and embracing the peasants, intellectuals, and sectors of the middle class—all of whom were or "objectively" should have been interested in supporting the revolution. It should be understood, however, that the Communists had difficulty in garnering support for their notions of agrarian reform in the area north of the Tagus River, where small landholdings predominated and reform meant expropriation. The PCP's *ouvriériste* approach to the problem of political power only served to reinforce the antagonism. Moreover, during this phase (and subsequently) the party made little effort to disguise its view that the political parties of the bourgeoisie were rapidly becoming obsolete. This approach was doubtless influenced by the legacy of clandestinity—which led the PCP to expect that the other parties on the Portuguese scene would soon enough demonstrate their intrinsic weakness—but the months after September 1974 reinforced the party's perspective.

Given the special conditions existing in Portugal after September, it was the MFA (not the political parties) which had emerged as the principal actor, and it was therefore the MFA which constituted the logical axis upon which the party might rest its political alliances. In the PCP's view, the MFA had become "the guarantor of the democratic process"; hence, partnership with it was the imperative of the moment. The Socialists and the Popular Democrats would have to face that reality and respond as they saw fit.[17]

Yet for all its latent hostility toward other political parties, the PCP still insisted that they had a role to play, if only they would change their orientation and look leftward instead of to the right. There were two reasons for this attitude. First, it would have been impolitic and have unnecessarily aggravated matters in the international sphere to break openly with ruling members of the coalition, particularly since the Socialists had excellent relations with Social Democrats who controlled governments in several European countries. More important to the Communists, the elimination of the Socialists could have backfired at home, inasmuch as some sectors of the "radical military" [18] saw *all* political parties as

[17] According to the PCP, however, there was still time for a Communist-Socialist entente to play "a highly positive role" despite the fact that the Socialist Party had undertaken a "shift to the right" which brought it "nearer to and in certain respects in identification with the most conservative forces" (*Avante!* [Lisbon], Jan. 29, 1975). Cunhal was less optimistic about the Popular Democratic Party, which was "born from the womb of the fascist dictatorship and suckled from the breast of fascism [its] first political milk" (*ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1975).

[18] The term "military radical" describes members of a loose coalition grouping two more or less distinct factions within the MFA whose submerged political and personal differences came to the fore after March 1975, but who, until then, assumed more or less similar stances on the need to insure continued MFA participation in the political process, the *Movimento*'s formal institutionalization, and the apportionment of seats for its representatives in the Constituent Assembly. There were, on the one hand, officers close to Prime Minister Vasco dos Santos Gonçalves; they looked for the Communists to be the political axis upon which a united front of the Left could be formed. Few among them were outright members of the PCP, and their alignment with the Communists reflected, more than anything else, a distrust of and aversion to spontaneous popular mobilization. On the other hand, there were those members of the MFA radical wing who rallied around Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho and, to a lesser degree, Navy Admiral António Rosa Coutinho. For these officers, who might be loosely described as military populists and who were to develop (especially in Carvalho's case) close ties with such extreme Left groups as the Revolutionary Party of the Proletariat-Revolutionary Brigades (*Partido Revolucionário de Proletariado-Brigades Revolucionários* or PRP-BR) and the Popular Democratic Union (*União Democrático Popular*—UDP), the further advance of the Portuguese revolution could only be accomplished by discarding traditional political organizations and establishing direct links between the MFA and the people (*povo*) through workers' and soldiers' councils.

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an obstacle to the construction of a socialist society and, egged on by ultraleftists, would presumably have had no compunction in turning against the PCP after first eliminating the Socialists. Thus, the Communist leadership had to engage in a careful balancing act—seeking to weaken the other parties and minimize their role in the revolution without undercutting the PCP's own relationship with the MFA.

That the radical audience in the MFA to which the PCP directed its attention did not believe it could depend on most of the myriad political parties which had surfaced in post-April Portugal—by one count they numbered at least four dozen[19]—to accomplish the transformation of Portuguese society was not so surprising. Not only had these parties (if they had even existed) failed to overthrow the *Estado Novo* and had the MFA to thank for the fact that Caetano was no longer around, but the degree of their commitment to what the radicals came to consider the aims of the revolution was open to question. Against this generally bleak picture, the PCP stood out in striking contrast. The Communists, though not altogether to be trusted, voiced wholehearted support for any and all MFA initiatives and were almost alone in arguing the absolute necessity of the MFA's presence in the Constituent Assembly scheduled to be elected in April 1975—and beyond, for that matter—in order to guarantee the continued success of the revolution. Moreover, the politically inexperienced and somewhat unsophisticated officers of the MFA left wing found the political analyses of the PCP compelling, especially when, as in the case of Communist insistence that the alternative to the MFA was fascist rule, the arguments gave an ideological justification for the *Movimento* to continue to run the country. Add to that the organizational and mobilizational talents which the party could put at the MFA's disposal in the larger cities and in the South, and one can readily understand why the military radicals, although certainly wary of the Communists, at least did not regard the PCP with the disdain they reserved for the other parties.

Eager to strengthen the hand of the military radicals, the PCP and groups to its left had, in the aftermath of the "silent majority" demonstration, called for a purge of the still considerable number of conservative officers that remained in the Portuguese armed forces, but this had not happened. The results of the elections to the individual MFA branch assemblies in early 1975, in which prominent radicals like Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho were defeated,[20] demonstrated the continued strength of the conservative elements and suggested that the radicals' power reflected more the influence they exerted over the "commanding heights" of the military establishment than the support they had at the unit level (we must exclude here most of the units composing the elite security force known as COPCON, short for *Comando Operacional Continente* or the Continental Operations Command). In fact, with the change in the composition of the MFA General Assembly wrought by the service-branch elections, the prospects were good for defeating the radicals' bid for control of that body at a plenary session scheduled for early March.

This being the case, it is difficult to understand what the conservatives hoped to gain from the March 11 coup attempt. Nevertheless, on that date, there was an aerial attack on RAL-1, a unit known for its leftist sympathies. The rebels apparently expected their action to trigger a broader-based response, and when other units refused to join, the coup collapsed. Even now a debate rages as to the motives for the affair—there are a variety of plot and counterplot explanations. But whatever the answer, one thing is sure: the coup, as poorly executed as it was conceived, gave the radicals in the MFA an unprecedented opportunity to deal a crushing (and nearly fatal) blow to political and military moderates.

Radicalizing the Revolution

For the Communists, the defeat of the rightist coup attempt and the prompt announcement of measures to assure dominance of leftist elements within the MFA[21] seemed to set the structural conditions for finally resolving the dichotomy between political and economic power that had existed since April 1974. Given the Portuguese domestic situation in the period from March through August 1975—and the perspective from which the PCP approached that reality—any decision other than to have opted for a continued and rapid radicalization of the revolution would have been unthinkable. The results of the April 1975 Constituent Assembly elections—

[19] A useful compendium of information about the diverse parties is *Partidos e movimentos politicos em Portugal* (Parties and Political Movements in Portugal), Lisbon, SOAPLI, 1975.

[20] *Expresso* (Lisbon), Feb. 8, 1975.

[21] For a summary of these measures, see Hottinger, *loc. cit.*

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A Communist-organized rally in support of the Armed Forces Movement (Movimento das Forças Armadas—*MFA) in Lisbon on March 14, 1975, several days after an abortive rightist coup. The banner speaks of the "People" and the "MFA" being united in their destiny "to crush reaction and construct socialism."*

—AEI via Keystone.

which showed the Socialist Party with a comfortable plurality of nearly 38 percent of the vote, the Popular Democrats with something over 26 percent, and the Communists trailing with under 13 percent[22]—could only have underscored for the PCP leadership the correctness of its decision. If the moderate parties of the Center and Left were to succeed in establishing a parliamentary democracy in Portugal, the Communists could expect to play little more than a secondary role in the country's evolving political process.

Once having forsaken democratic parliamentary politics, the Communists found the range of possible political alliances open to them dramatically narrowed. Their choice was to work with the leftist Provisional Government of Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves and the radical elements within the MFA. Although in the months that followed, the PCP was to grow increasingly concerned over the widening rift between the military populists and the pro-Communist officers coalescing around Gonçalves, for the moment the party leadership was confident that the MFA radicals could not afford to embark on a policy of profound structural changes in Portuguese society without the PCP.

For the PCP, collaboration with the MFA meant in effect the jettisoning of the Socialists as possible allies. Of course, the Communists continued to go through the motions and call for unity of the Left—including the Socialists—but they did so with increasingly restrained enthusiasm. And by the end of July, after the PS had withdrawn from the coalition government of Vasco Gonçalves, the PCP's leadership was ready to attack Socialist policies as "the axis of reactionary activities" and accuse the PS leadership of allying itself with "reactionary and conservative forces and against those of progress and revolution." [23]

One other consequence of the shift in PCP policy was that the party now turned its attention to cultivating alliances with groups to its left. Earlier, the party could afford to ignore the existence of the ultra-

[22] For the complete election results, see *Expresso*, April 30, 1975.

[23] *Avante!*, July 24, 1975.

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Left *groupuscules*[24] as a rhinoceros might a mosquito, but once having opted to reject "electoral politics and electoralism" in favor of "the dynamics of force," as Cunhal called it,[25] the party had to deal with these groups and to contend with their influence in the PCP as well as in the mass organizations. Internally, the problem was how to cope with the thousands of new members who had entered the party since April 1974. In the space of little more than a year, the party had gone from an organization of 2,000-3,000 members to one with more than 100,000 members.[26] Not surprisingly, some in this new and untried following, expecting an uninterrupted advance to the new society, tended to be disenchanted by the inevitable twists and turns in policy and the tactical retreats and readjustments ordered by the party leadership. Likewise, in the labor movement and among sectors of the population where Communist influence had traditionally been strong, the party now found itself having to respond much more urgently than before to the challenges from the groups of the extreme Left. The numerical and organizational weight of the latter were nowhere near those of the PCP, but their criticism of Communist *dirigisme* and their calls for "direct democracy" outside traditional party structures struck a responsive chord among the populist elements of the MFA, with whom these groups effected a tacit alliance.

REGARDLESS OF Communist perceptions and commitments, when it came to the implementation of policies, the PCP found itself during this phase by no means the master of the situation, reacting as often as not to others' initiatives. In no position to dictate strategy to the MFA radicals, the party had to endure their endless debates and resolutions on how to structure the organs of power for the transition to socialism. With regard to one such resolution, which called for the establishment of neighborhood and workers' councils, the Communists could try to reassure themselves that the "more direct participation of the MFA in the process did not dispense or annul, but on the contrary reaffirmed, the vanguard action of the party of the Portuguese working class."[27] However, it is clear that by this time many officers in the MFA had come to believe that it was the military as an *independent* organization above political parties that should play the leading role in the construction of socialism. Even those whom we have chosen to call the pro-Communist officers in the MFA, while frequently adopting positions that were close to those of the Communists, were not pliant tools of the PCP. They had their own inchoate vision of the nature of the MFA-PCP alliance, and we can be sure that if they had succeeded in their revolutionary venture, they had no intention of simply handing power over to Cunhal and his associates.

But these were the tribulations of a party whose star appeared to be on the rise. The declining fortunes of the Socialists in the spring of 1975 offered a vivid contrast. Because the PS had made no effort to disguise its belief that the military should retire from an active role in politics as soon as possible, its relations with the MFA had been strained for quite some time. After the Socialist victory in the Constituent Assembly elections, these relations grew worse as the MFA first refused Socialist demands for immediate local and provincial elections and then officially recognized the Communist-controlled *Intersindical* as *the* national organization of trade unions, thereby undermining the position of Socialist and other union elements. Not surprisingly, the Socialists concluded that there was little place in the radicals' plan for the PS, and they began to cast about for an issue on which to challenge the MFA. The occupation of the plant of the Lisbon newspaper *República* by striking typographical workers in late May 1975 gave the PS its opportunity.[28] When the MFA

[24] A good description of the small groups operating on the extreme Left in Portugal can be found in Xavier Raufer, "Movements of the Extreme Left in Portugal," *Est et Ouest* (Paris), June 1975, pp. 269-80.

[25] See his speech in *Avante!*, June 26, 1975. An even blunter expression of Cunhal's views came in his celebrated interview with Oriana Fallaci in *L'Europeo* (Milan), June 15, 1975. Asked whether the PCP's strategy was not playing into the hands of the European Right and embarrassing other European Communists, Cunhal replied: "How I am grieved, torn to pieces, distressed! I am distressed! Truly distressed! Poor Italian Communists! I shed tears for the Italian Communists! For all the Communists in Europe, I shed tears, I curse myself, I suffer! Of course, I know their laments. Those are the ones they repeat to me when they come here. . . . Faced with the laments of West European Communists, I have but one answer: we, we do not await election results to change structures and to destroy the past. We accomplish the revolution, and this revolution has nothing to do with all your systems."

[26] See *Avante!*, July 17, 1975. For details on the organizational structure of the expanding PCP, see the party's organizational bulletin, *O Militante* (Lisbon), June 1975.

[27] See *Avante!*, June 5, 1975.

[28] In laying down this challenge to the MFA radicals, the Socialists were aware that to phrase their dispute with the military in terms of struggle over freedom of the press was a tactically shrewd move, made all the more dramatic because it coincided with the (*continued on p. 31*)

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failed to comply with repeated Socialist demands that the workers who had taken over the premises be evicted, the PS finally withdrew its members from the Cabinet, on July 11.

Despite their apparent weakness, the Socialists picked a good time to challenge Prime Minister Vasco Gonçalves, the MFA radicals, and the PCP. In midsummer 1975, for the first time since the overthrow of Marcello Caetano, the MFA could not count on the enthusiastic and automatic support of a large part of the Portuguese people. The interminable debates over subtle ideological nuances which took up so much of the Council of the Revolution's time seemed increasingly irrelevant and contributed to a growing sense of popular alienation over decisions being taken (and, as often as not, being disregarded) in the heady and intoxicating Lisbon atmosphere. The rise of separatist sentiment in the Azores and the utter failure of the Portuguese decolonization scheme in Angola only added to the general tension. On the economic front, too, the government was beset with difficulties: it had a stagnating economy with rising unemployment (250,000 according to official figures, but with the prospect that the number could easily double as a result of the anticipated return of several hundred thousand settlers from the former colonies), and a climbing balance-of-payments deficit brought on by the need to import more and more agricultural products. These economic problems could only be alleviated through the imposition of austerity measures, yet, unfortunately for Gonçalves and the radicals in the MFA, such a strategy required a not inconsiderable amount of political capital—something the beleaguered Prime Minister did not have.

Within the MFA, too, Gonçalves had increasingly come under fire not only from the military populists but also from a small nucleus of "moderate" leftists who still remained in the Council of the Revolution. If Gonçalves was able to survive their uncoordinated efforts to remove him as Prime Minister during July and part of August, it was primarily due to the MFA's almost instinctive reaction to rally around him in the face of the simultaneous Socialist attack. However, in early August Ernesto Augusto de Melo Antunes and eight other officers of the Council of the Revolution finally issued a public statement, the "Document of the Nine" (*Documento dos Nove*), bitterly criticizing incumbent Prime Minister Gonçalves for leading Portugal toward an East European-style totalitarian regime, for trying to impose "political dogma in a sectarian and violent fashion." [29] The alternative strategy proposed by "the Nine" was to work toward creation of a broadly inclusive bloc, composed of urban and rural workers and most sectors of the middle class, which would be capable of ensuring Portugal's peaceful long-term movement toward socialism. While the signatories of the document saw themselves as the true heirs to the April 1974 revolution and their proposal as the only viable *alternative de gauche* open to the MFA, it was really their critique of Gonçalves that struck the most responsive chord among wide segments of the armed forces. But it is highly improbable that the dissident "moderates" on the CR could have pressed forward and forced Gonçalves' eventual ouster in early September had they not been able to secure the temporary support of Saraiva de Carvalho, the ambitious and mercurial commander of COPCON forces.[30]

Without underestimating what the Communists had to gain from the final elimination of all resistance to the radicals within the MFA and without slighting the PCP's ability to coordinate demonstrations and strikes in favor of Gonçalves, one should point out that the party was essentially a marginal spectator to the drama being played out in the MFA General Assembly and the Council of the Revolution in late July and early August. The Communists could do little about the progressive disintegration of the MFA except to continue, as they had done so often in the past, to urge the radicals to put aside their differences with each other and the PCP.

In an attempt to gain some political leverage, the

occupation a few days later of the Catholic hierarchy's transmitter at Radio Renascença. The Socialist decision was sure to strike a responsive chord—despite the fact that PCP participation in and responsibility for the occupation of *República* was at best indirect and may have been largely a response to the militancy of workers associated with the Maoist-inspired UDP—not only domestically but (perhaps more important) among Europeans and North Americans who viewed developments in Portugal, and the growing Communist influence in particular, with a great deal of concern.

[29] This statement was published in *O Jornal* (Lisbon), Aug. 8, 1975.

[30] Carvalho's personal rapprochement with "the Nine" came as something of a surprise. Nevertheless, it was the logical outcome of his always wary approach to the Communists—an intuitive mistrust he felt confirmed in early August when unidentified leftist officers (no one publicly accused them of being Communists or of having the backing of the PCP, but Carvalho obviously came to believe the party was responsible) led a mutiny in an elite commando regiment which formed part of the COPCON command structure. *O Jornal* of Aug. 8, 1975, analyzes this "Neves affair." The COPCON officers also drafted their own document at this time, criticizing Communists, Socialists, and moderates within the military. See *Expresso*, Aug. 15, 1975.

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PCP leadership in this period tried to cultivate and perhaps split off from the Socialist Party left-wing elements possibly disaffected by the PS leadership's decision to effect a tacit alliance with more conservative, and in some cases openly reactionary, forces only then publicly reemerging in the country. However, these Communist efforts (which included instigating invitations to such prominent PS left-wingers as António Reis and António Lopes Cardoso to enter Gonçalves' new Provisional Government—*i.e.*, the one formed after the Socialists had withdrawn) had only the opposite result, serving—at least for the time being—merely to rally the Socialist leadership around Mário Soares and his decision to break with the MFA.

The unexpected strong support which the *Documento dos Nove* elicited in the armed forces plus the decision by Saraiva de Carvalho to oppose Gonçalves forced the PCP to temporarily adopt a more conciliatory stance than it had in early July, when it had called for rapid constitution of "homogeneous revolutionary power" (*poder revolucionário homogeneo)* in response to the Socialists' decision to withdraw from Portugal's coalition government.[31] This tactical retreat was signaled at a Central Committee meeting on August 10, where Cunhal argued against "a hardening of positions" and "a rigid demarcation line of those for and against the revolution," and urged once again a defensive "unification of all forces concerned with the process" of combating "fascist and reactionary forces." [32] But in mid-August, as the military populist faction of the MFA turned from Carvalho and for the main part moved back to Gonçalves, the PCP abandoned its conciliatory stance and effected a rapprochement, under the auspices of the COPCON military populists and Fifth Division officers close to the PCP, with the parties of the ultra-Left.[33] Fueled by a mutually held contempt for the Socialists and the apparent belief that the choices had by this time narrowed themselves down to either revolutionary socialism or fascism, these parties combined to form a United Revolutionary Front (*Frente Unitário Revolucionário* —FUR) and adopted a joint platform calling for "a powerful offensive of the masses against fascism, social democracy, and imperialism, and the advancement of the revolutionary process." [34] For a few days in August it seemed the PCP (in "unholy alliance" with the ultra-Left, or so Soares described the entente) was ready to reenact the assault on the Winter Palace.

The alliance, however, proved to be short-lived, and there was no climactic storming of the citadels of power. At the last moment, realizing the fundamental weakness of its position and the fact that the radicals within the MFA had lost their initiative, the PCP pulled back, deciding to accept Gonçalves' ouster and proposing talks with the Socialist leadership. These steps signaled a new stage in Communist policy.

Rural supporters of the Portuguese Communist Party demonstrate enthusiastically at a rally in Beja the week before the April 25, 1975, elections to the Constituent Assembly.

—J. P. Paireault/Magnum.

[31] *Avante!*, July 10, 1975.

[32] See the text of Cunhal's address to the CC in *ibid.*, Aug. 11, 1975.

[33] An article in *Expresso* of Aug. 30, 1975, summarizes the twists and turns of Communist policy during this critical month.

[34] For the text of their communiqué, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *op. cit.*, Aug. 26, 1975, p. M4.

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In the next stage, which was to last until the abortive leftist coup of mid-November, the PCP found itself in a political situation which—while deteriorating—was not totally devoid of opportunities. The Communist decision to abandon Gonçalves and to enter the sixth Provisional Government under Admiral José Pinheiro de Azevedo (albeit with only one minor portfolio, Public Works) reflected a sober assessment of the significant shift that had occurred in the balance of forces in the country.

Battling Worsened Odds

The PCP would clearly have preferred that Gonçalves remain in power as head of a left-leaning government and certainly did not relish the almost certain efforts of the Socialists to deprive the party of the positions the Communists had so laboriously acquired in the various ministries and in the media. Yet the change of government was not entirely disadvantageous either to the PCP or, more generally, to all those forces still interested in a radical political solution.

In the first place, a new government, especially one tilting to the right, the Communists reasoned, would have to carry primary responsibility for stabilizing not only the political situation (in both the military and civilian spheres) but also the economic situation. This task seemed beyond the capability of the PS. Moreover, "Socialist hegemony" in the Cabinet, as the Communist leadership called it, might have an unsettling effect on the PS itself, exacerbating tensions within and perhaps ultimately splitting that party.

Although the Communists defined the new phase as one in which "the forces of the Left had receded," they still insisted that the situation in Portugal had significant "socialist and revolutionary" potential.[35] That perspective, publicly noted for the first time by the PCP in October 1974, was what, in their minds, made Portugal unique in Europe. Bourgeois democracy, they were convinced, could not work. Because of the low level of industrial and agricultural development in Portugal, Cunhal continued to insist, the triumph of Socialist positions would bring with them the restoration of capitalism and "such a degree of exploitation that only a repressive apparatus could impose it." [36] As the Communists would claim in November, the "national-democratic" revolution had gone too far to be reversed without "the destruction of liberties and the implantation of a new dictatorship." [37]



Premier Vasco Gonçalves lashes out at the Socialists and at extreme leftists in the Armed Forces Movement on August 18, 1975, in a speech at a meeting in Almada organized by the Communist-controlled Intersindical *labor organization. This was at the height of the crisis which brought Gonçalves' ouster 11 days later.*

—S. Juliene/Sygma.

Once again, the principal enemy was "fascism." At one level, the raising of this specter harked back to the earlier stages of the Portuguese revolution when the party had in mind primarily its defensive connotations. However, an offensive dimension also lurked closely in the background. The Communists saw the present political preponderance of the Socialists less as a function of PS strength than as the product of the division of the revolutionary forces, and particularly of the MFA. The struggle against "reaction" during this stage would serve a dual purpose: on the one hand, it would bind the MFA together and reunite the military populists, pro-Communist officers, and supporters of "the Nine";

[35] *Avante!*, Sept. 18, 1975.
[36] See, for example, *ibid.*, Oct. 9, 1975.
[37] *Ibid.*, Nov. 13, 1975.

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on the other hand, it would force the Socialists to opt either for continued alliance with the Popular Democratic Party (which the Communists now openly described as a party of reaction) or with the PCP and some parties of the ultra-Left.

Only marginally committed to the latest Provisional Government, the PCP could now take "leftist" positions with relative impunity. It no longer had to defend official policies and was thus much more able to compete with the *gauchistes,* preempting the appeals these groups could make to the agricultural laborers of the Alentejo and to the industrial working class. Workers under Communist control—*e.g.,* those in construction and metallurgical unions—could now make outlandish wage demands, forcing the Socialists, who currently bore the largest share of responsibility for economic policy by virtue of their control of the Ministry of Finance, into the position of urging restraint. Consequently, the Communists had an easier time than before in blunting Socialist efforts to win control of key unions in *Intersindical.*

The PCP was also in a comfortable position with regard to the agrarian reform program. While Agriculture Minister António Lopes Cardoso was a Socialist, a Communist, Vitor Louro, served in the critically important post of Secretary of State for Agrarian Structure and as often as not worked at cross-purposes with the Minister. In the regional Agrarian Reform Centers (*Centros da Reforma Agraria* —CRA's), Communist directors held over from the Gonçalves government could disregard the directives emanating from Lisbon and rule their jurisdictions as largely autonomous fiefdoms, in some cases encouraging land-hungry laborers to illegally occupy land. The party could then claim credit for advancing agrarian reform, and it was the Socialists who had to remove the illegal occupants.

Ironically, the ouster of Gonçalves and the attendant rise in the influence of conservative elements in the ruling Armed Forces Movement worked to improve the opportunities for the Communists to carry on organizational work in the MFA aimed at strengthening the hand of its leftist elements. Without underestimating the extent of such work carried on by the PCP prior to August 1975, it is clear the party had felt constrained in that earlier stage to act with great restraint in its dealings with the military out of fear that too open an intervention in MFA affairs might antagonize some group among the military radicals. Now, however, the Communists found themselves no longer the weaker element in the alliance with the *Movimento* and, conscious of the leverage to be gained, played a significant role in fomenting indiscipline in military units. Thus, the PCP was at least partly responsible—along with the ultra-Left—for organizing a loosely structured soldiers' union, Soldiers United We Shall Overcome (*Soldados Unidos Venceremos*—SUV), and for the disappearance of weapons from military arsenals throughout the country. The only way the government could stop the growing disorder within the military, Cunhal warned in one speech, was "to stop the purges of leftist elements" and "to reinforce the positions of the revolutionary Left in the military and the government." [38] (Unrest in the army—especially among units in the Lisbon and Oporto military regions—was indeed becoming a serious problem for the government: by early November matters were so grave that security forces refused to intervene when a construction workers' demonstration besieged the national government palace in São Bento.)

Already by mid-October, perhaps a bit earlier than the Communist leadership had anticipated, the tide had appeared to shift against the Pinheiro de Azevedo government and moderate forces within it. Sensing this and arguing that now "the danger of a right-wing reorganization had been overcome," the Communists began to issue strident calls for the restructuring of the Cabinet and of the Council of the Revolution.[39]

Matters reached crisis proportions in mid-November when, amid rumors of coups and countercoups, *Intersindical* organized a massive rally in Lisbon to demand Pinheiro de Azevedo's dismissal and the return of Vasco Gonçalves. To this challenge, the Cabinet responded by suspending its own activities and refusing to resume operation until the Council of the Revolution gave it a vote of confidence. With the situation at an impasse and with the prospect of a purge of remaining left-wing elements in the Council of the Revolution imminent, some army units staged a leftist version of the March 1975 Spínola comic-opera coup attempt.

This is not the place to undertake a detailed consideration of the rebellion, or to try to pinpoint the degree of Communist involvement—which has not

[38] *Ibid.,* Oct. 23, 1975.

[39] Cunhal took this stand at a rally in Torres Novas. It was time, he went on to say, for the MFA "to resume its dynamic participation in Portuguese politics in alliance with the progressive political forces and the popular movement." See *Diário de Noticias* (Lisbon), Oct. 20, 1975.

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Leftists gather outside the barracks of a dissident artillery regiment shortly before the soldiers surrendered without a fight in the November 26, 1975, radical coup attempt.

—Wide World.

been, and may never be, conclusively established.[40] In a series of speeches after the coup,[41] the PCP's leadership noted that the party had never come out openly in favor of confrontation and had always urged a political solution to the crisis (to be sure, the PCP would have preferred to pursue its objectives without having to resort to a coup). But such subtle and legalistic distinctions do not conceal the fact that Communists, along with representatives of various ultra-Left groups like the PRP-BR and the Popular Socialist Front (*Frente Socialiste Popular*—FSP), were prominently and heavily involved in the coup at the level of neighborhood and workers' commissions and in the activities of the *Intersindical* unions mobilized in and around Lisbon on the night of the coup, November 25-26. The PCP leaders presumably held back until they could see which way the tide was running, and chose not to commit themselves when they saw the ease with which the revolt was being put down.

Thus, the Communists, who for several months had openly challenged the legitimacy of the sixth Provisional Government, for a second time pulled back from a decisive test of strength. It remained for the PCP to beat an orderly retreat and attempt to minimize the enormous defeat dealt to itself and the ultra-Left.

Reaction to Defeat

While the Communists could have rationalized their acquiescence to Vasco Gonçalves' ouster in late August as a temporary and tactical retreat, confidently expecting that they would in the near future recover the offensive, the implications for Communist policy of the defeat inflicted on November 25 were of a different order. Although, in the year or so that has passed since that disaster, the party could retain its faith that matters had not com-

[40] For the official version of the events, see *Relatório da Comissão de Inquérito as Acontecimentos do 25 de Novembro* (Preliminary Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Events of November 25), Lisbon, 1976. The PCP admitted that there was evidence that individual Communists participated in the coup attempt, but it insisted that there was no evidence of direct involvement on the part of the leadership (*Avante!*, Jan. 22, 1976).

[41] See speeches published in *Avante!* in early December 1975.

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pletely gotten out of hand, its hopes for a rapid advance of the revolutionary process were dashed.

The Communists could insist on the necessity for continued intervention by the military in political life and on the absolute need for an alliance between the armed forces and the "popular movement," but the PCP was for the most part swimming against the tide of events. In the aftermath of the November coup attempt, over 150 leftist officers were arrested, COPCON was disbanded, and Carvalho, Rosa Coutinho, and Army Chief of Staff Carlos Soares Fabião (among others) were ousted from the Council of the Revolution. Melo Antunes' "group of Nine" (*grupo dos nove*) found itself at the left end of the political spectrum in the Council, arguing for continued MFA leadership of Portugal's march toward socialism and for the "indispensability" of Communist participation in the process. But these were not the priorities of those career military officers of the permanent staff (*quadro permanente*)—men such as new Army Chief of Staff Ramalho Eanes and former Interior Minister Mário Firmino Miguel—who had been instrumental in putting down the rebellion and now emerged as power brokers. Opposed to continued military involvement in politics, these officers pushed forward with plans to restructure and streamline the military so that they could turn full political power over to civilians and return to the barracks as quickly as possible. To this end, they demanded a revision of the constitutional pact which had been signed between the MFA and the political parties in April 1975. The new version, signed by the PCP and other major parties in late February 1976, reflected the changed situation. It contained no reference to the MFA, the MFA's General Assembly, or the military's leading role in the Portuguese revolution and sought as well to relegate the Council of the Revolution to a primarily advisory capacity.[42]

Even though in their rhetoric the Communists clung to their theoretical judgments concerning the unviability of bourgeois democracy in Portugal's political future and the need to defend and consolidate such revolutionary gains as agrarian reform and nationalization, they recognized that the new situation demanded moderation of actual party policy at all levels, particularly at the level of political and social alliances.[43] The aggressive, leftist-oriented stance of the previous phase was now dropped by the PCP. In fact, the party excoriated the extreme Left for "goading the enemy and provoking his attack when you are not in a position to withstand or defeat him."[44]

Circumstances called for the Communists to conclude an alliance with the Socialists, but this was no easy matter. The Socialist leadership, for its part, had no intention of accepting the repeated Communist proposals for the elaboration of a common platform, preferring to steer clear of any entanglement with the PCP (or for that matter with the PPD, which called for the ouster of the Communists from the Provisional Government) which might cost it support among members of some class or in some section of the country. Faced with the categorical unwillingness of the Socialists to join with them, the Communists sought to foster contacts between the two parties at the base level through such social organizations as trade union and neighborhood and workers' commissions and at the same time prepare for the parliamentary elections in April 1976 with the hope of preventing formation of a coalition government comprising the right-of-center Social Democratic Center (*Centro Democrático Social*—CDS) and the PPD and making a PCP/PS coalition at least an arithmetical possibility. The strategy could have the additional advantage of expanding the party's audience among the middle classes and might thereby help coalesce a broad alliance of those social sectors which were objectively interested in the revolution at this stage but were hesitant to join with the Left and, in particular, with the PCP.

The new approach was particularly evident in the tone of the mass demonstrations the Communists sponsored during this phase to protest various government decrees increasing the cost of food staples, energy, and transportation as well as one suspending collective bargaining which in effect froze wages for more than 750,000 workers. These demonstrations lacked the offensive thrust of the marches and rallies organized the previous fall and were primarily vehicles for developing what the Communists call "unity of action" on "bread-and-butter" economic issues. Symptomatic of the change, too, were passages in official party documents criticizing the trade union leaderships for excessive politicization of their organizations and their "bureaucratic" methods of leadership,[45] behavior which was not conducive to

[42] *Expresso*, Feb. 26, 1976.

[43] See PCP Secretary-General Cunhal's statement in *Avante!*, Dec. 12, 1975.

[44] *Diário de Notícias*, Jan. 16, 1976.

[45] See, for example, the Central Committee statement in *Avante!*, Dec. 16, 1975.

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the lowering of tensions within a given mass organization or to the reconciling of differences between Communist and Socialist workers.

These efforts assume particular relevance when viewed in the context of the party's preparations for the 1976 parliamentary elections. That the PCP should be insisting on the importance of those elections as an instrument for forcing an eventual understanding between themselves and the Socialists was not without its ironies. However, it was consistent with the party view that the time for the "dynamics of force" had temporarily passed. Organization for the campaign began in early January and included the formation of national, regional, and district electoral commissions which—in coordination with a special task force headquartered in Lisbon—were to make empirical analyses of voting patterns and recommend to party leaders at various levels what issues should be raised in a given zone or what sectors of the population it might be useful to cultivate in a given area.[46] In its campaign propaganda, the PCP sought to tone down its *ouvriériste* image and to cultivate the broadest possible social base by referring to itself as "the party of the workers" rather than as "the party of the working class and all workers" and by arguing that a vote for the Communists was "a vote for anti-fascist and democratic unity." [47]

The outcome of the parliamentary elections indicated that the Communist strategy had been at least partially successful.[48] The Socialists' share of the vote declined nearly 3 percent from their 37.9 percent showing of the previous year, and the number of PS seats in the Assembly dropped from 116 to 107. Similarly, the PPD's share went from 26.4 to 24 percent, and the party lost 9 seats, leaving it a total of 71. On the other hand, the CDS increased its relative share, from somewhat more than 7.5 percent to nearly 16 percent, and more than doubled its previous holding of 16 seats, capturing 41. The PCP also increased its percentage of the vote (by more than 2 percent), winning 14.6 percent of the overall figure, and it bolstered its representation in the Assembly by 10 seats, giving it a total of 40. With only 112 out of 263 seats, the PPD and CDS could not form a government, whereas a majority Socialist-Communist coalition government had, at least numerically, become possible.

Beyond these global details, several additional comments about the Communist showing are in order. The PCP scored significant gains in its traditional strongholds—the industrial cities and the South—becoming the leading vote-getter in Beja, Evora, and Setúbal; and it registered only slight losses (or in some cases, even minimal gains) in the North. In achieving these results, the Communists picked up some votes from the Portuguese Democratic Movement (MDP), which had come to be viewed almost universally as little more than a front for the PCP and did not field candidates in this election. This gain was most pronounced in the South, for the MDP's former supporters in the North apparently opted in large part to vote Socialist. On the negative side, the voting results demonstrated the markedly regional nature of the PCP's constituency and the apparent failure of Communist efforts to expand from that base and win new support among employees of the tertiary sector, medium and small farmers, and elements of the middle class.

WHILE THE alignment of parliamentary seats made a Socialist-Communist alliance at the national level possible and the Communist leadership ceaselessly predicted the Socialists' inability to govern alone, the PCP still lacked the leverage to impose its will. If the Communists abstained on votes dealing with legislation they considered vital, a PPD/CDS bloc vote could defeat those measures. Moreover, the procedural rules adopted in the Constituent Assembly made it possible for a government to rule without a working majority. On motions of no-confidence in the government, there had to be an absolute majority in favor for the government to fall. However, the Communists would not likely vote with the PPD and CRS or vice versa, and to abstain would in effect cause defeat of the motion. Thus, there was a likelihood that the Socialists could form a government on their own with less than a majority of the seats and without having to deal with the PCP.

Faced with this frustrating prospect, the Communists decided to field their own candidate in the June 1976 presidential elections, in the hope of gaining more leverage on the future government. This decision was taken despite the PCP's long insistence on the preferability of having a military man as President of the Republic. The party had hoped that, given the broad executive powers granted the President by the February 1976 constitutional accord, the Council of the Revolution would designate a consensus candidate. But the CR proved

[46] *Ibid.*, March 16, 1975.

[47] Ibid. This whole issue of *Avante!* is devoted to the party's National Conference. According to this account, some cadres openly objected to the adoption of the language "party of the workers."

[48] See *Expresso*, April 30, 1976.

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unable to agree on a candidate, and two members of that body—Prime Minister Pinheiro de Azevedo and Army Chief of Staff Ramalho Eanes—announced their candidacies. While Pinheiro de Azevedo ran as an independent, Eanes quickly received the support of the three largest parties, the CDS, the PPD, and the PS, which together had collected nearly 75 per cent of the vote in the recent parliamentary elections. By putting forth their own candidate, Central Committee member Octavio Pato, the Communists initially hoped to deprive any one candidate of an absolute majority in the first round, thereby forcing a second vote, prior to which the PCP might extract some significant concessions. If things did not seem to be going well, the party could withdraw even prior to the first round. However, this option was foreclosed when Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho entered the contest as the candidate of a loose coalition of the ultra-Left. Carvalho's presence made it absolutely imperative that Pato continue in the race, lest Carvalho preempt the role of spokesman for the Left.

The results were, from the Communist point of view, disastrous.[49] Carvalho, in finishing second to Eanes, received over 17 percent of the vote (more than double Pato's total), handily outdistancing the Communist candidate in PCP strongholds in the South and draining away more than 400,000 of the votes the party had won in April 1976. Whatever chance the Communists might have had of preventing the Socialists from forming a minority government in the wake of the parliamentary elections evaporated after the presidential contest. As anticipated, Eanes called upon Soares to head the new government, and in mid-summer the Socialist leader presented his Cabinet and government program to the Assembly.

The PCP candidly admitted that it had lost ground in the presidential election, but it tried to take some solace from the fact that the combined totals for Carvalho and Pato gave the revolutionary Left a 24-percent share of the vote—some 200,000 more votes than the groups supporting the two candidates had received in the April election. This was seen as an indication of a still substantial reservoir of support for more radical options, although the Communist leadership warned about any illusions that the Left could, in the near term, return to use of "superior forms of struggle." In particular, the PCP rejected the call of the ultra-Left for formation of a revolutionary front and the return to mass-demonstration politics. It should be noted that this moderation was still only a tactical maneuver: The Communists predicted that the program of the new government concealed "the intentions of a rightist, social-democratic policy, full of dangers for Portuguese democracy," and they still maintained that bourgeois democracy was unviable in Portugal. The PCP declared its opposition to any measures seeking to shift the burden of economic stabilization onto the working class.[50]

Despite harsh criticism of the Socialist government, however, the Communists did not present any

[49] See, *e.g.*, the PCP's commentary in *Avante!*, July 1, 1976.
[50] See, for example, *ibid.*, July 29, 1976.



Independent leftist candidate Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho (left) and Communist Party candidate Octavio Pato (right) address last-minute appeals to the voters in the June 1976 Portuguese presidential election.

—Wide World and UPI.

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formal motion of censure in the National Assembly during the remainder of 1976. Instead they redoubled efforts to have the PS invite the PCP into a coalition government. These overtures were rejected, as was a Communist appeal to the Socialists to agree to joint PS-PCP candidate lists in the December 1976 municipal elections. Frustrated in the latter attempt but determined to overcome its poor showing in the June presidential election, the PCP formed its own electoral front—the United People's Electoral Front (*Frente Eleitoral Povo Unido*—FEPU)—with the MDP and leftist independents.

In the elections, the Socialists and the PPD (or Social Democratic Party—*Partido Social Democrático* or PSD—as it had renamed itself at its Congress in late October) each polled over a million votes, but the FEPU polled nearly 740,000 votes and, benefiting from a light voter turnout, gained control of more than 250 municipal assemblies. The Socialists, by holding their own in the municipal elections, avoided the necessity of accepting coalition partners from either the Right or the Left. The Communists, for their part, demonstrated that they remained a force to be reckoned with, particularly since by late 1976 the PCP had consolidated its control over *Intersindical,* quashing Socialist efforts to break the Communist monopoly over the labor movement.

Moreover, the Socialist Party was itself beset with internal difficulties.[51] The Communists remain firm in their belief that the PS will eventually have to opt for an alliance with them—either in a PS-PCP coalition government or one presided over by a civilian or military independent but relying on support from those two parties in the National Assembly. Such an outcome, while not impossible, remains unlikely. More probably, the Socialists will eventually turn to the PSD for a formal or informal partnership.

The PCP's Future Course

It has been suggested in the preceding pages that the radical and revolutionary cast of Portuguese Communist policy since April 1974 can best be understood when it is viewed as a response to the highly unstable political situation that the PCP encountered after the overthrow of Marcello Caetano. Moreover, it should be recognized that the Portuguese Communists have been operating in a situation qualitatively different from those which the French and Italian Communists encountered after World War II: (1) there was no allied army of occupation in 1974 Portugal (in fact, the country's armed forces were among the most radicalized sectors of the society), and (2) in light of the international situation, direct United States or West European intervention in Portuguese events seemed unlikely. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Communist leadership, steeled by a lengthy clandestine experience, opted for a radical course.

Subsequent events, particularly the election of Ramálho Eanes as President and the designation of Mário Soares as Prime Minister, suggest that the PCP may have lost its gamble; nevertheless, the outcome is still unclear. If Portugal fails to institutionalize a West European-style parliamentary democracy, that would certainly tend to reinforce the conviction of the Communists that their disdain for and opposition to bourgeois democracy and parliamentary politics has been well founded.

But even a continued evolution toward a parliamentary system of government does not automatically ensure a change in Communist perspectives. Under what circumstances and within what time frame might the PCP abandon its Leninist outlook and adopt the pluralistic and consensual stance which has become an increasingly important part of the ideological baggage of the other major West European Communist parties? It is these questions that we shall address in the concluding remarks below.

Before embarking upon an examination of possible Communist policy under a parliamentary democracy, however, let us briefly turn to a description of the problems—political and economic—whose solution is a precondition for the achievement of democratic stability in Portugal. In a broad political sense, Soares and the moderate elements in Portugal need to forge a national consensus not only on the accomplishments of the April 1974 revolution, but equally as important on the institutionalization of a parliamentary system as the best guarantee for preserving those gains. Opposition to the attainment of that consensus has and will continue to come from the extremist movements of both the Right and the Left—the first of these denying the legitimacy of the April revolution, the second rejecting the principles of parliamentary democracy as a vehicle for defending those gains and expand-

[51] At the Second PS Congress in early November a rival leadership list presented by the Socialist left wing succeeded in gaining 25 percent of the delegate vote. In addition, several days later, left-wing Socialist Lopes Cardoso resigned as Minister of Agriculture in opposition to the PS's agrarian reform policies. See accounts in *Le Monde* (Paris), Nov. 3 and 5, 1976.

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ing them. It is the social groups on which these movements are based (the small- and medium-scale farmers of the North and the *retornados* from the former colonies settled in the large urban centers, on the one hand, and the industrial working class and the agricultural proletariat of the South, on the other hand) whose political and social integration the regime must foster in the months ahead.

That is only the political side of the equation. The success of the venture is also conditioned by, and intimately linked to, the revitalization of the Portuguese economy, which has to recover from the effect of a political and social revolution that generated a climate of deep insecurity. The decolonization scheme to which the MFA committed itself after it assumed control of the government resulted in a radical restructuring of trade patterns, the elimination of the sizable profits derived from the exploitation of the precious metals and other resources of the former colonies, and a mass exodus of white settlers whose numbers swelled the unemployment rolls in the metropolis. Moreover, sources of investment capital, foreign and domestic, dried up because of the manner in which the nationalization and agrarian reform programs were carried out. In addition, there has been a decline in the remittances of emigrants (a source of substantial income for the country) and a loss of tourist revenues—both of which not only have made it difficult for the government to cover Portugal's traditional agricultural deficiency with food imports but also have contributed to a growing balance-of-payments deficit. To turn the situation around, while making good on the promise to achieve a more equitable distribution of income, will require great political dexterity.

Soares' success in coping with these myriad problems is obviously by no means assured. But let us assume, for the sake of argument and because his track record so far has been good (indeed, who would have predicted in the summer and fall of 1975 that he would be where he is today?), that he is at least partially successful. What can we then expect of the PCP?

With the progressive consolidation of a parliamentary democracy in Portugal, the Communists will have either to maintain their commitment to the "dynamics of force" and run the risk of becoming a marginal force whose influence will focus on a relatively narrow sector of society or else to change their party's stance and, like their counterparts elsewhere in Western Europe, direct their energies toward reassuring and gaining the support of the domestic middle classes. As the experience of other Communist parties suggests, however, the process of adaptation and change is likely to be slow, with changes of profound strategic significance appearing at least initially to be simply tactical readjustments. Therefore, it may be quite some time before the PCP comes to share the view of other West European Communist parties that profound structural changes in their respective societies must be fostered and promoted (although not necessarily concluded) within the parameters of the institutions of a parliamentary democracy. In this regard, one should pay careful attention to changes in the PCP's attitude toward its social and political alliance partners, in its international relationships, and in its ideology and organization; for, as research on other Communist parties has suggested,[52] the beginnings of the deradicalization of the PCP will be reflected in those spheres.

What are the prospects for change in the short to medium term? To a large extent these depend on a change either in the attitude of the Communist leadership or, more radically, in the composition of that leadership. The likelihood that the present leadership would effect such a shift is very slight—*Avante!* has dismissed the possibility of the "domestication" of the PCP as the "dream of national and international social democracy."[53] Secretary-General Cunhal has been the architect of and guiding spirit behind the radical policies followed by the PCP, and his highly moralistic and sectarian view of politics makes any prediction of such a change in his orientation rather farfetched. There is, moreover, no reason to believe that he is not the dominant force within the Central Committee of the PCP. And while we have no reason to think that any other member of the leadership has mounted a challenge to Cunhal's leadership (say at the recent Eighth Congress of the party), it is important to remember that any such move, had it occurred, would as likely have been grounded in a criticism not of the radical orientation of Cunhal's policies, but of perceived irresoluteness in his revolutionary leadership.

Let us examine briefly why this would likely be the case. First, it is clear that the Communists look to the Portuguese working class for much of the

[52] See, for example, a number of the essays in Donald L. M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow, Eds., *Communism in France and Italy*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1976.

[53] *Avante!*, Dec. 4, 1975.

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PCP's organizational strength and electoral support. However, in contrast to the situation in many other European countries, in Portugal a sizable segment of the working class is susceptible to radical rhetoric, a phenomenon which perhaps reflects the latent influence of anarcho-syndicalist traditions and ideas. Consequently, as the strong showing of Carvalho in the presidential elections demonstrated, the PCP cannot consider Portugal's industrial and agricultural proletariat an exclusive fief; in drafting party policies, the PCP's leaders must constantly compete with the utopian and demagogic line of the ultra-Left. Thus, there is little chance that a move within the PCP to blunt its radical perspective would find much support in the social base of the party in the near future, particularly as the inevitable government measures to enforce wage controls and reassert industrial discipline will presumably only increase the restiveness of the workers. To the degree that those measures will exacerbate (at least in the short run) divisions along class lines in the country, they are unlikely to lead to changes either in the organizational style of the PCP or in the content of party ideology.

The short- and medium-term prospects for an evolution of Portuguese Communism depend as well on the future role of the military in the country's politics. It seems that the military will play an increasingly important role in that sphere, particularly as it is to them—as the effective wielders of power—that Mário Soares will inevitably have to turn for support in the austerity period which the Portuguese economy is now entering. Moreover, the need to counter the still-present danger of a right-wing revival, or even coup, may give added weight to the remaining leftist elements in the military. This will be important for the PCP, not because Melo Antunes and his associates directly support the Communists or share their views (as we have seen, "the Nine" played a critical role in preventing a Communist seizure of power), but because in continuing to insist on safeguarding and expanding the socialist accomplishments of the Portuguese revolution, on the necessity that the PCP play a role in that enterprise, and on the need for the military Left to function as a catalyst therein, the latter is an ally (albeit an "objective" one only) in the Communists' struggle to regain—if not necessarily the initiative—at least some of their lost influence.

How the military Left perceives its future role was suggested this past August, when the leftists on the Council of the Revolution, faced with a choice between retaining what operational commands they held and continuing to be members of the CR, chose the latter course. The reorganization of this supreme military organ may well have been undertaken to weaken leftist control of military units, but the decision has in fact also served to make the CR a bastion of leftist influence. Moreover, after a lengthy silence dating back to before the presidential elections, Antunes has begun once again to make public declarations, urging that the Council of the Revolution and also the special Constitutional Commission (a type of constitutional tribunal with the power to declare laws unconstitutional), which he heads, play a more active role. He saw both as functioning as centers of power parallel to the National Assembly and the Cabinet.[54]

For the present, there is little chance that the PCP will change: the situation does not now and may not for some time require it. The leadership continues to believe that, despite "tactical" failures, the political line articulated over the last 2 to 3 years was the best possible one and remains so (there has, after all, not been a decisive defeat). Thus, in a recent interview with *Expresso,* Cunhal could declare that "in its essential aspects the PCP's strategic line has been confirmed by life." [55]

There has been some speculation that this perspective might be moderated by the expansion of the PCP Central Committee from 36 to 90 full and candidate members at the party's Eighth Congress last November, for some of the new cadres are persons who had joined the PCP after April 1974 and whose outlooks have therefore not been shaped by the clandestine experience.[56] However, it should be underscored that, while this development may have long-term implications, its immediate importance seems limited. The composition of the party's supreme organ—the Political Commission—continues unchanged, and most of those who entered the enlarged CC with *full* voting rights had been active in the PCP apparat prior to 1974. Change in the PCP's perspective will probably come only with the rise to power within the party of another generation of Portuguese Communists—cadres who neither experienced the era of clandestinity nor played any leading role in the PCP's actions during the heady months following the April 1974 coup.

[54] *Expresso,* Nov. 5, 1976.
[55] *Ibid.,* Nov. 19, 1976.
[56] See *Avante!,* Nov. 18, 1976.

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Greek Communists and the Karamanlis Government

By Dimitri Kitsikis

When the Communist Party of Greece emerged in the summer of 1974 from nearly a generation of illegality, it confronted a Greek political scene vastly different from that in which it had last functioned openly 27 years before. The party had been outlawed in November 1947, at a moment of civil war when the Communists, relying on guerrilla tactics and on supplies smuggled into Greece from Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Albania, seemed to have very serious prospects of taking power in Greece by force. At that time, all anti-Communist elements in the country, united in a common front under the direction of a broad coalition government headed by 87-year-old Liberal Themistoklis Sofoulis, supported the ban imposed against the insurgents.

In contrast, by 1974 it was no longer the Communists, responsible for the long-ended "guerrilla war" (*andartopolemos*) of 1946-49, who served as primary focus of hostility for the traditional political elite of Greece, but rather the vehemently anti-Communist elements responsible for the Yeoryios Papadhopoulos-Dhimitris Ioannidhis military dictatorship of 1967-74. On April 21, 1967, army officers of peasant and petty-bourgeois extraction that had fought communism in the mountains of Greece for the sake of the politicians of Athens during the late 1940's, staged a coup d'état against the same elite which they had earlier served. Laying sole claim to the anti-Communist banner, but at the same time claiming to represent an ill-defined ideology aimed at social justice for all Greeks in the face of inequities created by the country's wealthy urban political oligarchy, the officers—both Papadhopoulos and Ioannidhis were colonels—toppled their masters and imprisoned many of them. Political activity was suspended; dissenting opinion was severely repressed; and military-authoritarian rule destined to last seven years was introduced.

The military regime was finally brought down—by increased restiveness at home following the replacement of Papadhopoulos by the more rigid Ioannidhis, by worsening inflation and deepening economic trouble, and, most immediately, by its gross mishandling of the Cyprus crisis of 1974. But the trauma which the military rulers had created for the Greek aristocracy was such that the pre-1967 oligarchic elite which returned to power did so with a much more tolerant attitude toward communism, the junta's professed bogeyman. On July 23, 1974, Konstantinos Karamanlis was recalled from France, where he had lived in voluntary exile since resigning as Prime Minister of Greece in 1963, to form a coalition government preparatory to the holding of new elections and the full restoration of parliamentary rule. Prime Minister from 1955 to 1963, he had been accused by all opposition parties of rigging the parliamentary elections of 1961 and of moral

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responsibility for the death of United Democratic Left deputy Grigorios Lambrakis in 1963.[1] Sensitive to the scars left by seven years of dictatorship, upon returning home Karamanlis sought, immediately, to demonstrate to his countrymen that accusations of authoritarian tendencies made against him in the past had been false and that he was, in fact, Greece's best democrat. His behavior since 1974 has clearly been designed to secure his own place in history—that is, less toward coping with communism than toward making clear to his compatriots that he is the country's best hope for averting events of either the 1946-49 or 1967-74 varieties.

Thus, the return to power of Karamanlis and the pre-1967 sociopolitical elite which he represents has resulted in an unexpected opportunity for the rebirth of Greek Communist strength. Whether the Communists will be able to exploit this opportunity to improve their standing in the political arena will depend (a) on how well they succeed in avoiding errors committed in the past (*i.e.*, unconditional obedience to Moscow and hostility toward the peasantry), and (b) on whether they manage to formulate a political strategy agreeable to all factions of the Communist movement and compatible with the realities of Greece "after the colonels."

The present article will attempt to summarize the development of communism in Greece—its strengths, weaknesses, and electoral record—from its origins in 1918-20 just after the Russian Revolution to its reemergence as a legally active movement contesting the parliamentary elections of 1974. Then, after examining the nature of the relationship which exists between Communist ideology and Greek socioeconomic realities, the article will discuss what the Greek Communists are doing to try to exploit the opportunity which has presented itself and what their prospects for success are for the foreseeable future.

Communism in Greece to World War II

The Greek workers' movement began to develop in the 1870's, but it was not until November 17, 1918, that the Workers' Socialist Party of Greece was established, during a Panhellenic Socialist Congress in Piraeus. The party grew out of the fusion of diverse small socialist groups which had emerged before and during World War I. At the party's second congress, held in Athens between April 18 and 26, 1920, supporters of the Third (Communist) International, founded in Moscow in March 1919, asserted control and added the word Communist, in parentheses, to the party's title. The party adopted the hammer and sickle as its emblem and formally entered the Comintern; however, the title of the party daily, *Rizospastis* (Radical), which had commenced publication in 1917 before the Piraeus congress, remained unchanged.[2]

One of the problems which the new Communist party had to face was the very limited scale of heavy industry in Greece during the first half of the 20th century. The absence of an industrial working-class base was bound to hinder the electoral performance of a proletarian party. This clearly accounted for the fact that Greece failed to develop a social-democratic or reformist-internationalist party of the working class as most countries of Western Europe did during this period. The names of certain left-of-center parties which did develop were misleading. For example, Alexandros Papanastasiou's Agrarian and Workers' Party, which was active between the two world wars, and the Socialist Democratic Party with which Yeoryios Papandreou contested the 1946 elections,[3] while based on Western ideas, were certainly not working-class socialist parties. In fact, the only serious endeavor to create a non-Communist workers' party was that of Ilias Tsirimokos and Professor Alexandros Svolos, who founded the Union of People's Democracy (*Enosi Laikis Dhimokratias*—ELD) during the German occupation of Greece and fought

[1] In the 1961 elections, Karamanlis' National Radical Union won 49.6 percent of the valid ballots cast. The Center Union of Yeoryios Papandreou and Sofoklis Venizelos had anticipated winning the election, but, in alliance with the small Progressive Party of Speros Markezinis, received only 34.3 percent of the vote. The Communist-dominated Pan-Democratic Agrarian Front got 15.1 percent, way down from its 1958 record of 24.3 percent. Disappointed with the election results, both opposition forces complained bitterly of fraud and intimidation at the polls.

Furthermore, they attributed Lambrakis' death in Thessaloniki to deliberate government action. The Communists founded a youth movement called Democratic Youth Lambrakis, intended to spread communism among the younger generation. Mikis Theodhorakis was leader of the movement. The motion picture "Z," for which Theodhorakis composed the score, was based on the story of Lambrakis' death.

[2] Stavros Zormbalas, *Simaia tou laou: selidhes apo tin istoria tou "Rizospasti," 1917-1936* (People's Flag: Some Pages from the History of *Rizospastis*, 1917-1936), Bucharest, Politikes kai Logotekhnikes Ekdhoseis, 1966. See also, D. Kitsikis, *Propagande et pressions en politique internationale—La Grèce et ses revendications à la Conférence de Paix, 1919-1920* (Propaganda and Pressures in International Politics—Greece and Her Claims at the Peace Conference, 1919-1920), Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1963, pp. 460-80.

[3] Yeoryios Papandreou founded the Socialist Democratic Party in 1933. The party was not active within Greece until after World War II.

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the Germans as part of the National Liberation Front (*Ethniko Apelevftherotiko Metopo*—EAM). This party, however, received just 3,912 votes in the 1951 parliamentary elections—the only elections in which it ran alone—and then disappeared. The United Democratic Left (*Enieia Dhimokratiki Aristera*—EDA), established to fill the gap that was left by the outlawing of the Communist Party in 1947, was the spiritual heir of the latter and not of the ELD.

In the first national elections which it contested, the Workers' Socialist Party (Communist) received fewer than 20,000 votes, and each of the party's candidates was defeated in the electoral district where he ran. By the November 7, 1926, elections, the Communists had officially changed the name of their party to the Greek Communist Party (*Kommounistiko Komma Elladhas*—KKE), but they campaigned as the United Electoral Front of Workers, Peasants, and Refugees in an attempt to attract the votes of the uprooted Greeks repatriated from Asia Minor under terms of the 1923 Greek-Turkish Treaty of Lausanne. The KKE received 41,982 votes, or 4.4 percent of those cast. Owing to the proportional electoral system used for the first time in these elections, this performance secured the Communists 10 seats out of 279 in parliament.

During the rest of the interwar period the Communists' electoral fortunes varied from election to election, but the number of votes they received never exceeded 10 percent of those cast. They won parliamentary seats only when the proportional electoral system was used (1926, 1932, 1936), never when the majority candidate in each district automatically won the seat contested (1923, 1928, 1933, 1935).

In the elections of August 19, 1928, the Communists' vote total fell to 14,325, only 1.4 percent of those cast, and not one of their candidates was elected. But after the world economic crisis their performance improved. The elections of September 25, 1932, gave them 58,223 votes (5 percent) and 10 deputies. The figures remained approximately the same in the elections of March 5, 1933, with the KKE getting 52,958 votes (4.6 percent)—though no parliamentary seats—and then increased considerably in the elections of June 9, 1935. Profiting from the abstention of all parties of the Center and of the non-Communist Left (some of whose supporters voted for the Communists rather than abstain), the KKE amassed 98,699 votes, an interwar high of 9.6 percent of the total, even though the majority electoral system in force still kept them out of parliament. Because of the reintroduction of the proportional electoral system, 15 parliamentary seats out of a total of 300 went to Communists in the elections of January 6, 1936, but the total vote received by the party fell to 73,411, or 5.8 percent of those cast.[4]

Clearly, the Communists still represented a small minority in the country. The absence of heavy industry in Greece, which might have supplied a working-class base of support, was reflected in the social origins of the members of the Communist parliamentary group of 1936: some workers in the tobacco industry, a hairdresser, a streetcar employee, a barrister, and a high school principal.[5] Total party membership in 1936 was only 14,000.

During the dictatorship of General Ioannis Metaxas from 1936 to 1941—as during the 1967-74 military dictatorship—the KKE was particularly weak, corroded by internal strife. From 1936 to 1941, it was split into three groups. At the head of two of these groups—called the Former Central Committee and the Provisional Leadership—Metaxas' police put its own agents. The third group took shape in the country's prisons, especially in the prison of Akronafplia Fortress in the Peloponnesos. One of the members of this last group, Pavlos Nefeloudhis, who is still a Communist today, wrote in his memoirs, published in Athens in 1974, that at the time of the establishment of the Metaxas dictatorship "there was no contact of the party with the rank and file."[6] The KKE had done nothing to prepare itself for the eventuality of a coup, even though it suspected that one was in preparation. As a result, as in 1967, many of the Communist Party's leaders were arrested in their beds on the night of the coup.

Metaxas' death on January 29, 1941, cut off George II, Greece's "English" king (so called because of his pro-British sympathies and his 12-year exile in Britain, which had been ended by his restoration in 1935), from the Greek masses, after he had already been cut off from the bourgeoisie by the General's 1936 coup. In May, the king departed his country once more, abandoning Greece to any movement which would support parliamentary democracy

[4] D. Kitsikis, "Greece," in Jean Myriat and Stein Rokkan, Eds., *International Guide to Electoral Statistics*, The Hague, Mouton, 1969, Vol. 1, pp. 163-82.

[5] D. Kitsikis, "Parliament and Social Change in Greece up to the Military Coup d'Etat of 1967," *Social History—Histoire sociale* (Ottawa), November 1970, p. 63.

[6] Pavlos Nefeloudhis, *Stis piges tis kakodhaimonias. Ta bathitera aitia tis dhiaspasis tou KKE, 1918-1968: episima keimena kai prosopikes empeiries* (At the Roots of Bad Fortune. The Deep Causes of the Split in the Communist Party of Greece [KKE], 1918-1968: Official Documents and Personal Experiences), 2nd ed., Athens, Gutenberg, 1974, p. 116.

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to please the middle class and set up national resistance to the Axis invaders and promote social justice to please the masses. Here was an unprecedented opportunity for the Communist Party to exploit, if only it would dress in the democratic mantle. The Communists responded by founding the National Liberation Front (EAM) in an atmosphere of social leveling due to hunger, on the September 27, 1941, in Athens.[7]

1941-1974

There is no doubt whatsoever that the EAM, the most important organization of Greek resistance to the Axis occupation, was at the beginning the Communist Party itself. This is openly acknowledged in the memoirs of Communist EAM leader Petros Rousos which were published in Bucharest in 1966 by the party's press in exile, the *Politikes kai Logotekhnikes Ekdhoseis* (Political and Literary Press).[8] Rousos describes with pride the extraordinary transformation of the Greek Communist Party, through the EAM, from an extremely weak and divided entity in May 1941, into the dominant political force in Greece at the end of the Axis occupation. According to Rousos, the social leveling produced by the occupation made the EAM an enormous fraternity of more than one and a half million members—out of a total population at the time of 7,350,000—united by the most benign sentiments of solidarity and sacrifice. The organization's ranks included six bishops, hundreds of priests, and great numbers of Greek patriots who fought the Germans as members of EAM while remaining totally unaware of the KKE's unconditional subservience to the Soviet Union.

Communists often equate foreign occupation with a dictatorial regime that is not favorable to them. Indeed, the Greek Communists have frequently compared the military regime installed on April 21, 1967, to the German wartime occupation.[9] But the comparison hardly seems convincing. It affords no explanation as to why the strength of the Communists went up tremendously during the German-Italian-Bulgarian occupation of 1941-44, whereas during the 1936-41 and 1967-74 dictatorships, when they had to suffer less repression, they had no success at all.

The KKE temporarily increased its membership from 14,000 in 1936, when Metaxas outlawed the party, to 350,000 in 1944, when the German occupation ended, by exploiting Greek national sentiment. Yet within three years, utter disregard of the same national sentiment and Greek values by the Communists, vividly demonstrated by the way they waged the 1946-49 guerrilla war, sent them down to defeat—disgraced and outlawed politically in 1947, and finally beaten militarily in 1949.

They reappeared in disguise on the Greek political scene as early as 1951, when the Communist-dominated party called the United Democratic Left (EDA) was founded. But the Communists, always a small minority of under 10 percent of the electorate before the war, could hardly expect to do much better after the disastrous outcome of the civil war. The EDA received 24.3 percent of the votes in 1958, but most of these were protest votes by left-of-center non-Communists against the three-year-old Karamanlis government, which they considered much too conservative socially. More typical of the Communists' postwar performances were the elections of February 16, 1964 (the last before the coup d'état of April 21, 1967), when the EDA garnered only 11.8 percent of the votes cast.

In 1967, as in 1936, the Communists were caught unawares by the military coup d'état. They put up no resistance whatsoever, and Greek communism appeared to be on the verge of collapsing completely. The inevitable result soon followed. Differences broke out openly between the leadership of the Communist Party situated "in the exterior," *i.e.*, in the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, and the leadership of EDA, representing communism "in the interior," or within Greece.

Long before 1967, EDA had complained of being obliged to follow the directives of Communist leaders settled outside of the country since 1949 who had—in the opinion of the militants of the interior—lost contact with Greek reality.[10] Moreover, the exiled Greek Communist Party, EDA leaders maintained, had had a very turbulent and disgraceful history abroad, with internal disputes so violent that many had lost faith in it. Such was the case with Dhimitris

[7] D. Kitsikis, "Starvation in Greece, 1941-1942: The Political Consequences," *Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale* (Paris), April 1969, pp. 17-41.

[8] Petros Rousos, *I megali tetraetia* (The Big Four Years), Bucharest, Politikes kai Logotekhnikes Ekdhoseis, 1966.

[9] See D. Kitsikis, "The Communist Movement in Greece," *Etudes internationales* (Quebec), September 1975, pp. 334-54.

[10] On divisions within the KKE, see Antonio Solaro, *Storia del partito comunista greco* (History of the Greek Communist Party), Milan, Teti, 1973. Solaro has been in the KKE since 1948.

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Vlantas, KKE Politburo member from 1947 to 1956 and Minister of Defense of the Communist guerrilla government from 1948 to 1949. The experiences that had destroyed his belief in the party are worth recounting in some detail.

Vlantas had been a member of the Greek Communist Party since 1924. In 1943, during the Axis occupation, he founded and led the Communist-inspired United Panhellenic Youth Organization (*Enieia Panellinia Organosi Neon*—EPON). During the civil war, he was the Communists' Minister of Agriculture, then Minister of Defense. But in March 1956 he was excluded from the party as a member of the overthrown Stalinist leadership of the KKE led by Nikos Zakhariadhis. He was exiled, by decision of his party and the Russians, for 11 years in the Carpathian Mountains of Romania, where he lived under extremely harsh conditions. Finally, in October 1967, he managed to find refuge in Paris, where he continues to live today. Even though he still considered himself a Marxist (though no longer a Leninist), leftist French journalists like Eric Rouleau of *Le Monde* declined to help him publish his memoirs. Finally, he decided to give part of them to the rightist Athenian newspaper *Akropolis*, which published them, in the form of an interview, in a series of four articles which appeared between April 1 and 5, 1973.[11]

In his recollections, Vlantas makes a disclosure that adds a new element to the explanations given

General Dhimitris Vlantas, then an officer in the Greek leftist guerrilla forces, speaks to the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party held in Sofia, December 19-24, 1948.

—Wide World.

by others who have written of the period—for example, Evanghelos Averoff-Tossizza and Dominique Eudes—concerning the decisive rift which took place during the civil war between the Secretary-General of the KKE, Nikos Zakhariadhis, and the head of the Communist government and army, Markos Vafiadhis.[12] Vlantas says that the Russians told Zakhariadhis that in 1948 they had received a letter from Markos, addressed to the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, accusing Zakhariadhis of being a traitor. While Vlantas seems to believe that the letter really existed, he himself did not see it—which of course leaves open the possibility that Stalin forged the accusation to widen the rift already separating the two leaders.

Another of his recollections concerns a serious incident which occurred in 1955 in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, between rival groups of Greek Communist refugees in the USSR. In 1955, Vlantas was in Moscow, a KKE Politburo member. The party asked him to go to Tashkent to cope with a fractional group that had developed among the 12,000 former Greek Communist *guerrilleros* living there. The disruptive faction was headed by Communists opposed to the Zakhariadhis leadership, with the

[11] D. Vlantas, "Why I Disagreed with the Communist Party," *Akropolis* (Athens), April 1-5, 1973.

[12] Evanghelos Averoff-Tossizza, *Le Feu et la hache: Grèce '46-49* (The Fire and the Axe: Greece '46-49), Paris, Editions de Breteuil, 1973, pp. 260-63; and Dominique Eudes, *The Kapetanios: Partisans and Civil War in Greece, 1943-1949*, London, NLB, 1972. Averoff-Tossizza is a former Minister of Foreign Affairs. In the present Karamanlis government, he is the Minister of National Defense.

Averoff said that the reason for Markos Vafiadhis' elimination was his great respect for Tito. Like Tito, Markos, as he is generally known, was a nationalist Communist. Consequently, Moscow ordered Zakhariadhis to remove Markos from all his positions. Averoff also said that Markos did not agree on military tactics with Zakhariadhis, who instead of continuing guerrilla warfare wanted to launch regular army operations in a positional war.

Eudes, who got his information from Markos himself, confirms the accuracy of this last cause of divergence alleged by Averoff. Markos is supposed to have said to the disagreeing Zakhariadhis on Jan. 15, 1948, "We are not a regular army, and we are in no position at the moment to operate seriously against urban centers" (*The Kapetanios*, p. 309). And in August of the same year, in another violent quarrel, "Markos accused Zakhariadhis of trying to liquidate the revolution" (*ibid.*, p. 330). On Aug. 21, 1948, says Eudes, Zakhariadhis tried unsuccessfully to murder Markos; Averoff, however, doubts this.

Markos gave more details of his rift with Zakhariadhis in a series of articles published under the title, "Markos Vafiadhis' Diary," *Ta Nea* (Athens), Sept. 13-21, 1976.

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well-known Markos Vafiadhis, Dhimitris Partsalidhis, Leonidhas Stringos, Kostas Kolliyiannis, and Takis Dhimitriou prominent among them. As Vlantas tells it, however, the fractional group had in fact been organized by the Soviet authorities, who had themselves decided to oust Zakhariadhis.[13]

When Vlantas arrived in Tashkent, a representative of the leadership of the Soviet Communist Party asked him to help the fractional group rather than destroy it, and to become its leader with Soviet backing. Vlantas refused. In retaliation, on August 18, 1955, when Zakhariadhis himself arrived in Tashkent, the Soviet Security Policy armed about 500 Greek Communists with knives in order to try to murder Vlantas. Vlantas suggested to Zakhariadhis that both go back to Bucharest, Romania, where the headquarters of the Central Committee of the Greek Communist Party was located, and attempt from there to quell the fractional group. But the appeal was in vain, and Vlantas remained in Tashkent. On September 10, 1955, 500 armed fractionalists attacked the party's offices in Tashkent under the conduct of Soviet security agents. Vlantas and 35 of his men barricaded themselves inside, using furniture to block the doors. The battle lasted nearly two hours, with the assailants shouting, "Death to Vlantas." Finally, 3,000 former *guerrilleros* came to Vlantas' aid from the different parts of the city and succeeded in liberating him. He returned to Bucharest.

In October 1956, Vlantas was arrested in Bucharest and, as has already been mentioned, sentenced to internal exile within Romania. He says he is grateful to his Romanian comrades for not having allowed the Russians to exile him to Siberia and for having kept him in their country instead, even though as a prisoner.

While the 1967 coup in Athens precipitated the crisis between Greek Communists abroad and those at home, a formal split did not take place until February 1968, at the 12th Plenum of the party's Central Committee. There then emerged a Greek Communist Party "of the exterior" and a Greek Communist Party "of the interior." The EDA, although no longer allowed to operate in the open as the Communists' legal façade because the regime of the colonels had outlawed all political parties, leaned heavily toward the Communist Party "of the interior," whose viewpoints it by and large shared.

[13] Zakhariadhis had been approved to head the KKE by the Comintern in 1931. He was appointed Secretary-General in 1934.

It should be noted, however, that this split did not represent the only fractionalization of the Greek Communist movement during the 1960's, even if it was the most serious one. In 1964, a Maoist group had broken away from the EDA. Led by Iannis Khotzeas and Isaak Iordhanidhis, it issued a monthly review called *Anayennisi* (Rennaissance) up to the time of the military coup in 1967. Its publishing house, *Istorikes Ekdhoseis* (History Press), also produced translations of Chinese books.

The End of Illegality

All these various Communist elements survived the hardships of the years of the Papadhopoulos-Ioannidhis dictatorship and entered the overt political arena in the summer of 1974 after the restoration of parliamentarism in Greece. They endeavored to increase their constituencies in the country by putting pressure on the Karamanlis government to allow the repatriation en masse of all Greek refugees who had lived in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union since 1949.

The Greek Parliament opened a debate on the matter on February 20, 1975. Konstantinos Stefanopoulos, Minister of the Interior, said that the number of refugees involved was approximately 100,000, and that while the government could not permit so many people to come back at the same time, it would permit individual repatriation. Each refugee would merely have to fill out an application for repatriation. The minister added that in fact repatriation was very easy, and that the government was no longer asking applicants for a declaration of political beliefs.[14]

In practice, the procedure has not proved quite as simple as Stefanopoulos suggested it would be. For example, the Ministry of Public Order did refuse to repatriate Markos Vafiadhis from the USSR, even though Vafiadhis made an official application on July 25, 1976.[15] Nevertheless, many refugees have returned to Greece since 1974. For instance, 71 Greek Communist refugees arrived in Piraeus by boat from Tashkent on October 4, 1976, and were received in the harbor by a great number of their comrades.[16] This sort of reunion has been a source of great concern to anti-Communist circles in the country, who

[14] On Stefanopoulos' statement of government policy, see *To Vima* (Athens), Feb. 21, 1975; and *Vradhini* (Athens), Feb. 21, 1975.

[15] *Akropolis*, Oct. 8, 1976.

[16] *I Avyi* (Athens), Oct. 5, 1976.

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fear that at least some of those repatriated have been trained abroad for guerrilla warfare and are secretly bringing weapons into the country with them.

Despite the new political atmosphere favoring them, the Communists did not do spectacularly well in the general elections held under Karamanlis on November 17, 1974. A Communist electoral front called the United Left (*Enieia Aristera*—EA) garnered 464,331 votes—9.45 percent of the total—and 8 of 300 parliamentary seats (see Table 1). The electoral coalition joined three Communist parties: the EDA, led by Ilias Iliou; the Communist Party "of the interior" (*Kommounistiko Komma Elladhas-esoterikou* or KKE-Interior), headed by Secretary-General Kharalambos (Bambis) Dhrakopoulos and Leonidhas Kirkos; and the Communist Party "of the exterior" (*Kommounistiko Komma Elladhas* [*exoterikou*] or KKE-Exterior), led by Kharilaos Florakis (Yiotis). The eight people who won election to parliament on its slate included Ilias Iliou of EDA; Bambis Dhrakopoulos and Leonidhas Kirkos of KKE-Interior; and Kharilaos Florakis, Grigorios Farakos, Mrs. Mina Yiannou, Konstantinos Kappos, and Dhimitris Gondikas of KKE-Exterior.

Five out of the eight deputies, it should be underscored, belong to the orthodox, pro-Soviet KKE-Exterior. That this share of the seats reflects this party's real relative popular strength is attested by the sales of its Athenian daily, *Rizospastis*. *Rizospastis* sells nearly twice as many copies as does *I Avyi* (Dawn), the daily of the KKE-Interior and EDA. During the week of July 26-August 1, 1976, for example, *Rizospastis'* sales averaged 13,904 copies a day, or 2.8 percent of the total sales of the 13 dailies in the Athens-Piraeus area (see Table 2). This figure ranked it eighth on the list of 13 papers. *I Avyi*'s sales, in contrast, averaged 7,312 copies a day, or 1.5 percent of the total sales. This figure put it at the very bottom of the list of papers.

The Maoist Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece (*Epanastatiko Kommounistiko Komma Elladhas*—EKKE) ran a separate slate in the 1974 elections. It got only 1,013 votes, or 0.02 percent of the total. (It should be noted here that the Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece does not enjoy a monopoly on the Maoist label. Indeed, there are now more than 20 ultra-Left splinter organizations in Greece, the most "Maoist" of them being the Organization of the Marxist-Leninists of Greece—*Organosi Marxiston Leniniston Elladhas* or OMLE.)

From the 1974 election figures, then, it is clear that neither the prolonged clandestine existence of the KKE since 1947 nor seven years of antiparlia-

Table 1: Results of the Greek Parliamentary Elections of November 17, 1974

Parties and Electoral Alliances	Votes cast	Percent of total vote	Number of seats	Percent of total seats
Conservative				
New Democracy (ND[a])	2,670,804	54.37	220	73.33
Center				
Center Union—New Forces (electoral coalition of EK and ND[b])	1,002,908	20.42	60	20.00
Non-Communist Left				
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK[c])	666,806	13.58	12	4.00
Communist				
United Left (electoral coalition of EDA, KKE-Interior, and KKE-Exterior[d])	464,331	9.45	8[e]	2.67
Other[f]	107,507	2.18	0	0
TOTAL	4,912,356	100.00	300	100.00

[a] *Nea Dhimokratia.*
[b] *Enosi Kentrou, Nees Dinamis.*
[c] *Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima.*
[d] *Enieia Dhimokratiki Aristera, Kommounistiko Komma Elladhas-esoterikou, and Kommunistiko Komma Elladhas (exoterikou).*
[e] Of which the EDA got 1, the KKE-Interior got 2, and the KKE-Exterior got 5.
[f] This category, embracing a variety of small parties and splinter groups, includes the Maoist Revolutionary Communist Movement of Greece (*Epanastatiko Kommounistiko Komma Elladhas*—EKKE), which received 1,013 votes, or 0.02 percent of the total vote cast.

SOURCE: Richard F. Staar, Ed., *1975 Yearbook on International Communist Affairs*, Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, 1975, p. 202.

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mentary military dictatorship have altered the degree of strength that the Communists enjoy in Greece. When Communist forces were allowed to reappear lawfully and contest elections in 1974, they obtained the roughly 10 percent of the vote that they had traditionally captured. Non-Communist left-of-center voters who had at times pushed EDA figures above this level in earlier years—to as high as 24 percent in 1958—this time channeled their support elsewhere, most notably to Andreas Papandreou's Panhellenic Socialist Union (*Panellinio Sosialistiko Kinima*—PASOK).

In these circumstances, several questions about the future of communism in Greece arise. Will the Communists find new bases of support in the Greek populace, which has remained unresponsive for so long to Communist appeals? Will the Communists, so badly defeated in 1949 after the collapse of their armed rebellion, be able to avoid past errors such as unconditional submission to the will of a foreign power (*i.e.*, the Soviet Union) and inability to adapt to peasant realities? And will they adopt political tactics conducive to furthering a modus vivendi with the Karamanlis government and not destroying the opportunity for greater Communist influence in Greek political life which has presented itself? It is to this series of questions that our discussion must now turn.

Communism and Greek Reality

Despite much economic progress over the last 20 years, Greece is still in essence an underdeveloped country. The numerically predominant elements in Greek society are the peasantry and the lower-middle classes. The country has few large industries under local ownership. The ruling middle class stems largely from comprador ranks—those who work for or have business ties with foreign firms. Industrial workers are limited in number. All this is bound to affect the fortunes and stifle the appeals of a proletarian movement.

The adherence to traditional values which is normal for a peasant and petty-bourgeois population is accentuated in Greece by the fact that the country's population is, demographically, one of the world's oldest. Not only is the Greek birth rate very low—0.5 percent a year, but emigration over a long period from rural villages directly to foreign countries has left the countryside peopled predominantly with old folk. This state of affairs is in absolute contrast with

Table 2: Average Daily Sales of Newspapers in the Athens-Piraeus Area

(Week of July 26-August 1, 1976)

Papers, ranked by sales	Number of copies sold	Percent of total sales
1. *Ta Nea*	137,775	28.2
2. *Apoyevmatini*	80,668	16.5
3. *Elevtherotipia*	75,590	15.5
4. *Vradhini*	49,514	10.1
5. *Akropolis*	33,295	6.8
6. *To Vima*	28,444	5.8
7. *I Kathimerini*	22,026	4.5
8. *Rizospastis*	13,904	2.8
9. *Elevtheros kosmos*	13,644	2.8
10. *Athinaiki*	11,515	2.4
11. *Estia*	7,398	1.6
12. *Ethnikos kirix*	7,330	1.5
13. *I Avyi*	7,312	1.5
TOTAL	488,415	100.0

SOURCE: *O Takhidhromos* (Athens), Aug. 5, 1976.

that in Turkey, for example, which has—despite emigration—a very young population and an annual population increase of 2.5 percent.

An additional factor affecting the Communists' situation is that Greek traditional values are non-Western. Despite the long-standing myth—fostered by a West eager to discover noble ancestors in its geneology—that Greek culture is Western, it is not and never has been. There exists, according to a long tradition represented by the greatest spiritual figure of Eastern Orthodoxy, Saint Grigorios Palamas and the famous 15th-century Greek philosopher Yeoryios O Trapezountios, a traditional Russian-Greek-Turkish-Persian-Arab civilization in which Greek Orthodoxy and Islam are not contradictory, but rather two aspects of the same reality.[17] Western penetration into this area of civilization, which began with the crusades of the 11th century, led in Greece to the development of a pro-Western political trend—or "Western party"—and an anti-Western traditional political trend—or "Eastern party." The overwhelming power of the West in 19th century Europe succeeded in imposing on Greece in 1821 a Westernist revolution and a Westernist political and cultural elite, the Liberals, who remain today the most enthusiastic supporters of the assimilation of

[17] Grigorios Palamas (1269-1359), Archbishop of Thessaloniki, has been thoroughly studied in the many works of Professor John Meyendorff. On the "Eastern Party" and Yeoryios O Trapezountios (1395-1484), see D. Kitsikis, "From Byzantine to Contemporary Greece," in *Encyclopedia Universalis*, Paris, 1970, Vol. 7, pp. 1077-85.

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Kharalambos Dhrakopoulos, now Secretary-General of the Greek Communist Party "of the interior" (KKE-Interior), in a photo released in October 1971 after his arrest by security police for alleged antistate and terrorist activities.

—Wide World.

Greece into the European Common Market. The Eastern party, which lost out in 1821 but which continued to reflect most accurately Greek values, has taken refuge today in the Orthodox monasteries spread throughout the country and, in the form of a trend that could be labeled "Eastern modernist," in the Greek army. Both the monasteries and the military, populated by peasant children of the Greek countryside, get strong support from Greek society's most numerous elements.

Communism, which is, like liberalism, a Western ideology imported into Greece, has not succeeded in developing there a real agrarian variant which would —in fact if not in theory—give precedence to the peasant and the countryside over the industrial worker and the city. The "Maoists" of Greece are no different from those of the West. They are confined to the cities and know nothing about the countryside. And their weekly Athenian newspapers, *Laikos Dhromos* (The Road of the People) of OMLE and *Laikoi Agones* (People's Struggles) of EKKE, are more concerned with the presentation of China's and Albania's views and activities and with anti-Soviet attacks than with promoting the views of the Greek peasantry. (*Laikos Dhromos* gets official support from China, and Peking's New China News Agency on occasion quotes it.[18])

Only during World War II did agrarian communism in Greece have a genuine supporter, Aris Veloukhiotis, the founder and head of the Communist guerrilla National Popular Liberation Army (*Ethnikos Laikos Apelevftherotikos Stratos*—ELAS), which was mainly a peasant army. At the end of the war, however, in June 1945, Aris was condemned as an adventurist by the leadership of the KKE and killed. All Greek Communist parties today praise his example with endless eulogies and blame others for his death. But no party has adopted his ideas.

The result is that Greek communism has not the slightest originality and has no mass base of support. All variants of communism that exist in the West are present in Greece, but only as imported alien phenomena. Even the Greek slogan "socialism with national colors" has little meaning for non-industrialized Greece. It is a slogan for Italian and French Communists, not for their Greek counterparts. One might argue, in fact, that "Greek communism" does not exist, only "communism in Greece." This point of view is confirmed by the study of the political activity of Mikis Theodhorakis.[19]

Mikis Theodhorakis

Theodhorakis, Greece's best known contemporary composer, was born in 1925 and studied music in Athens from 1943 to 1950. But he completed his studies in Paris from 1954 to 1960, and his music, as he himself, became Westernized Greek. He maintains close contact with Paris and, like Karamanlis, has been influenced by French politics.

From the age of 17, Theodhorakis has been a Communist. Before 1967 he was an EDA leader and member of parliament, and when the Democratic Youth Lambrakis movement was founded in 1963,

[18] See, for example, NCNA's press release datelined Peking, Aug. 3, 1976, concerning the entry into the Mediterranean of the Soviet aircraft carrier *Kiev*.

[19] For a monographic study of Theodhorakis' life, see George Giannaris, *Mikis Theodorakis*, New York, NY, Praeger, 1972.

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he assumed directorship of it. After the KKE split of 1968, he became a Politburo member of the KKE-Interior, but he left the party in 1972 for reasons which we will examine below. Finally, in 1974, when EDA was reconstituted, he once again assumed a leadership post in it as a member of the party's Executive Committee.

Theodhorakis has always used the enormous prestige he enjoys as a composer for political purposes, and his public declarations of 1976 show no change in this behavior. His avowed intention is to become the Communist counterpart of Andreas Papandreou and to regroup all Greek Communists under his leadership. He has even explained how he intends to do this.

In a 25-page memorandum dated April 1972, Theodhorakis explained to his former comrades the reasons for his resignation that year from the KKE-Interior. Citing the abortive Czechoslovak experience under Alexander Dubcek in 1968 and taking as an example the government of Salvador Allende then in power in Chile to support his views, Theodhorakis wrote:

The experience I got from my participation in the leadership of the Greek Communist Party-Interior over the last two years, has revealed to me that the international Communist movement has ceased to represent revolutionary change. . . . Such revolutionary change is not admissable within the framework of military confrontation between the two superpowers. Therefore revolutionary change in Greece is connected with the full independence of revolutionary forces. . . . This certainly does not mean that an independent people's movement will not be faced with the furious reaction of imperialism. . . . Nor does it mean that in the [resultant] clash the natural allies of the movement will not be the Soviet Union, the socialist camp, and the Communist parties of the world.[20]

Theodhorakis continued his argumentation by calling for the dismantlement of all existing Greek Communist organizations and the regrouping of all their members in a new independent people's movement. He did not specifically name a leader for the proposed movement, but the tone of his memorandum left little doubt that he envisioned himself in the role. As for the cultural context of the movement, he clearly grounded it in Western civilization by proclaiming, "I staunchly believe that the twentieth

[20] Untitled typed memorandum in Greek, dated April 1972, pp. 2, 4. The author has a copy of this memorandum in his personal collection. An earlier and shorter French-language version was dated March 19, 1972, Sydney, Australia.



Mikis Theodhorakis addressing a rally at Corfu during his unsuccessful campaign on the ticket of the United Left (EA) in the November 1974 Greek elections.

Keystone.

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century is the century of liberty, the century of the triumph of a universal civilization." [21]

Theodhorakis, who had been imprisoned by the colonels' regime for a time and had then spent four years in exile in Paris, returned to Greece in July 1974—two years after writing the memorandum which we have been citing—when Karamanlis made all political parties legal. Recordings of the controversial composer's music, banned during the 1967-74 military dictatorship because of their use for political purposes (most notably in the film "Z"), began to sell in huge numbers. Yet, despite his popularity as a composer and his previous election as an EDA member of parliament in the 1964 elections, Theodhorakis failed to win a parliamentary seat in November 1974, when he ran as a candidate of the Communists' United Left (EA). This was not an unwelcome development for the orthodox Greek Communist apparatus, whose members worried about the composer's disobedient mind. But it assured that Theodhorakis would continue in Greece the "independent" tactics and quest for an independent people's movement which he had begun abroad. For the time being, Theodhorakis would act from within the ranks of the EDA, a party well suited to his needs. He declared to the non-Communist, centrist daily *To Vima* in the late summer of 1976:

I belong to EDA. They are old Communists with all the wisdom and experience of a life filled with anguish, thought, and action. They do not have blinders. They are totally free.[22]

Nevertheless, Theodhorakis has used the non-Communist press of Athens much more than *I Avyi*, the joint daily of the EDA and the KKE-Interior, to present his views to the Greek people. In August 1976, for example, he published in the right-wing mass-circulation daily *Apoyevmatini* two articles under the imposing title, "The Only Way out of the Pincers of the Two Blocs: National Unity Behind Karamanlis." [23] In them, he strongly criticized Andreas Papandreou's uncompromising opposition to the Karamanlis government and repeated his already well-known conviction—publicized with the slogan "Either Karamanlis or the tanks!"—that Karamanlis represented the country's only defense against the return to power of the military, and therefore deserved all Greeks' full support.[24]

Then, on September 6, 1976, the same rightist newspaper began publishing the 50-page report, entitled "Let Us Build Up a New Left with Greek Colors," which Theodhorakis—clearly borrowing from the French Communist slogan, "Socialism with the colors of France"—had presented two months earlier to the Steering Committee of EDA. In this report, Theodhorakis had stated in the clearest terms yet the independent attitude which he would have the Communists of Greece adopt.[25] In essence, his point of view was that Greek Communists, whatever the reaction of international communism, (*i.e.*, Moscow, primarily), had to propose a "national compromise" to the governing Right, comparable to the "historic compromise" that Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer had proposed to the ruling Italian Christian Democrats.[26] They had to collaborate with the Karamanlis government, he said, in order to prevent an authoritarian comeback.

Theodhorakis justified his call for the assertion of Greek Communist independence and the rejection of submission to policy directives from abroad in the following way:

I believe that orthodox Communists very rightly accuse [non-ruling] European Communist parties [the Eurocommunists] of in fact abandoning communism. This is a game of words. For what, after all, is communism? It is no longer possible to define it in a purely theoretical way. It is neither pure Marxism nor classical Leninism. More than fifty years of practical application have given the word communism a clear historical and substantive meaning. Communism is Soviet Stalinism with the improvements and variations which have been incorporated after the 20th Congress [of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]. Consequently, accusations made by the supporters of Soviet communism, to the effect that the [non-ruling] Communist parties of Europe have given up the basic principles and main characteristics of what is commonly called communism, can be said to be correct. . . . I tend to believe that for those Europeans, including myself, to whom thousands of signs indicate that the time for European socialism is upon us, one of the most serious obstacles on the path to socialism is Stalinist com-

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[22] *To Vima*, Aug. 8, 1976.
[23] *Apoyevmatini* (Athens), Aug. 17-18, 1976.
[24] For earlier efforts to promote the pro-Karamanlis slogan, see, for example, *To Vima*, Aug. 8, 1976.
[25] *Apoyevmatini*, Sept. 6, 1976.
[26] On the "historic compromise" proposal of Berlinguer, see Giacomo Sani, "The PCI on the Threshold," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1976.

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Ilias Iliou, Chairman of the United Democratic Left (EDA), casts his vote in the 1974 Greek elections.

—Wide World.

munism, distorted and frozen Marxism. . . . The new policy [which I suggest] is socialism with national colors. EDA has proclaimed in favor of it courageously, plainly, and clearly. The KKE-Interior, however, is hesitating.

The dramatic way in which Theodhorakis' unorthodox views were publicized, by appearance in a right-wing mass-circulation newspaper, led many to believe that a rift had developed between the composer and his party and that the ideas expressed in *Apoyevmatini* were Theodhorakis' alone. But, Theodhorakis stated in his published text that the EDA supports his views, and what we know of EDA chairman Ilias Iliou lends credence to Theodhorakis' assertion—at least insofar as Iliou himself is concerned. Why, then, did Theodhorakis publish his report in *Apoyevmatini?* The answer lies, it would seem in the nature of the relationship which exists between EDA and the KKE-Interior. The two parties collaborate, but there are members of both, and especially of the KKE-Interior, who feel that Theodhorakis and Iliou are moving too far too fast. They are "hesitating," as Theodhorakis stated in his report. The joint press organ of the EDA and KKE-Interior, *I Avyi,* which is edited by the number-two man in the KKE-Interior, Leonidhas Kirkos, is in fact entirely controlled by the KKE-Interior. As a result, when EDA and the KKE-Interior disagree, the EDA is left without a party daily newspaper in which to express itself. Under such circumstances the EDA, and in this case Theodhorakis, is obliged to use the non-Communist press to make its views known.

Of course, Iliou is old and ailing, and Theodhorakis might be the new and dynamic leader who could unite the two parties and give them a broader base of popular support. He is interested, with Iliou's connivance, in using his personal prestige and the support of public opinion to impose his views on both the EDA and the more recalcitrant KKE-Interior. The publication of his program in *Apoyevmatini,* which sells approximately ten times as many copies as *I Avyi,* may not have been ill-conceived as a means of stimulating developments in this direction.

Reaction of the Right

Communist reactions to Theodhorakis' attempt to use public opinion to bolster his position within the movement are as yet inconclusive. But the reactions of the Right and of the Karamanlis government to the composer's proposals for collaboration have been quick and very favorable, indicating not only a readiness to collaborate, but a desire to see Theodhorakis' aspirations within the Communist movement fulfilled as well.

In fact, an atmosphere favorable to the promotion of the idea of a national (or "historic") compromise between moderate Communists and the Karamanlis Right has been developing almost since the fall of the military dictatorship, and certainly since the elections of November 1974. At times this has led to exercises in mutual flattery. Yeoryios Rallis, for instance, leader of Karamanlis' New Democracy party (*Nea Dhimokratia*—ND) and one of the pillars of his government, made the following comments about the EDA's Ilias Iliou in March 1975:

The man who gave me the key to the Greek political situation was Ilias Iliou. This leader of the Left, a humanist respected by all, even by his most staunch opponents, has had an inhuman fate. At the time of the civil war, he was deported for five years, from 1946 to 1951, and subjected to continuous torture during two of them. Then came his difficult and dangerous experience in semi-clandestinity. In 1967,

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the coup d'état took place, and the venerable leader, whose health had been compromised by so many hardships, was again deported, to Yaros, and tortured, before being transferred as a prisoner to the military hospital of Athens, where he stayed during four trying years. But nothing succeeded in making him submit. He has always spoken without fear. And now he still speaks without hate.[27]

And Iliou reciprocated as follows:

Take Rallis' case: he was imprisoned by the military on the basis of laws he had himself issued against us. The colonels did not need to resort to exceptional measures. The traditional Right fell victim to the arsenal it had built up to muzzle the Left. This made it think. From now on, we are trying on both sides for mutual understanding.[28]

Now, however, Theodhorakis has broached the subject of cooperation publicly and has received a public response.

Since Iliou's Communists are far weaker than Berlinguer's in Italy, Karamanlis does not feel that he need fear—as Italian Christian Democracy may have to—being used by the Left in any compromise arrangement which is reached. Karamanlis endorses collaboration with the EDA/KKE-Interior and hopes to exploit it to increase his own popularity—though, as we have seen, the Communists, like Karamanlis himself, lack firm ties to the peasantry and lower middle classes. He may also see the promotion of Theodhorakis' "independent Left" and "national compromise" ideas as a means of preserving disunity in Communist ranks. Certainly, the tone of the Right's praise of Theodhorakis invites this interpretation. In September 1976, for example, *Apoyevmatini* contained the following passage:

Apoyevmatini *has lately extended its hospitality to two articles by Mikis Theodhorakis, related to the Aegean crisis. They made a great and profound impression, mainly among the broad masses of the Greek people. The government itself took a stand on them through a governmental statement emphasizing the patriotic character of Theodhorakis' views. Nearly all of the Athenian press commented on them. . . . In fact, with his articles, Theodhorakis has definitely laid the basis for a* New Greek Left, *which, with courage and responsibility, slashes the ties with all the sins and faults of the past.*[29]

Kharilaos Florakis (left), leader of the Greek Communist Party "of the exterior" (KKE-Exterior), chats with Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev during a break at the 11th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party on March 19, 1975, in Budapest.

—Ference Vigovszki/MTI via Eastfoto.

And the reaction of the KKE-Exterior to the "new Left" and "national compromise" ideas has been accommodatingly violent and uncompromising. Kharilaos Florakis stated definitively his party's view of what was happening in Greece on March 19, 1975, in Budapest, at the 11th Congress of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party:

On its road, the Communist Party [of Greece] has to face not only the militarist movements inspired by the United States and the conservative politics of the government, but also the obstacles put up by the revisionist group of the Right which has detached itself from the Party, presents itself under the name of "Communist Party of the interior," and today works inside the workers' movement in collaboration with the ruling class.[30]

Bearing in mind that jockeying for position and

[27] *To Vima*, March 4, 1975.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] *Apoyevmatini*, Sept. 6, 1976.
[30] *I Avyi*, April 5, 1975.

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advantage within Communist ranks and between the Greek Right and Greek Left is still going on, we must now address these questions: Under what conditions might collaboration between Right and Left be initiated in Greece? And who would likely profit in the long run from the development of an Italian-style "historic compromise" in the country—Karamanlis' traditional Right or the Communists, perhaps under Theodhorakis' leadership? The answers depend, it seems to this observer, on the development of Greek-Turkish relations.

Scenario for National Compromise

Greece's moderate Communists, as well as Andreas Papandreou, apparently think that a Greek-Turkish war—or at least a prolonged crisis situation—is inevitable, and they are trying to use this state of affairs to come to power. They would like to duplicate—up to a point—the wartime record of the EAM. Their analysis with respect to the foreseeable future might be summarized as follows: The traditional Right has no more capability of organizing Greece's masses against an invasion by Turkey today than it had in 1941 of rallying the masses against the German-Italian-Bulgarian invasion. The Communists are better organized among the masses for such a purpose. If the anticipated war should be lost, the new (Communist) Left would control armed resistance to the invader and exploit national feelings against Turkish occupation. On the other hand, if the war should be won, the Communists would emerge reinforced by having supported Karamanlis' government.

The domestic-international linkage in Communist calculations was made quite clear in a memorandum signed by Leonidhas Kirkos which the KKE-Interior sent to Karamanlis on March 18, 1975. It said:

Mr. President, we would like to submit to your government some thoughts concerning the Cyprus crisis, the threats which our country has to face [from the Turks], and the reorientation which is necessary—in our opinion—in our foreign policy. We have the impression . . . that our country is gradually being driven toward the center of a great international crisis and that the time that is left to us in order to face it successfully is perhaps limited. . . . In the idea of the preparation of the Nation, we include the preparation of the Armed Forces, the union of the army with the people, and the unity of the people above all ideological and political differences . . . . We propose [therefore] the formation of a government of national union, with the participation of all parties and groups of the present parliament, without any exception, in order that the whole people, as one man, support the common national effort. [31]

And a year later, the Communists used the occasion of the renewed Aegean crisis over exploration of the continental shelf to ask the government for formation of a national guard, a people's army which the Communists could hope to control. The Central Committee of the KKE-Interior, meeting in extraordinary session on August 13, 1976, issued the following declaration:

Konstantinos Karamanlis, Prime Minister of Greece since his return in July 1974 from an 11-year voluntary exile.

—Alain Nogues/Sygma.

[31] *Ibid.*, March 20, 1975.

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Our country is facing its greatest outside threat in its postwar history . . . . The continuous provocation of Sismik I *[the Turkish ship which precipitated the 1976 crisis] has dangerously increased the tension in Greek-Turkish relations. The danger of an armed conflict is real . . . . [We propose] the organization of the nationwide mobilization of all human and material resources for a struggle of long duration and that this mobilization be self-governed with the participation of the people's organizations . . . [specifically, we propose] the setting up of a national guard with the periodic participation of all Greeks of the reserve, without distinctions.*[32]

On the same day, Kirkos made the following statement to *Ta Nea*, the Athens daily newspaper with the largest circulation:

The crisis in our relations with Turkey can be a prolonged one. . . . Cuba, for instance, has not reached a state of war with the USA. But the mobilization of its people on a solid moral and political basis allowed that country to build structures and institutions, to develop economically and socially to such a degree that the preparation of its national defense also was better than it had ever been.[33]

It is important to note that centrist *Ta Nea* urged the Greek public to adopt a similar path.

While Andreas Papandreou is also attempting to profit from the Greek-Turkish crisis, his tactics are very different. Instead of supporting the government and trying to climb on its back as the EDA and KKE-Interior are doing, he has violently attacked Karamanlis for not having declared war on Turkey immediately and has accused the Prime Minister of national treason. Papandreou seems to be seeking to stir up the army against Karamanlis with the hope that a Portuguese-type military coup would raise him and his PASOK to power.

In any case, the course of the Aegean crisis thus far tends to suggest that the calculations of the Left regarding Karamanlis' vulnerabilities in the foreign policy realm may not be all that unrealistic. The continuing crisis has shown that, like his predecessors, the Prime Minister lacks a clear-cut program with which to cope with the Greek-Turkish problem. He has taken decisions on a day-to-day basis while the Turks have followed a preconceived plan of action, and the result has been major frustration for Greece.

After assuming office, Karamanlis adopted a hard stand toward Turkey, but the oil-exploration activities of *Sismik I* in the Aegean in July-August 1976 forced him to retreat. He appealed first to the Security Council of the United Nations, hoping that it would condemn Turkey; however, the Security Council on August 25, 1976, unanimously advised both countries to begin direct bilateral negotiations on the Aegean issue—an endorsement of the Turkish, not the Greek position. Then he took the matter to the International Court of Justice, asking this body to prohibit *Sismik I* from looking for oil in what Greece considers part of its continental shelf. But on September 11, 1976, the International Court rejected Athens' petition also, by a vote of 12 to 1, with 2 abstentions.

Nor did any of the other avenues through which Karamanlis sought to improve Greece's diplomatic leverage against Turkey yield more positive results. For example, the Greek Prime Minister had pursued a policy of Balkan entente designed to partially disengage Greece from the United States and to bring about a rapprochement with the Soviet Union—with the ultimate end of winning the support of the Communist states of the Balkans and of the USSR against Turkey. Yet soon after the Aegean crisis broke out, the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Romania all announced their neutrality in the dispute. Neutrality was, under the circumstances, rather favorable to Turkey. Similarly, Karamanlis had endeavored to get Greece admitted to the Common Market in the hope that he could then bring West European pressure to bear on Turkey. But with the possible exception of France, the Common Market countries have proved unwilling to give Athens unconditional backing against Ankara.

In short, Karamanlis has found himself isolated internationally and obliged to retreat before a dynamic Turkish foreign policy. To avoid being ousted by internal adversaries dissatisfied with his handling of the country's affairs, he might conclude that he has no choice but to rely "on the masses" by turning to the Left for support—or to go to war with Turkey and let the chips fall where they may. In either case, the Greek Communists could reap some benefits.

[32] *Ibid.*, Aug. 15, 1976.
[33] *Ta Nea*, Aug. 13, 1976.

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Books

The Succession Drama in China

By Lowell Dittmer

MICHAEL LINDSAY, Ed. *The New Constitution of Communist China: Comparative Analysis.* Taipei, Institute of International Relations, 1976.
J. P. JAIN. *After Mao What? Army, Party, and Group Rivalries in China.* New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1975.
A. DOAK BARNETT. *Uncertain Passage: China's Transition into the Post-Mao Era.* Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 1974.
KENNETH LIEBERTHAL. *Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China, 1949-1975.* White Plains, NY, International Arts and Sciences Press, 1976.

CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG is dead, and with him a legendary generation of leadership is rapidly passing from the scene. What lies ahead? This is the question to which the books under review are addressed, though each of them deals with a different aspect of the general *Problematik*. Michael Lindsay and his collaborators focus on constitutional engineering in the People's Republic and on its potential contribution to the institutionalization of succession; J. P. Jain examines "army, party, and group rivalries," dealing with the question "After Mao What?" in an interest-group context; A. Doak Barnett approaches the problem from a more comprehensive sociological perspective, looking at China in terms of its potential evolution along the lines of the general historical pattern called "modernization"; and Kenneth Lieberthal provides a valuable research tool for those interested in succession or in any other issues involving the central policy process in postrevolutionary China. Inasmuch as these books are all relevant in one way or another to the succession, they can now be evaluated in terms of the validity of their predictions—at least so far as that can be determined, for the succession drama has only begun.

The Lindsay volume, published by the Institute of International Relations in Taipei, deserves credit (with qualifications) for focusing attention on an area of Chinese politics that has long been neglected by its students: the formal, constitutional aspect. Its central theme, to which each article in the anthology repeatedly adverts, is that formal theory and informal practice are worlds apart in Chinese politics. The authors could have utilized this unsurprising discrepancy as an opening wedge for a discussion of the tacit rules of informal politics and how these relate to the formal structure, attempting a serious discussion of how theory and practice came to diverge.[1] Instead, they use theory as a platform to launch a polemical assault upon practice, indignantly decrying Communist hypocrisy. Rather than resort to naked tyranny, the Communist regime seeks to masquerade in the legalistic cant of democratic civil rights, a multiparty National People's Congress, the secret ballot, and so forth—all of which, the authors keep saying, means very little.

"And so what?" one finds one's self responding upon the ninth or tenth repetition of the point. It is probably true that the Communist Party adopted its constitutional machinery for the purpose of appealing to the middle classes at home and the liberal democracies abroad, whose support was deemed useful and attainable, and that the decision to integrate these forms permanently into the government is theoretically inconsistent with the conception of a dictatorship of the proletariat. But every state seeks to legitimize its rule in formulas that strike an expedient compromise between the state's own conception of its mission and its need to attract public

[1] This has been done admirably for an earlier period by Andrew J. Nathan in his *Peking Politics, 1918-1923: Factionalism and the Failure of Constitutionalism,* Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1976.

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support.[2] It is hardly surprising to observe the successive attrition of these empty forms, which might better be regarded as an accommodation of formal institutions to existing power realities than as a trend toward despotism.[3] If the sole purpose of the constitution is to bamboozle the bourgeoisie, why does the Communist Party also seek to shape its own destiny through constitutional engineering?[4] Why bother to discuss at such length a document without binding power, for that matter?

Its own arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, this book does have a contribution to make to our understanding of the contingencies of succession. By analyzing the historical evolution of constitutionalism in the People's Republic—*i.e.*, by comparing the 1975 Constitution with its preliminary drafts (in 1970 and 1973) and with its antecedents (the Common Program of 1949 and the 1954 Constitution)—we can identify certain trends which serve as indicators of the shifting locus of political power and its future disposition. For example, there has been a discernible decline in the prerogatives of the state and a parallel increase in the dominance of the party,[5] a trend that is characteristic of Communist systems and yet noteworthy in the Chinese case in view of the near eclipse of the party during the Cultural Revolution. There has also been a tendency toward concentration of power in the position of the Chairman of the CCP: in the 1975 Constitution, the Party Chairman is designated "leader of the people," "chief of state" (a title formerly conferred on the incumbent of the now defunct office of State Chairman), and "supreme commander" (of the PLA). The "triple crown" thus bestowed leads one to expect that Hua Kuo-feng's accession to the party chairmanship will give him an advantage over any challenger. The situation contrasts with that in the Soviet Union following the deaths of Lenin and Stalin, when the formal equality among Politburo members made it more difficult to ascertain which office was the locus of prevailing power. On the other hand, the apparent trend toward the "personalization" of power before Mao's death might tend to exacerbate Hua's succession problems by implying that power was unique to Mao's person and thus inhibiting the routinization of the charisma of the party chairmanship *per se*. But while this implication might be drawn from the first (1970) draft of the constitution, the tribute paid to "Mao Tse-tung" has since been transferred to the "Thought of Mao Tse-tung," something that might be expected to survive and legitimate any successor who pays token obeisance to it.

In the context of this review, we can conclude that although the Lindsay volume undermines its own purpose by scoffing at the documents that it seeks to construe, although it is marred by needless repetition and numerous typographical errors, it does, in fact, make a useful contribution to the shape of our expectations regarding succession.

JAIN APPROACHES the succession issue more directly, eschewing constitutional or polemical concerns and dealing with political arrangements as they exist. Although he fails to make his framework of analysis explicit, he seems to adopt a modified interest-group approach similar to that introduced by H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths in Soviet studies and adapted by Michel Oksenberg to the China field.[6] This is a potentially powerful tool of analysis, enabling its user to determine not only the relative strength of the various contenders for power but the positions each is likely to take on a spectrum of issues, simply by ascertaining his group affiliation. The problem has always been to determine on what basis these groups are constituted and

[2] See Chalmers Johnson, "The Two Chinese Revolutions," *China Quarterly* (London), July-September 1969, pp. 12-30.

[3] True, freedom of residence was rescinded, along with the freedom of artistic, cultural, and research endeavor. The secret ballot was replaced by "democratic consultation." But none of these rights had ever been accorded meaningful recognition in the first place. On the other hand, the 1975 Constitution asserted significant new rights, among them the right to speak out and criticize authority without fear of political reprisal, the right to strike, and the right to display big-character posters. Economic rights include the right of artisans and craftsmen to engage in private labor so long as it involves "no exploitation of others," and the right of peasants to cultivate private plots, to pursue limited sideline production, and to keep a small number of livestock for personal needs.

[4] One of the principal grievances against Chiang Ch'ing and the radicals concerned their disregard of constitutional procedure in the Cultural Revolution purges, and again in the recent ouster of Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

[5] In the 1975 Constitution, the functions and powers of the State Council (the cabinet) were reduced from 17 items to four, the National People's Congress (NPC)—nominally the highest state organ—was relieved of the power to declare war, and the functions of the NPC and its Standing Committee were now described as being decided and bestowed by the CCP.

[6] See H. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Eds., *Interest Groups in Soviet Politics*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1973; and Michel C. Oksenberg, "Occupational Groups in Chinese Society and the Cultural Revolution," in Chang Chun-shu *et al*, Eds., *The Cultural Revolution: 1967 in Review*, Ann Arbor, MI, Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1968, pp. 1-45.

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what limits govern their operational latitude. Here Jain adopts the common-sense assumptions that a combination of organizational affiliation and ideological opinion (and not patron-client ties or other informal connections) provides the dominant criterion for recruitment, and that constraints on factional activities were formerly quite stringent but were relaxed during the Cultural Revolution and will probably be further loosened if there is a protracted succession crisis.[7] What he sees emerging in the wake of this relaxation is not an unruly free-for-all but rather a "system of checks and balances," which is likely to "strengthen the base of collective leadership, facilitate the adoption of decisions by consensus, and restrain tendencies toward one-man rule" (see pp. 127-33). This new relationship among groups Jain characterizes as "coalition politics," a "curious blend of collusion and competition" in which all participants seek to avoid serious conflicts and adopt decisions by consensus and compromise, at the same time continuing to strengthen their respective power positions.

Much of this carefully documented and cogently argued little book consists of a demonstration of how such a system of checks and balances arose following the Cultural Revolution, as succeeding group coalitions sought to break the deadlock and obtain positions of secure dominance, only to find themselves checked by a stronger coalition. During the Cultural Revolution, Mao formed common cause with the political commissars in the PLA under the General Political Department to encourage the mobilization of student-worker masses; but as the need to restore order became imperative, the commissars fell into disfavor, the GPD was purged, and control of the PLA's political work shifted to the direct control of the Military Affairs Commission and to the professional commanders subordinate to it.

The purges of the bureaucratic Right during the Cultural Revolution, followed within four years by the purge of the military Left in the Lin Piao affair,[8] resulted in an attenuation of central control and in the rise of the regional military commanders, whose support had been courted in order to isolate Lin Piao. This devolution of power was successfully countered by the drastic reduction of military representation at the 10th CCP Congress in August 1973; by the transfer of China's eight most powerful commanders from their regional power bases the following December; and by the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius (*p'i Lin, p'i K'ung*) campaign of 1973-74 (which included lengthy articles praising

[7] The six major groups in the post-Cultural Revolution arena that he considers are: 1) the leaders of the state administrative and diplomatic machine not purged during the Cultural Revolution; 2) party and administrative cadres who were purged and then rehabilitated; 3) the Cultural Revolution "Left"; 4) the emerging public security "Left" (whose members have gained considerable influence since the 10th Party Congress); 5) the regional military leaders, who despite the late 1973 transfers still pose a threat; and 6) the central military leadership, represented in the Politburo by Yeh Chien-ying and Su Chen-hua, and further strengthened by the rehabilitation of Yang Ch'eng-wu.

[8] Although Lin Piao died in an airplane crash in the summer of 1971 (allegedly in an escape attempt), not until after the enlarged Politburo meeting in June 1972, when five Politburo members were purged, did the Maoists feel confident enough to denounce Lin Piao publicly, still gingerly exempting the PLA as a whole.

Reviewers in This Issue

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ANDRZEJ BRZESKI—Professor of Economics, University of California (Davis); member of the staff of the State Planning Commission of Poland until 1958; author of a number of articles and reviews on the political economy of communism.

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ROBERT GERALD LIVINGSTON—Vice-President of the German Marshall Fund of the United States (Washington, DC); writer on European political and economic problems in such publications as *Foreign Policy*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, and *The Sun* (Baltimore).

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HENRY W. MORTON—Professor of Political Science, Queens College (New York); author of *Soviet Sport: Mirror of Soviet Society*, 1963; coeditor of and contributor to *Soviet Policy-Making: Studies of Communism in Transition*, 1967, and *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's*, 1974.

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Ch'in Emperor Shih Huang-ti for unifying China and vilifying the neo-Confucianists for their attempts to carve China into principalities). Civilian control over the military was consolidated by appointing Yeh Chien-ying, a Chou En-lai protégé, as Defense Minister and two civilians, Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Chang Ch'un-ch'iao as Chief of Staff and Director of the GPD, respectively.

Then, as leaders of the party-state bureaucracy took advantage of the anti-Lin, anti-Confucius campaign to impugn leftist policies and reassert "pragmatic" policies (and also to "reverse verdicts" on a host of purged rightists, first among them Teng Hsiao-p'ing), a rift developed between the bureaucratic Right led by Chou En-lai and the Left which had backed the Cultural Revolution.[9] This rift was created by the ultimately incompatible attempts of China's two dying demigods, Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai, to set the stage for their successions. The conflict became dramatically public upon Chou's death in January 1976, which occasioned a precipitous attack by the Maoists on his designated successor, Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

The latter development, however, transcended the time frame of Jain's study, which was completed in 1975. The author closed with a picture of balanced powers tilted slightly to the right: Teng Hsiao-p'ing was entrenched as Mao's heir apparent, occupying strong concurrent positions in the party, state, and army apparatuses; moderates held five of the nine seats on the Politburo Standing Committee, and radicals were excluded from the State Council (with the sole exception of Chang Ch'un-chiao). While obviously superceded by political vicissitudes in its specifics,[10] Jain's general picture of competing and coalescing bureaucratic interest groups continues to apply to the current situation.

JAIN'S "check-and-balance" model coincides neatly with A. Doak Barnett's more ambitious and sweeping macrosociological analysis, which also forecasts a moderating trend. *Uncertain Passage* is the second book in the last decade by this distinguished American scholar to anticipate China's succession, and he has altered his 1967 prognosis only in unessential detail.[11] As in 1967, he perceives a decisive cleavage between Mao and the "non-Maoists." The latter

. . . have tended to stress economics over politics, the growth of production over the transformation of values, professional technocratic competence over egalitarian goals, material rather than ideological incentives, institutional rather than mass mobilizational approaches, and orderly incremental change in preference to dramatic sudden leaps. They have usually been more willing than the Maoists to compromise when the regime has encountered serious obstacles and more predisposed to adjust their goals to intractable social realities. In this sense, they have been generally less visionary and more empirical, pragmatic, and "realistic" than Mao.

It will surprise few who read this depiction of the available alternatives to learn that "China's transition to the post-Mao era" will probably lead in a "non-Maoist" direction. The future will hold few "dramatic swings" comparable to the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution—these revolutionary upsurges originated for the most part with Mao and "reflected his very personal revolutionary vision and style." It is also "almost certain" that there will be a decline in the force of ideology in China. And along with this decline there will be an attenuation of internal conflict, for it is ideology that provides the most intractable basis for social cleavage:

Under a collective leadership, . . . the viability of the coalition would depend on its ability to make compromises preserving minimal consensus. . . . The built-in pressures would be toward "centrism," with the bias probably favoring relatively cautious policies. . . . In order to survive, a collective leadership would be impelled to balance and accommodate diverse interests, and to evolve relatively pragmatic, "realistic," and instrumental approaches to policymaking. (pp. 201-02)

Prospects for foreign policy developments seem equally felicitous, in part because the Chinese

[9] The rift was augured by Mao's well-publicized absence from the Fourth NPC and from the Second Session of the 10th Central Committee that immediately preceded it; by the campaign to criticize the novel *Water Margin* in the summer of 1975; and by the pattern of central appointments over the last several years, as each side attempted to stack the deck (a disproportionate number of previously ousted bureaucrats on the one hand and mass representatives on the other acquired positions in the wake of the purge of Lin Piao and his associates in 1971).

[10] Tung Pi-wu, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai have all died, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing has been purged (though there is now talk of his rehabilitation), leaving only one of Jain's group of five moderates, the aged Yeh Chien-ying, still in the Politburo Standing Committee.

[11] Barnett first dealt with the succession question in *China after Mao: With Selected Documents*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1967.

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picture of the world is becoming more cognitively complex. It seems probable that Sino-Soviet rivalry will persist, that Sino-American relations will continue to improve, and that Peking will refrain from a direct assault on Taiwan.

Barnett's research is so thorough, his reasoning so lucid and carefully qualified, that his conclusion seems inescapable: In all but perhaps the cultural and educational policy-areas (controlled by the radicals at the time he wrote), China in the "post-Mao era" will probably pursue policies similar to those associated with Liu Shao-ch'i and Teng Hsiao-p'ing.

LIEBERTHAL'S *Research Guide to Central Party and Government Meetings in China* contains a comprehensive, annotated list of all the important central meetings held from 1949 to 1975, as well as an introductory essay by Michel Oksenberg that provides useful tips for the interpretation of the *Guide*. Had it been available, both Jain and Barnett would undoubtedly have used it in preparing their studies, and those wishing to dissect China's succession crisis will find it most helpful as a source of background information. The meetings described reveal much about how China's leaders interact and about the range of issues that is on their minds at any one time —none of which is apparent in formal organization tables. Lieberthal demonstrates that the power to convene meetings is the power to mobilize support—by manipulating the roster of participants, by setting the agenda, and by selecting the speakers—leading one to infer that whoever convenes the meeting is responsible for its decisions. He also offers some interesting clues to the nature of the decisions reached at particular meetings, based in part on the type or format of the meeting; here, however, a caveat seems in order, inasmuch as the character of meetings may change over time (*e.g.*, the Supreme State Conference under Mao and then Liu). Perhaps, as Oksenberg suggests in his introduction, China's mode of leadership may best be seen as a system of meetings:

The image that emerges . . . is one of a secretive system, not closely constrained by organizational boundaries and formal rules, but nevertheless one that places high value on consultation and that retains for the most part a profound awareness of its own limitations of information and resources. It is a system whose major characteristic is flexibility in format of meetings as much as in the substantive debates about policy. (p. 13)

THE GENERAL consensus of these studies appears to be that the dominant trend is toward a future of what Peter Ludz calls "institutional revisionism," characterized by "fundamentally pragmatic, non-ideological approaches" to politics (Barnett, p. 321). In our final assessment of this prognosis, it may be of interest to compare the Chinese case to some previous succession crises in the Communist-ruled states.

Succession is both important and problematic in all Communist regimes. It is important because power is concentrated at the top and politics is highly variable; and it is problematic because no reliable means for the transfer of power has yet been devised in any Communist system.[12] Premortem succession offers the best way of reducing uncertainty, for it allows the successor to consolidate his power with the aid of the retiring dictator. The problem is that the latter may harbor ambivalence about his selection, and that his successor may justify his suspicions by precipitating his premature retirement or tarnishing his reputation once he is dead. Thus, most dictators with intimations of their mortality prefer to arrange a postmortem succession. Here they are apt to fail even more miserably, no matter how elaborate their preparations, for once death claims the leader, the entire political scene changes.[13] The dictator's death suddenly frees the surviving members of the Politburo from the power he has wielded over them for so long, and they are not eager to throw themselves into a position of dependency and abject vulnerability again. As a result, the leadership finds itself torn between fear of renewed tyranny and the need for leadership,[14] a dilemma Myron Rush calls a "succession crisis." It is a crisis not because the system threatens to fall apart but because for the time being no significant decisions (*i.e.*, decisions of "policy line") can be

[12] See Myron Rush, *How Communist States Change Their Rulers*, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1974.

[13] V. I. Lenin wrote a famous last testament expressing his grave misgivings about Josef Stalin and left explicit instructions that it be read to the party congress, but both will and instructions were ignored. Stalin's heir apparent, Georgi Malenkov, was outmaneuvered by Nikita Khrushchev. And most recently, of course, Chou En-lai's carefully choreographed arrangements were upset by the Maoists within days of his funeral.

[14] See Robbins Burling, *The Passage of Power: Studies in Political Succession*, New York, NY, Academic Press, 1974, pp. 223 ff. See also Jack Gordy, Ed., *Succession to High Office*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1966; Frederick Mundell Watkins, "Political Succession," in Edwin R. A. Seligman, Ed., *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, New York, NY, Macmillan Co., 1934, Vol. 14, pp. 441-44; and Ting Wang, "Looking Inside China: The Succession Problem," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), May-June 1973, pp. 13-25.

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made, for each such decision raises the prior question of *who* is to make it. Because this question cannot be answered until the succession crisis is resolved, significant decisions are reached through circuitous and time-consuming consultation and compromise. This is known as "collective leadership" and may last for a period of several years. In the absence of authoritative leadership, tendencies toward rift, vacillation and deadlock are prone to attenuate the efficacy of the entire regime, and for this reason collective leadership is normally followed by an eventual return to personal rule, albeit more limited.[15]

Our prognosis of institutionalized revisionism for the Chinese succession corresponds closely to the pattern in an interregnum of collective leadership. Even before the death of Mao there were some concrete developments in China which pointed in this direction. Witness the leadership's reluctance to hazard any significant "line" decisions that might grant one group a policy advantage over the others: Teng Hsiao-p'ing's attempt in the summer of 1975 to lay down a "General Program for All Work of the Party and the Nation," meant to provide guidelines for work over the next 25 years,[16] was followed by Teng's purge in the wake of Chou's death; and the radicals' subsequent attempt to exploit the anti-Teng campaign to eliminate his associates was stubbornly resisted.

This comparative perspective also enables us to predict, however, that the dangers of "authority leakage" during the interregnum period, and the inherent instability of any collective leadership, will lead to its eventual supercession by a strong personal ruler. Can Hua Kuo-feng press his initial advantage to entrench himself in the leading role, or will someone else emerge? In other Communist systems, the eventual successor has triumphed by controlling personnel policy (Stalin), by resorting to clandestine factional maneuvers (Stalin and Khrushchev), or by appealing to outside constituencies (Khrushchev, and to some degree Brezhnev and Kosygin). The books under review are strongest in their analysis of these time-tested techniques, all of which have been and may continue to be used in the Chinese succession struggle.

But since the Cultural Revolution, it has been widely assumed that Chinese politics differs in certain crucial respects from other Communist systems, introducing new and incalculable variables into the succession equation. Integral to the Chinese conception of politics are such notions as "class struggle" and "mass movement," which suggest more latitude for mass participation in certain types of elite decisions than exists in other Communist systems.[17] The medium through which this participation has been achieved in the past has been ideology, and ideology was thought to have been revitalized in turn by the participation that it legitimized. Articulating this ideology was a revered—even deified—party chairman, surrounded by a group of publicists, who seemed to have fashioned a political tool capable of mobilizing support from a congeries of disprivileged social groups for a coherent set of radical policies. Though they received scant consideration in the prospectuses for the future examined here, a revitalized revolutionary ideology and a propensity for active mass participation in politics seemed to many to comprise the legacy of the Cultural Revolution.

At the time of writing, however, a new development has taken place in the succession struggle that may vindicate the authors' cursory treatment of this radical legacy and even throw open to question whether the Cultural Revolution left any enduring legacy at all. Hua Kuo-feng, without much heed for the radical commitments that accompanied his rise to national prominence, appears to have aligned with established military and bureaucratic elites to eliminate the radicals from contention in one fell swoop, despite the apparent efforts of mass supporters of the "gang of four" to register backing for their patrons through strikes and other forms of public agitation. The episode seems redolent of the 1953 purge of L.P. Beria by Stalin's heirs; the radicals, like Beria, had their own political base and in the view of the moderates in the ruling apparatus constituted a threat that had to be removed.

At present, the Hua group appears to be in control of the situation. But recent reports of continuing ferment in the provinces make it clear that mass activism has not vanished with the arrest of the radical leaders. This underscores the longer-range dilemma confronting the leadership. If Hua (or a successor) completely aban-

[15] Myron Rush, *Political Succession in the USSR*, New York, NY, Columbia University Press, 1965, Chap. 4 *et passim*.

[16] Parris Chang, "Mao's Last Stand?" *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1976.

[17] Elsewhere the reviewer has tried to show that this was true, for instance, of the Cultural Revolution. See Lowell Dittmer, *Liu Shao-ch'i and the Chinese Cultural Revolution: The Politics of Mass Criticism*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1974, pp. 295-335. Naturally, other types of decisions (foreign policy decisions, in particular) allow very little latitude for popular participation and may be viewed as issuing from a system of elite meetings.

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dons the radical legacy, he will be thrown into the arms of China's more coercive political organizations. On the other hand, the leadership clearly cannot and would not choose to revert to the unreserved embrace of activism as advocated by Mao. The basic issue, then, is whether Mao's successor will be able to find some stable middle ground between repression and permanent revolution. A possible avenue of approach may lie in taming the revolutionary ideological heritage—specifically in Hua's editorial revisions of the forthcoming fifth volume of Mao's selected works—and in providing scope for a civil form of mass participation under the chaperonage of mass organizations aligned with the center.

The alternatives ahead are not easy ones, and the future is still uncertain. In any case, with her first succession crisis, the People's Republic of China has clearly turned a corner and launched into a new phase—one in which decisive changes could yet occur.

East Europe's Economic Reforms

By Andrzej Brzeski

JAN MARCZEWSKI. *Crisis in Socialist Planning: Eastern Europe and the USSR.* Tr. from French by Noel Lindsay. New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.
L. A. D. DELLIN and HERMANN GROSS, Eds. *Reforms in the Soviet and Eastern European Economies.* Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, D. C. Heath and Co., 1972.
IANCU SPIGLER. *Economic Reform in Rumanian Industry.* London, Oxford University Press, 1973.
JANUSZ G. ZIELINSKI. *Economic Reforms in Polish Industry.* London, Oxford University Press, 1973.

AS EARLY AS 1966, Gregory Grossman writing in this publication observed that "nearly all the countries of Eastern Europe [had] succumbed . . . one after the other, like so many dominoes, to the winds of economic change." Only Romania and Albania had "escaped the epidemic of economic reform." [1] Today, ten years later, there are no exceptions: all the Communist countries of Eastern Europe have carried out reforms, and no doubt further changes are in store.

Of course, attempts to streamline Communist economies, to make them more efficient, are anything but new. From the earliest Soviet era, Communist leaders—including Lenin—have for one reason or another tinkered with their economies. Yet, the main features of Stalin's system seemed to have solidified after 1931, and it was this Soviet prototype—proclaimed as the ideal blueprint—that spread indiscriminately throughout Eastern Europe in the postwar years. All local critics of this model were silenced; indeed, even the outside world began to regard it as a crude but nonetheless awesome engine of material progress. Not until the mid-1950's (if one excepts Tito's heresy) was the case for a general overhaul of the Soviet-type economies opened, by the historic Polish debate on the "economic model of socialism." However, it was only when the rates of growth of the East European economies tapered off drastically at the beginning of the 1960's that economic reforms were proposed and essayed on a wide front.

In attempting to assess the past, present, and future of economic reforms in Eastern Europe, we are faced with a growing array of literature, in a dozen different languages—beyond anyone's capacity to keep abreast. The four books under review offer a mere sampling from this mass of writings. Jan Marczewski's volume, despite its brevity, is comprehensive and self-contained. He proceeds from a description of the old Stalinist system to a cross-national survey of changes in the planning and management of agri-

[1] Gregory Grossman, "Economic Reform: A Balance Sheet," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), November-December 1966, p. 43.

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culture and industry in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. He also discusses growth strategies, thus putting planning and management practices in perspective. The book contains a good deal of interesting, if not always sufficiently annotated, statistical material. Altogether, this is a very useful introduction to the subject, although the translation by Noel Lindsay is, unfortunately, rather awkward. The Dellin and Gross collection is less systematic in approach and takes for granted the reader's familiarity with background facts. Dealing for the most part with individual countries, the contributions (originally prepared for a symposium held in Bonn) blend economic and political insights in highlighting selected issues. Summary essays by Karl C. Thalheim and L. A. D. Dellin distill the conclusions of the individual contributors. The books by Iancu Spigler and Janusz Zielinski have a narrower focus. These monographs (from a Glasgow University series to be continued) look at industrial reforms in Romania and Poland, respectively. Exhaustive and replete with technical detail, the volumes are for specialists only.

SEVERAL OBVIOUS questions arise in studying Communist economic reforms: (1) Is there a discernible pattern of change? (2) Do we have satisfactory hypotheses to account for it? (3) Can cross-national differences be explained? (4) Can we divine the future course of reforms? Regarding the first two of these queries, an essential consensus emerges from the books under review.

The common characteristic of the East European economic reforms—except for those in Yugoslavia and Hungary, which require separate discussion—has been caution. Compared with early proposals and expectations, actual modifications of the prototype bequeathed by Stalin have been anticlimactically modest. Details differ from case to case, sometimes substantially, but the overall result is similar: "half-way houses" lacking design and permanence. Even East Germany's "Economic System"—apart from the Yugoslav and Hungarian reforms, the most radical departure from the classic Soviet model—fits this description.[2] In view of the uncertainties involved, this caution is understandable and perhaps not all that bad. But it should by now be clear that stories in Western business magazines heralding "marketization" of communism and reinstatement of the primacy of the "profit motive" were nonsense. (One is reminded in this connection of the reassurances of the Wiemar Republic's press to the German public in 1927 about Stalin's moderation and devotion to economic rationality.[3])

Despite the modest nature of the reforms, changes *have* taken place in the organization, planning, and management of the East European economies. There has, for instance, been a tendency toward "coarsening" of the organizational structure of industry, *i.e.*, toward increasing the size of the firm and eliminating intermediate managerial and administrative links. This is especially true in the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, and (more recently) Poland: in each case industrial associations [4] represent *de facto* mergers of constituent firms which permit the firms to bypass the usual ministerial hierarchy and exercise a certain amount of operational independence. Whether this trend has any consequences apart from administrative expediency is not yet clear. In the past, similar organizational designs have been tried and abandoned, *e.g.*, in Poland in 1947-50 and in Czechoslovakia in 1958.

Other potentially significant modifications that have been adopted to a lesser or greater extent in all East European economies include: (a) reduction in the number of physical production targets imposed on plant managers; (b) strengthening of direct links between production and marketing units; (c) the use of more flexible pricing; (d) increased emphasis on profitability and self-financing; (e) introduction of managerial success indicators related to sales and/or profits; and (f) use of bank credit in investment financing.

There has been considerable variety in the application of such innovations in the different Communist economies. Therefore, lest one become bogged down in details, it is essential to look at the process of reform in a broader conceptual framework. It is customary to view the evolution of Soviet-type economies in the categories of three dichotomies: (a) centralization *vs.* decentralization; (b) commands *vs.* incentives, and (c) plan *vs.* market. While related, these concepts are neither coex-

[2] The reference here is to the "Economic System of Socialism" *(Ökonomisches System des Sozialismus)*, which surfaced in the GDR in the years 1967-70.

[3] N. Sewig, "Pragmatism in the USSR as Reflected in the German Press," *Sowjetstudien* (Munich), June 1964.

[4] The designations for "industrial association" in the three countries are, respectively: *Vereinigung Volkseigner Betriebe* ("association of nationally-owned firms"—VVB); *darzhavno stopansko obedinenie* ("state economic association"—DSO); and *wielka organizacja gospodarcza* ("large economic organization"—WOG).

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tensive nor necessarily complementary. The centralization-decentralization issue refers to the locus of decisions concerning what is to be produced and how it is to be allocated and distributed. Commands and incentives are different means of implementation of decisions. And plan and market are alternative mechanisms for coordination of decisions. An economic reform *may* consist of moves from centralized command planning toward a decentralized incentive-motivated market. This would result in genuine "market socialism," which was advocated by some Polish economists in 1956 and closely approximated by post-1965 Yugoslavia. Yet different possibilities exist. For instance, there may be a move *from* commands *to* incentives, accompanied by *more* centralization and *more* planning; this is essentially the interpretation of economic reforms suggested by some Soviet mathematical economists.[5] Indeed, any combination of moves is conceivable. Even if we consider each of the three dichotomies to represent pairs of mutually exclusive extremes, we arrive at eight possible combinations. When it is recognized that in the case of each dichotomy we are really dealing with a near-continuum, there emerges a multitude of possible solutions, provided that appropriate algorithms and implementation instruments can be devised. The precise number of variants or the optimum variant are puzzles best left to the computo-utopians at Akademgorodok.

Less abstractly, it is enough to state that Communist economic reforms have as many facets as the affected economies themselves. A great many options exist and are exercised as a matter of practical artisanship rather than scientific systems engineering. Moreover, the solutions selected are somehow, though not clearly, interrelated with a number of other things such as growth strategies and priorities for allocation and distribution of goods and services. The complexity of the task facing economic reformers is compounded by the interplay of reforms with internal politics. East European regimes are loath to undertake anything that might weaken their control over society. Good Leninists as the leaders are (in this respect at least), they never forget the famous dictum about the priority of politics over economics. Nor can Politburo infighting and bureaucratic conflict on all levels—the cryptopolitics of autocracy—be disregarded when it comes to restructuring of the economy. This is a fact of life in Eastern Europe as much as in China, as Wladyslaw Gomulka was reminded in 1970. Last but not least, there is the context of a changing international environment which offers opportunities but also entails risks and greatly complicates forecasting.

Is it at all surprising under these conditions, then, that the pattern of economic reform in Eastern Europe has been one of half-measures adding a modicum of flexibility to a tired but tried system? If anything is puzzling at all, it is the scope and ingeniousness of Hungary's New Economic Mechanism, with its downgrading of short-term planning; the almost exclusive reliance on indirect, mainly financial, policy instruments; the devolution to the level of the firm of decision-making regarding inputs, outputs, and marketing; and above all, the degree of openness to foreign trade. Because of import-induced inflation and inopportune shifts in income distribution to the detriment of the workers, a retrenchment of some aspects of the Hungarian reform may be in prospect. Between now and 1980, one can expect an expansion of direct planning and central price-setting and a corresponding curtailment in the operational and financial independence of the firms. This reversal has, in fact, been under way for some time; Hungary's New Economic Mechanism may yet be brought in line with the half-reforms of her partners in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. It will take more than Magyar genius to prevent this.

Nevertheless, various purely economic factors *do* continue to prompt a move toward the decentralization-incentives-market solution in Eastern Europe. Three considerations are of paramount importance here. First, there is the increasing difficulty posed to centralized command planning as the assortment of products expands with industrialization. The number of targets and allocation quotas increases in proportion to the square of the number of products. According to one source, the Soviet standard classification of products of about 20 million in 1963 entailed the astronomical number of 40 to the 13th power (or over 670 quintillion) possible planned relations; so measured, the complexity of Soviet planning has increased 1,600-fold since 1928.[6] No wonder that even less-

[5] See, for example, A. Aganbegyan *et al.*, *Modele matematyczne w planowaniu gospodarczym* (Mathematical Models in Economic Planning), tr. from the Russian, Warszawa, Panstwowe Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1974, pp. 40 ff.

[6] See W. Keizer, *The Soviet Quest for Economic Rationality*, Rotterdam, Rotterdam University Press, 1971, p. 226.

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advanced East European countries, in particular Bulgaria(!), look to computers to resolve the problems of planning. Second, the transition from extensive to intensive growth, necessitated in part by dwindling labor surpluses, makes it imperative that resources be used more efficiently. Third, there is the effect of an increasing need to participate in the international division of labor through trade. This necessity (or desirability) is rendered acute (or self-evident) both by the increasing complexity of the East European economies and by the exhaustion of extensive margins of growth. Especially when trade is conducted with the industrial West, centralized command planning and the insulation of rigid domestic prices and of intra-CMEA exchange rates from the world market become an intolerable liability. In small, resource-poor countries like Hungary, such considerations are the main reason for reforms.

Economic arguments for adoption of some sort of "market socialism" are incontrovertible and could be multiplied *ad libitum.* As Professor Marczewski puts it (p. 57) "the Stalin model of planning and economic management is inefficient and very costly. It also is extremely clumsy and inflexible, and involves the existence of a class of bureaucrats whose number and powers are constantly increasing."

But at the same time, there are economic counterarguments. Reforms pose a number of risks: the possibility of (a) destabilization of output and employment, (b) a slowdown of growth, should decentralization and use of incentives reduce the availability of investible funds, (c) intensified inflationary pressures, (d) accentuation of income inequalities, and (e) increased vulnerability to foreign business cycles. Yugoslavia's mounting economic difficulties demonstrate these dangers rather distinctly. More important, the current economic disarray of the West must also give rise to many a cautionary thought in the assorted politburos. Certainly, no government today, let alone a Communist one, can be indifferent to such perils. Hence, to the East European leaderships, the *ancien régime* of central command planning at home, combined with supranational CMEA integration, might in the final analysis seem to constitute the most acceptable alternative.

HOWEVER, NEITHER such balancing of potential economic benefits and costs nor the enormous problems in trying to carry out and control a general overhaul of an entire economy fully explain the attitudes of the East European regimes toward economic reform. Nor can the leaders be viewed as pursuing dispassionate, let alone rational, social engineering. At the heart of their relationship to economic reform lies politics.

Internally, Communist regimes are not about to relax their grip on the economy. Lacking traditional and charismatic legitimacy, the Giereks, Honeckers, and Zhivkovs have increasingly sought to base their public *raison d'être* on their meddling in the economy. And so also have the party *apparat* and the bureaucracy, on which the entire power structure in each of the East European countries is founded.

Externally, there is the Soviet colossus, wielding not only the Brezhnev Doctrine, but also other means with which to discipline those who displease the Kremlin —*e.g.,* economic sanctions or support of party factions trying to unseat the leaders in power. In spite of the mystery of apparent Hungarian license in matters economic, it is not at all clear whether radical departures from the Soviet way of "reforming" Communist economies could be attempted, say, by Poland without Moscow's approval. An unsigned *Pravda* article criticizing a given reform proposal might well suffice to have it killed in Warsaw, although this situation too may change with time.

Social science is, of course, an unreliable guide to the future; a crystal ball would probably do just as well for anyone interested in making predictions. Even so, some things do seem predictable. In particular, there are reasons to believe that the long-term prospects for Eastern Europe and for economic reforms there will remain closely tied to internal developments in the Soviet Union. With respect to the latter, the course of the future lies somewhere between the most optimistic scenario painted by advocates of détente and the darkest vision of Alexander Solzhenitsyn. In the first case, Eastern Europe might be expected to share in the economic and political benefits of a liberalization of the Soviet political system. As for the second case, which spells a catacylsmic breakdown of the Soviet system, it is more difficult to speculate on the consequences.

One is on safer grounds when attempting to peer into the less distant future. For Eastern Europe, there will most probably be more of the same: recurring cycles of advance and retreat in economic reforms between the extremes of centralized planning and the market.

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Hungarian Views of CMEA Integration

By Roger E. Kanet

SANDOR AUSCH. *Theory and Practice of CMEA Cooperation.* Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1972.
TIBOR KISS. *International Division of Labour in Open Economies with Special Regard to the CMEA.* Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1971.
TIBOR KISS, Ed. *The Market of Socialist Economic Integration: Selected Conference Papers.* Budapest, Akademiai Kiado, 1973.

IN THE YEARS immediately following the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the Soviet Union initiated a major effort to increase economic integration among the members of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In April 1969 a special session of CMEA (its 23rd) adopted a 25-point protocol on cooperation, and two years later the 25th session of the Council adopted a "Complex Program" which outlined in more detail procedures for future cooperation and coordination of the member states' economies.[1] Although the goal of an integrated socialist economy embracing the seven European members of CMEA remains far from realization, significant progress has been made in tying the economies of the member countries more closely to one another—primarily through bilateral agreements on production cooperation.

The most important aspect of the developing cooperation among the CMEA economies has been the conclusion of intergovernmental agreements on production specialization. While sharing the Soviet commitment to expanded cooperation within the CMEA framework, however, some East Europeans have differed with Moscow over the kind of integration to be sought and the means to achieve it.

In particular, Hungarian economists and officials began, soon after introduction of domestic economic reforms in 1968, to call for a major reform of the entire structure of trade within CMEA with a view to introducing market relations financed by convertible currencies. This, they argued, would improve the operations of the organization and reduce the obstacles to expanded economic cooperation and trade.

One gets a good view of the Hungarian proposals in the three volumes reviewed here—all part of a series of English-language works on economics published by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (*Akademiai Kiado*).[2] As the third of the books attests, such views did not find widespread support among the other members of CMEA when first presented, nor were they reflected in the Complex Program of 1971 or the numerous cooperation agreements since signed. Nevertheless, the Hungarian recommendations represent an important alternative to the path to integration currently being followed in Eastern Europe. The bold and serious way in which the Hungarians have addressed some of the persistent obstacles to genuine economic integration in Eastern Europe and the fact that some, if not most, of these obstacles remain unsurmounted today make their proposals of enduring interest.

The first of these volumes is by the late Sandor Ausch, who

[1] The full text of the Program, entitled "Complex Program for the Extension and Improvement of Collaboration and the Development of Socialist Economic Integration of the CMEA Countries," appeared in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* (Moscow), No. 3, August 1971; translated in *Soviet and Eastern European Foreign Trade* (White Plains, New York), Fall-Winter 1971-72, pp. 187-305.

[2] The Hungarian Academy of Sciences is to be thanked for making available to the English-speaking scholarly community these and other important Hungarian publications on economics. At the same time, it must be noted that all three of the present volumes are poor translations, abounding in grammatical errors and awkward renditions that could have been avoided by the use of a copy editor more competent in the English language. Given the pricing of the books—quite on a level with spiraling costs of books in the West—the reader should have been able to expect a better English rendition.

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served as Hungary's representative at CMEA headquarters in Moscow in 1949 and again in 1962-64. His book, which appeared originally in Hungarian in 1968, is an attempt "to find out what is possible in the field of . . . cooperation" (p. 9). From an examination of the large integrated markets (with common currencies) that existed in Eastern and Central Europe at the turn of the 20th century and of their impact on the economic growth of Poland and Hungary, Ausch concludes that such markets may be more conducive than economic independence to economic growth (p. 23). Based on this premise, Ausch presents a careful, reasoned argument in favor of the creation of a truly multilateral, integrated market within CMEA. He sees this and the resultant expansion of trade as a virtual precondition for the continued economic growth of the member countries, especially the smaller ones, for whom a low level of exports results in a "relatively slow level of growth and in a relatively low efficiency of the national economy as a whole" (p. 59).

Ausch discerns a number of major hindrances to the development of multilateral trade within CMEA. He attributes particular importance to the irrationality of the pricing system utilized in intra-CMEA trade, under which, he notes, prices for machinery were more than 25 percent higher, for raw materials 15 percent higher, and for agricultural products 1.7 percent higher than prevailing world-market prices. This, Ausch argues, tended to reduce rather than to encourage trade among CMEA states (p. 85).[3] In addition, he contends that the major differential in pricing between manufactures and raw materials/foodstuffs tended to foster bilateralism in CMEA trade relations and hence also discouraged trade expansion (pp. 111-15). Ausch argues for the establishment of exchange rates that directly correlate internal and external prices and for a convertible currency within CMEA, whose existing clearing system "has satisfied the requirements of multilateralism only in a formal sense" (p. 168).

In addition to urging more rational pricing, Ausch stresses the need for economic units to have freedom of choice in matters directly related to sales and purchases—meaning, in effect, the elimination of central government control over foreign trade (pp. 169-70). In other words, he calls for the creation of "regulated and planned socialist market economies" in the other CMEA countries along the lines then being introduced in Hungary. In his concluding statement, he emphasizes that failure to bring this transformation about will have severe consequences:

. . . the concrete form of our production relations (the system of direct plan instruction) is hindering, to an ever-increasing extent, the unfolding of a more efficient intra-regional cooperation, giving birth to protectionist and autarkic tendencies, [which] induce men and countries to advocate opinions and take decisions opposed to the ideal requirements of the CMEA community. (p. 226)

[3] It might be noted that it was almost seven years later, in January 1975, that a major revision of CMEA prices was finally undertaken. By then, the prices charged for industrial goods in intra-CMEA trade had moved to a level about 50 percent higher than world-market prices. (It is still early to judge how the 1975 reform affected these discrepancies.)

ALTHOUGH Tibor Kiss's study of the importance of trade to "open economies" is a more broadly conceived work than Ausch's, his analysis leads him to many similar conclusions concerning intra-CMEA economic cooperation. Kiss defines open economies as those of small countries where economic growth is closely related to the international division of labor and for which "the volume and economic efficiency of exports have an almost decisive influence . . ." (p. 9). While he examines growth patterns and the role of foreign trade in the growth of open economies of both socialist and capitalist types, his emphasis is on the former, in particular those of the East European states belonging to CMEA.

Kiss enumerates some of the salient "contradictions" hindering intra-CMEA economic cooperation: (1) contradictions between the interests of individual countries and those of the socialist world economy as a whole; (2) conflicts between economically advanced and less developed countries; (3) differences in the level of productive forces and of raw material endowment; and (4) divergences between the specific economic systems operative in the various CMEA countries (p. 167). While Kiss proposes expansion of coordinated planning among CMEA member states, he also calls for development of a socialist market, a CMEA customs union, realistic currency exchange rates and currency convertibility, and direct contacts between economic enterprises engaged in intra-CMEA trade.

In their open-minded search for experience relevant to the future of the economies of Eastern Europe and cooperation between them, both Ausch and Kiss draw

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on the economic experience of the socialist and nonsocialist worlds alike. For one accustomed to reading the works of Soviet authors—written within an ideological strait-jacket—the absence of regular citation of the Marxist-Leninist "masters" in these two books is welcome indeed.

THE ARGUMENTS of Ausch and Kiss for restructuring CMEA and for broadly reforming the respective member states' economies in order to facilitate trade and cooperation are characteristic of the position taken by Hungary in the late 1960's and early 1970's—a stand supported in part by Poland. However, it was a minority stand within CMEA, as indicated in the third of the reviewed volumes. With Kiss serving as editor, *The Market of Socialist Economic Integration* assembles papers presented by East European and Soviet economists at a conference on "The Nature and Problems of the CMEA Market," held in Budapest in November 1970.

Differences of opinion on how to achieve the goal of expanded trade and the more distant objectives of economic cooperation and integration are manifest throughout this volume. The Romanians, for example, while admitting that trade is important for economic growth, tend to downplay its importance in the case of Romania, where—they claim—growth has been "based on the internal factors of development" (pp. 123-29). Also evident is a sharp divergence of views over the need for a convertible currency. N. Sheyn, a Soviet economist, argues in a paper summarized for the volume by the editor that the existing "transferable ruble" can "meet all the functions of a socialist international currency"—a contention countered not only by the Hungarians and Poles, but even by O. Bogomolov, the dean of Soviet specialists on CMEA integration (pp. 25-26).

At a more fundamental level, both the Soviet and East German participants disagree with the Hungarians' call for development of a "socialist market" among the CMEA countries. Bogomolov and his colleague, I. O. Tarnovskiy, both argue that the most effective method to expand economic integration within CMEA is to coordinate state economic plans (pp. 32, 46). Tarnovskiy warns that "commercialization of economic relations" would bring into play market factors which would result in uncontrollable effects that would be incompatible with the tasks of socialist economic integration—a position strongly seconded by G. Gräbig, an economist from the GDR (p. 202).

As noted at the outset, it is this Soviet approach which has dominated the efforts of recent years to rejuvenate and expand economic cooperation within CMEA. The Hungarian arguments for market relations, termed by East German economists "an attack against the determining advantages of economic cooperation of the socialist countries," [4] have not been heeded. Rather than focusing on efforts to develop a genuine socialist market with a convertible currency and expansion of direct contacts among economic producers operating in an atmosphere of reduced central governmental control, the CMEA has emphasized coordination of economic planning through a multitude of agreements reached at the governmental level.

Whether this approach and such measures as the 1975 revision of CMEA pricing are capable of generating the expansion of trade and economic cooperation needed for the growth of the member states' economies remains to be seen. If the Soviet-sponsored approach fails to achieve this objective, there is a good possibility that there will be renewed interest in the Hungarian proposals rejected at the turn of this decade.

[4] G. Gräbig, G. Brendel, and H.-J. Dubrowsky, *Ware-Geld-Beziehungen in der sozialistischen ökonomischen Integration* (Commodity-Money Relations in Socialist Economic Integration), Berlin, Verlag die Wirtschaft, 1975, p. 19.

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Insights into the Soviet Military

By Harriet Fast Scott

A. A. GRECHKO *et al.*, Eds. *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vol. 1. Moscow. Voyenizdat, 1976.

WESTERN STUDENTS of the USSR were intrigued when *Krasnaya zvezda,* the official newspaper of the Soviet Ministry of Defense, announced on June 12, 1974, the forthcoming publication of an eight-volume *Soviet Military Encyclopedia,* and they wondered whether this encyclopedia would help them pierce the veil of secrecy that had shrouded the Soviet armed forces over the years. So thick had this veil been that in the early 1970's Western estimates of the size of the Soviet armed forces had missed the mark by nearly one million men.[1] Moreover, estimates of Soviet military spending had been off by a factor of two or three.[2]

In the spring of 1976, the first volume of the new encyclopedia finally appeared, published in an edition of 105,000 copies. It had been sent to the typesetter in September 1974, and "polishing" on it had been completed 14 months later, in November 1975, after which it had been dispatched to the printer.[3]

The importance which the Soviet leadership attaches to this undertaking may be gauged by the character of the reviews of the first volume that have appeared in Soviet periodicals and newspapers. In a review published in *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil,* General of the Army Ye. Ye. Mal'tsev, head of the Lenin Military-Political Academy, stated that with the intensification of the ideological struggle between two opposed social systems, there was great need for a work of a military encyclopedia-dictionary type. He was especially concerned with the "military theoretical sphere" and asserted that "one of the important aims of the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* is to give a well-reasoned repulse to the underhand plottings of [our] ideological enemies, and to defend genuinely scientific understanding of problems of military theory and practice." [4]

Writing in *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal,* Professor and General of the Army P. A. Kurochkin, commandant of the Frunze Military Academy from 1954 to 1968, stressed that each military term and definition had been given a Marxist-Leninist explanation. "It is the first Marxist-Leninist military encyclopedia," he asserted. He also held that in "analyzing the first volume, it is clear that the land of the Soviets has convincingly proved the historical superiority of the socialist military organization over the capitalist." [5]

General Colonel M. M. Kozlov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff, offered an equally glowing tribute in *Pravda.* He pointed out that the first volume of the 1911 *Voyennaya entsiklopediya* had devoted only one article to aviation, the 1932 *Voyennaya entsiklopediya* had increased the number to 40, but the present work contained more than 140 articles on the subject.[6] (Perhaps later re-

[1] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1973-1974,* London, 1973, put the size of the Soviet armed forces at 3,425,000 men. In "Are We Underestimating Soviet Military Manpower," *Air Force Magazine* (Washington, DC), April 1974, p. 28, William F. Scott estimated it to be about 4,500,000. For a discussion of various estimates of Soviet military manpower, see US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, *Soviet Economy in a New Perspective,* Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1976, p. 144.

[2] Daniel O. Graham, "The Soviet Military Budget Controversy," *Air Force Magazine,* May 1976, p. 36.

[3] According to *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), Nov. 24, 1976, the second volume of the encyclopedia came off the presses in November 1976. At the time of writing, a copy of that volume was not yet available for analysis.

[4] *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil* (Moscow), July 13, 1976, p. 85.

[5] *Voyenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal* (Moscow), May 5, 1976, p. 107.

[6] *Pravda* (Moscow), May 6, 1976, p. 3. The earlier encyclopedias were K. I. Velichko *et al.*, Eds., *Voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Military Encyclopedia), Vols. 1-18, St. Petersburg, I. V. Sytin Publishers, 1911-15; and R. P.

(continued on p. 71)

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viewers will show that in 1911, before the Revolution, few articles were devoted to nuclear energy as well!)

In *Krasnaya zvezda,* Professor and General Lieutenant V. Reznichenko, Doctor of Military Sciences and head of the Tactics Department at Frunze Military Academy, emphasized the active role of leading scientists and specialists at institutions of higher learning and officers of the Ministry of Defense in preparing the encyclopedia.[7]

Western readers, however, will feel much better when all eight volumes are on the bookshelves, for they know what happened during the last attempt to publish a military encyclopedia in the USSR (in 1931-32). This encyclopedia, under the editorship of one of the most brilliant of the Soviet military strategists of that day—Komkor (three-star) R. P. Eydeman, commandant of the Frunze Military Academy from 1925 to 1932—was to have included "several volumes," but the project was nipped in the bud. It got no further than two volumes, covering "A" to Varna" (the letter "V" being the third letter of the Russian alphabet). Subsequently, Eydeman was one of the many thousands of Soviet officers killed during Stalin's purges.

THE FULL VERSION of the encyclopedia will, according to Soviet spokesmen, contain more than 10,000 entries. Responsibility for its content lies with the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); much of the writing will be done by faculty members of military schools and academies, the Institute of Military History, specialists in science and technology, and military leaders of note.[8]

The Main Editorial Commission for the encyclopedia was headed by Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, the Minister of Defense, who died just as Volume 1 was going on sale. There are 18 other members of the group. These include three of the five service commanders-in-chief—I. G. Pavlovskiy (Ground Forces), P. S. Kutakhov (Air Forces), and S. G. Gorshkov (Navy)—plus N. N. Alekseyev, Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments; A. T. Altunin, Deputy Minister of Defense for Civil Defense; N. V. Ogarkov, a Deputy Minister of Defense whose job is not known;* A. A. Yepishev, Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, and his First Deputy, P. I. Yefimov; and several other generals and some civilians.

Certain of the omissions from the Commission may raise some eyebrows. All three First Deputy Ministers of Defense—I. I. Yakubovskiy, V. G. Kulikov, and S. L. Sokolov—are missing, although they made signed contributions to Volume 1 of the encyclopedia. Also absent from the list are two service commanders-in-chief—V. F. Tolubko (Strategic Rocket Troops) and P. F. Batitskiy (National Air Defense).

The Commission itself is divided into seven thematic subcommittees: War and Politics, Ground Forces, Air Forces, Navy, Military Art, Equipment and Armaments, and Military Leaders. General Colonel G. V. Sredin, First Deputy Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, headed the War and Politics Subcommittee. Western analysts may find it interesting that Colonel Ye. I. Rybkin, sometimes called a "red hawk" in the West because of his 1965 article, "On the Nature of World Nuclear Rocket War,"[9] is on this subcommittee. Military art is the responsibility of General of the Army I. Y. Shavrov, head of the Academy of the General Staff. General Colonel-Engineer N. N. Alekseyev, known to many Americans from his work as a top Soviet military delegate in the SALT I negotiations, heads the Subcommittee on Equipment and Armaments. General of the Army I. N. Shkadov, Chief of the Main Cadre Administration, has responsibility for the Subcommittee on Military Leaders. Since in the Soviet Union biographies so often have to be rewritten to adjust to current party lines, Shkadov's task may prove most difficult.

The original publication schedule for the encyclopedia called for the appearance of the final volume by 1979. While Grechko's successor, Politburo member D. F. Ustinov, might conceivably want some changes in the remaining seven volumes, these volumes

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Eydeman, Ed., *Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya* (Soviet Military Encyclopedia), Vols. 1-2 only. See "Military Encyclopedias," *Bolshaya sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia), 3rd ed., Vol. 5, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo "Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya," 1971, p. 246, col. 725-26.

[7] *Krasnaya zvezda,* April 7, 1976, p. 2.

[8] *Ibid.* See also N. V. Ogarkov, "Soviet Military Encyclopedia," *Soviet Military Review* (Moscow), July 1976, p. 12.

*Subsequent to the writing of this essay, there were several significant changes in the Soviet high command. Ogarkov was named Chief of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces in January 1977 to replace V. G. Kulikov, who was reassigned to the post of commander of Warsaw Pact forces. Kulikov succeeded I. I. Yakubovskiy, who died on November 30, 1976.—*Eds.*

[9] *Kommunist vooruzhënnykh sil,* Sept. 17, 1965, p. 50.

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presumably have already been written and are in the pipeline since there is a long lead time involved in writing and assembling such a vast work (18 months from the moment they are typeset until they go on sale). At the promised rate of publication of two volumes a year, of course, only minimal changes would be possible. However, Voyenizdat, the Military Publishing House, has seldom in the past adhered to advertised publication schedules.

SEVERAL ASPECTS of the first volume of the encyclopedia merit special comment. It includes about a hundred biographies of leading Russian and Soviet marshals, admirals, and generals. Most of the same people are treated in the new third edition of the *Bolshaya Sovetskaya entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia);[10] however, many of the entries in the *Soviet Military Encyclopedia* contain more details. For instance, the latter's entry on Leonid Brezhnev provides much more information on his war record and his postwar stint in the navy, and it refers to him as the Chairman of the Defense Council.

Among the biographical sketches, it should be noted, are a number dealing with Soviet military figures who perished at the hands of their own countrymen. These include Ya. I. Alksnis, V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, G. D. Bazilevich, I. P. Belov, Ya. K. Berzin, V. K. Blyukher, and Ya. K. Bubnov. No reason is given for their untimely deaths—only the date. Perhaps the fact that three of them died on July 29, 1938—when what has been called the "July massacre" of Soviet officers took place—is enough of a clue to Soviet readers to indicate what happened.

In addition to biographies of Russian and Soviet military men, the Editorial Commission has included sketches of the careers of several world military leaders. There are, for example, biographies of General H. H. ("Hap") Arnold and General Omar N. Bradley. These are presented factually.

Many of the more important articles are signed by the authors. Marshal Georgiy K. Zhukov, for instance, wrote the "Berlin Operation 1945" and the "Battle Near Moscow 1941-1942." "The Belorussian Operation 1944" was contributed by Marshal A. M. Vasilevskiy, and the "Battle for the Caucasus 1942-1943," by Marshal A. A. Grechko. (All three men, incidentally, were involved in the operations that they describe. It is to be hoped that future volumes will preserve this same authenticity. Only a handful of the outstanding leaders of the last war are still living.) Marshal I. I. Yakubovskiy wrote the entry on the "Combat Community," which discusses the international role of the Soviet armed forces and concentrates on the Warsaw Pact and its united armed forces, of which Yakubovskiy himself was the commander-in-chief. Chief Marshal of Aviation P. S. Kutakhov contributed the "Aviation" entry, and the Soviet Navy's Marshal of Aviation, I. I. Borzov, the entry on "Aviation of the Navy." Marshal of Aviation B. P. Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation, wrote the discussion of "Aviation, Civil." General I. M. Tret'yak was responsible for the entry on the "Belorussian Military District," a district which he until recently commanded. "Ammunition" was written by the former SALT delegate, General N. N. Alekseyev. General V. G. Reznichenko, of the faculty of the Frunze Military Academy, contributed the entry dealing with "Combat Order."

Technically, the volume is well done. There are 95 first-rate color maps, showing both battles and world areas, and 502 other illustrations, charts, photographs, and drawings, all of which clearly make the text easier to comprehend. The volume is somewhat smaller in size than the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia,* and each of its pages contains only two columns instead of the three to be found in the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*. Hence, it is more convenient to read. As with most Soviet writings, however, the volume suffers from lack of an index.

Overall, the work has obvious flaws for the Western reader because of the heavy Marxist-Leninist emphasis and orientation of most entries. Furthermore, Western readers who expect a military encyclopedia to give a comprehensive treatment of military affairs will be disappointed with this effort. Data which in the West would be ordinary facts fall into the realm of "state" or "military" secrets in the USSR, and this situation places great limitations on what the Soviet contributors can write.

Nevertheless, for those interested in the many aspects of Soviet military affairs—especially Russian and Soviet military history—the information contained in this first volume is most instructive. It would be a loss to scholars if a change in leadership or new policies were to preclude the appearance of the remaining volumes.

[10] The *Bolshaya Sovetskaya entsiklopediya*, 3rd ed., is being published by the "Soviet Encyclopedia" Publishing House in Moscow. Publication began in 1970, and to date some two dozen volumes out of a planned 30 volumes have appeared.

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The Soviet Urban Scene

By Henry W. Morton

WILLIAM TAUBMAN. *Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development in the USSR.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1973.
ALFRED JOHN DiMAIO, Jr. *Soviet Urban Housing: Problems and Policies.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.
ALEXEI GUTNOV *et al. The Ideal Communist City.* New York, NY, George Braziller, 1970.

THE USSR OF THE 1970's is a land of city-dwellers, with over 60 percent of the Soviet people living in areas designated "urban." This is a recent development. Fifty years ago only 26.3 million people resided in Soviet cities and towns; by 1974 that number had increased six-fold to 153.1 million. Fifty years ago the USSR had only two cities with a population of over one million; by 1974 there were 13 such cities, and by 1990 Soviet demographers project twice this number. Fifty years ago there were no cities with a population between 500,000 and one million; by 1974 there were 29.[1]

These data raise all kinds of questions. Do they mean that Chekov's provincials who desperately longed to go to Moscow have realized their dream and are now living a cultured, urban existence in the capital or in other city centers? What are the economic, social, and political consequences of this unremitting flow from the countryside? What are the problems of Soviet cities, and do these differ from the current American experience?

The United States is now in a period of post-urban growth characterized by inner-city decay and poverty, with affluent suburbs surrounding the central city. Mayors of central cities have become mendicants seeking handouts at the national and state capitals. American cities need to attract commerce and industry and to hold on to the middle class. Desperately, they search for means to preserve their tax base from shrinking in order to pay for essential city services, whose costs have escalated. Instead, they attract lower income groups and the poor. Those with means flee to the periphery, seeking a better life.

A sharply contrasting situation exists in the USSR.[2] The country is still undergoing rapid urbanization. In the eyes of most Soviet citizens, cities are the most, indeed the only, desirable place to live, and the larger the city, the better—ideally Moscow or the capitals of the republics. But the city fringes are another matter. Of the 38.9 million people who crowded into the 22 largest metropolitan areas in the Soviet Union in 1970, 10.2 million (or 26.2 percent) lived in communities adjoining the main cities. Most of these "suburbanites" are the have-nots, the urban poor of Soviet society. Many commute to the center city for work, but not by choice. In recent years the regime has attempted to close off the large population centers to newcomers so as to prevent Moscow, Kiev, and other cities from turning into Soviet-style Bombays. Permission to move to them is rarely granted.[3]

For the Soviet citizen the question of living within the city or in surrounding settlements is not a casual but a crucial one. Beyond the city line, with the last high-rise structures still in sight, a harsh, rural life-style prevails,

[1] *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1959 godu* (National Economy of the USSR in 1959), Moscow, Gosstatizdat TSSR SSSR, 1960, p. 9; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1974 godu,* Moscow, Statistika, 1975, pp. 7, 22-31; *Strana sovetov za 50 let* (The Land of the Soviets over 50 Years), Moscow, Statistika, 1967, p. 2.

[2] The following five paragraphs are based on the reviewer's own research findings in the area of Soviet housing, including on-the-spot observations in the course of several research projects. See later footnotes for specific writings.

[3] The regime's effort to restrict in-migration to large cities has only been partially successful. Illegal entries are prevalent. Often sham marriages are arranged to obtain a *propiska* (permit) for the nonresident "partner" to live in such cities as Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev. There is also great pressure from industry to expand the urban working force, as discussed later in this essay. The 1970 census showed that approximately half a million more people lived in Moscow than had been estimated.

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greatly lacking in creature comforts and timesaving devices. Suburbs, as Americans know them, simply do not exist—except for isolated *dacha* (villa) communities of the top elite.

Despite severely overcrowded living conditions in cities (up to 40 percent of all Soviet families still share their apartments, kitchens, and bathrooms with strangers), new housing does come equipped with electricity, indoor plumbing, hot water, gas, and central heating. Many residents have telephones. On the other hand, rural housing means slum living for most. The typical wooden one- or two-story structure comes equipped with electricity, and some have propane gas to fuel the stove instead of kerosene or wood. But water has to be drawn from a pump; and an outhouse must do instead of a flush toilet. There is no central heating, and very few people have phones.

Shopping is a major problem. Consumer goods are inadequately and capriciously stocked in local stores (Moscow and the capitals of the republics are best supplied). Frequent trips to the city are necessary to buy meats and fresh vegetables. Even in large cities, such as Sverdlovsk, which has a population of over one million, meat is only occasionally available. The same holds true for clothing, appliances, furniture, and other items. Purchases are carried home by hand, on public transportation. Few Soviet citizens have cars. Those who live outside the city spend much more of their non-working time tending to daily needs. Out of necessity, many cultivate vegetable gardens for personal consumption. Leisure time is limited, and so are leisure activities. The chief divertissements are television and alcohol. Rural schools are qualitatively inferior to those in cities, drawing teachers who are less competent and pupils who are culturally deprived. The opportunity to enroll in local colleges or universities is severely limited, since such institutions are located primarily in the larger urban centers.

Thus, the quality of life for those who live outside the city is substantially lower than for those who reside within. City residents generally are better educated, possess greater skills, hold more responsible positions, and are more likely to be members of the Soviet middle class or of the blue-collar elite than their "suburban" and country cousins. They can provide better opportunities for their children and take better care of their aging parents. The less well-off who live beyond the city's fringe wait and hope to be let in.[4]

THE IMPORTANT role of the cities in Soviet society and economic development thus seems self-evident. How well the USSR plans and allocates its urban resources, sites its industrial plants, distributes its scarce labor resources, controls labor turnover, provides better housing and transportation, improves education, and increases the supply of consumer goods and other services which affect the quality of life will greatly determine the Soviet Union's capacity to develop into a modern society. The cruciality of these concerns prompts William Taubman to remark (in the first book under review) that "Soviet urban development is too important a subject to be left only to Soviet writers or to urbanists of East or West." One could hardly disagree. Regrettably, however, only a handful of Western political scientists have ventured into this area.[5] Therefore, the books by Taubman and by Alfred DiMaio are particularly welcome. Of the two, Taubman's is the broader. He has written a lean, neatly argued, conceptual essay on Soviet urban politics. In the process, he has provided an overview of who governs Soviet cities, offering a contextual view of the place of the cities in the structure of the Soviet system as a whole.

Taubman makes a series of conceptual pronouncements which deserve attention. These are put in the following perspective: The city is the creature of the republic and in turn of the central government, which determine the city's budget and closely supervise and monitor its activities. Many large and medium-sized Soviet cities are company towns. Their destiny is chiefly in the hands of directors of enterprises of large federal ministries, which provide revenue for many of the essential services, such as housing, public transpor-

[4] For an insightful analysis of "suburban" life throughout Eastern Europe, see Ivan Szelenyi, *Regional Management and Social Class: The Case of Eastern Europe*, London, Centre for Environmental Studies, 1975.

[5] The list includes: David Cattell, *Leningrad. A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government*, New York, Praeger, 1968; Jeff Chinn, *The Socio-Demographic Consequences of Urbanization in the Soviet Union*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, 1975; Theodore Friedgut, "Community Structure, Political Participation, and Soviet Local Government: The Case of Kutaisi," in Henry W. Morton and Rudolf L. Tökés, Eds., *Soviet Politics and Society in the 1970's*, New York, The Free Press, 1974, pp. 261-99; B. Michael Frolic, *Soviet Urban Government*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1972; Henry W. Morton, "The Leningrad District of Moscow—An Inside Look," *Soviet Studies* (Glasgow), October 1968, pp. 676-84; Henry W. Morton, "What Have Soviet Leaders Done about the Housing Crisis?" in Morton and Tökés, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-99; Robert J. Osborn, *Soviet Social Policies*, Homewood, IL, The Dorsey Press, 1970.

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tation, electricity, steam heat, and water supply. In many instances, these enterprises and not the city are in physical control of discharging and maintaining essential services. But since factory directors concentrate on productivity, upon which their job security depends, the delivery of essential urban services holds low priority in their scheme of things. Consequently, such services are seriously negiected. Housing needs are ignored; stores are not built; water is irregularly supplied; etc., etc. Treated like lesser vassals, the members of the city party committee and the executive committee of the city council lock horns with the director-barons to improve services but lack the political clout to redress the balance in the city's favor. Exceptions to this rule are the super-sized cities, (Moscow, Leningrad, and the capitals of republics), where city officials have greater control over resources, and — conversely — the many underdeveloped small towns which are stagnating because they have been unable to attract industry.

Taubman argues convincingly that to understand the Soviet political process, we should apply a bureaucratic model of politics, and he finds that Western studies of complex organizations are applicable. In this context, the USSR is seen as a configuration of complex bureaucracies. Different party and government bureaus compete for scarce resources. Complicated problems are sliced up and farmed out to organizational subunits. They lose sight of the big picture and pursue self-interest. How has this affected urban development?

A strategy that is decades old —the "industry-first, cities-be-damned" syndrome—is difficult to reverse. Soviet leaders could implement significant changes, but only by mounting a massive assault on entrenched bureaucracies: the ministries and their enterprises. This they hesitate to do, since "the leaders cannot bring themselves to break fully with the assumption of an earlier era, of which they themselves are a product" (p. 18). Given their conservative bias, they are undoubtedly concerned about the economic and political consequences that would result from changing too quickly. That is why the reforms of 1957 and 1971, which were intended to give cities and towns greater control over municipal services by reducing the role of enterprises in this sector, have been implemented at a snail's pace. Thus, integrative urban planning which would balance industrial and consumer needs has been postponed again and again. Only when city officials have adequate financial resources will they no longer be compelled to beg aid from enterprises which demand favors in return, particularly permission to build new plants or to expand existing ones. The latter impetus establishes a vicious circle. Each expansion brings a new influx of workers and their families, whose housing, shopping, and transportation needs will be slighted if not ignored. If convergence has taken place between the United States and the Soviet Union at all, comments Taubman, it has been in city mismanagement—"the failure to build and govern satisfactory cities" (p. 10).

Who governs Soviet cities? Taubman tells us it is not one group of notables. Rather, the party first secretaries and the factory managers restrain each other, creating conditions for local "pluralism," Soviet-style. One of his intriguing conclusions is that the "reds," the local party and government authorities, are the would-be innovators pressuring to improve city services and curb industrial pollutions, but that they are blocked in these efforts by the "experts," the factory directors, who are opponents of change.

Taubman's analysis is sophisticated, but does it tell the whole story? One could argue that a more complex, triangular relationship exists among the first secretary of the city party committee, responsible for industry and the municipality; the enterprise director, responsible for productivity; and the chairman of the executive committee of the local council, the "mayor," responsible solely for city services. The first secretary is boss unless outranked by the director of a large plant by virtue of the latter's membership in a higher party body (the provincial party committee or, in rare instances, the central committee of the republic or of the USSR). In the troika of city magnates, the mayor has huge responsibilities but little authority. He is the most concerned but the least effective in reordering the balance between municipal and industrial needs.

Taubman has provided us with an incisively written book. Unfortunately, it is too brief (the text runs only to 116 pages). He should and could have dug deeper, because the questions that he raises and the answers that he provides are thoughtful, unconventional, and provocative. The reader wants more information, illustrations, and analysis. Only several pages are devoted to city finances and transportation. Other areas such as urban planning and local trade are not covered at all. But no matter. The book is invaluable because it charts a concep-

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tual approach of how to look at Soviet urban problems from a political perspective.

OF ALL SOVIET urban problems, housing remains the most critical. The Tsarist legacy in housing was dismal. Under Stalin, conditions worsened. Stalin invested heavily in industry but failed to provide the resources to house the millions who left the farm for factories. The crowding of several families into one apartment was universal. The estimated living space per person in 1950 was less than 5 square meters (some 7 by 7 feet). Shortly after Stalin's death, the Soviet leaders decided to solve the housing crisis, and to some extent they did. Since 1957, the USSR has been building 2.3 million housing units yearly—a remarkable achievement, even if the quality and size of units are below Western standards.[6] Yet despite this effort, a serious shortage persists, and the promise made in the revised Party Program of 1961—that by 1980, "every family, including newlyweds, will have a comfortable flat"—will remain unfulfilled. An estimated 40 percent of Soviet families still share apartments, and the housing norm of 9 square meters of living space (10 by 10 feet) established in 1922, the standard by which Soviet citizens measure their housing comfort, has not yet been achieved by the majority of urban dwellers. Waiting for a new flat may take as long as 10 years, and only those whose living space is less than 5 square meters are considered. Newlyweds have little chance of their own apartments.

[6] See Henry W. Morton, "Low Cost Housing in the USSR," *Proceedings, I.H.A.S. International Symposium on Housing Problems—1976*, Clemson, SC, Clemson University, 1976, p. 100.

Because of the gargantuan nature of the problem, Western analysts of Soviet urban affairs have looked closely at the housing question — Taubman frequently refers to it. However, Alfred J. DiMaio's book is the only recent book-length examination of the subject. It is a carefully researched work, a basic building-block which serves as an introduction to a complicated problem. His is a competent evaluation of the successes and failures of party policy and of the reasons for the persistent, nagging shortage of housing—not least of which is the constant in-migration of millions from the countryside, despite official efforts to close off large cities. The latter problem is underscored in the case of Moscow, which by January 1970 had already exceeded its maximum population projection for 1981 (p. 47). This sisyphean struggle is the nightmare of Soviet housing planners. It plays havoc with their projections. Like Taubman, DiMaio finds Soviet urban planning uncoordinated and holds large enterprises responsible for an excessive use of power. He discusses the widespread application of the techniques of industrial-housing construction and their impact on design and quality; the regulations that govern the distribution of apartments; the problems of maintenance and repairs; and the role of housing cooperatives.

Two important facets of the housing problem are not covered in DiMaio's volume. He does not measure the severity of the housing need in terms of the annual shortfall of units built; nor does he explore the relationship between housing accommodations and social stratification in Soviet society to show that some groups receive preference in the distribution of apartments. While neither topic can be fully discussed here, some pertinent observations can be made.

The housing shortage is getting worse. From 1959 to 1965 Soviet builders gradually closed the scissors between the number of new households formed and the number of units built. Since then, the gap has been widening again. In 1965 the shortfall of units built was 142,097, but by 1974 it had reached a staggering 1.1 million units.[7] The problem results from the fact that since 1965 the number of households formed in terms of registered marriages and divorces has steadily increased, while the number of housing units built has remained constant—a trend that will continue throughout the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-80).

With respect to the nexus between housing accommodations and social stratification, members of the Soviet political, military, security, economic, scientific, cultural, educational, and worker elites receive superior accommodations in the form of comfortable, large apartments (by Soviet standards), in new or renovated buildings, ahead of turn of those on the waiting list. Yet the same low-rent scale applies to such housing as to communal flats. Thus, the

[7] *Naseleniye SSSR 1973*, (Population of the USSR, 1973), Moscow, Statistika, 1975, pp. 150, 151; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1965 godu* (National Economy of the USSR, 1965), Moscow, Statistika, 1966, p. 616; *Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSSR v 1974 godu*, pp. 7, 38, 581. The shortfall was actually greater. The reviewer's analysis does not include "singles," the large backlog of households waiting to move from communal quarters to individual dwelling units, or the fact that in 1974, 1.3 units were razed for every 10 units built (*ibid.*, p. 588). On the credit side, the figures do not reflect apartment vacancies that occurred from deaths and from the remarriage of a proportion of divorcees.

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groups that are most advantaged become the beneficiaries of redistributed social wealth by living in units that are in effect the most highly subsidized by the state.[8]

[8] For a fuller explanation, see Ivan Szelenyi, "Housing System and Social Structure," *The Sociological Review* (Keele, England), Monograph 17, February 1972, pp. 269-97.

THE LAST BOOK under review, *The Ideal Communist City*, written by a team of Soviet architects in the late 1950's and translated from the Italian into English in the early 1970's, need not take much of our time. It is a heroic but misplaced *tour de force* to convince the authors themselves and others that an organically integrated urban environment, providing the individual "equal opportunities for the free and harmonious development of his capabilities" is possible through careful planning (p. 26). This realization, as Taubman reminds us, has so far not taken place in the USSR or in the West, nor is it likely to in the foreseeable future.

A Tale of Two Germanies

By Robert Gerald Livingston

GERHARD WETTIG. *Community and Conflict in the Socialist Camp.* New York, NY, St. Martin's Press, 1975.
RICHARD LOWENTHAL. *Vom kalten Krieg zur Ostpolitik* (From Cold War to Eastern Policy). Stuttgart, Seewald Verlag, 1974.
PETER CHRISTIAN LUDZ. *Deutschlands doppelte Zukunft* (Germany's Dual Future). Munich, Carl Hanser Verlag, 1974.
KARL E. BIRNBAUM. *East and West Germany: A Modus Vivendi.* Lexington, MA, D.C. Heath & Co., 1973.
ROBERT W. DEAN. *West German Trade with the East: The Political Dimension.* New York, NY, Praeger, 1974.
SIEGFRIED KUPPER: *Der innerdeutsche Handel* (Inner-German Trade). Cologne, Markus Verlag, 1972.

WE IN THE WEST regarded *Ostpolitik*—that necessary, swift, and surprisingly smooth reversal of all West Germany's previous policy toward the East—from at least four distinct angles. It was seen as the emergence of the Federal Republic (FRG) as an active international force of major importance, not only in Eastern but also in Western Europe. On another plane, its main element was the legitimation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a second German state and thus of the territorial, political, and social status quo in Central Europe. Further, it was—and continues to be—one manifestation of the often bitter rivalry between the Federal Republic and the GDR for the German national heritage and purpose. Finally, it was and is an aspect of the long-standing contest between communism and social democracy in Europe.

The East European states also viewed *Ostpolitik* from these four angles. Additionally, they looked at it from other aspects, having to do mainly with domestic policy aspirations or anxieties and hence with opportunities or risks. The opportunity/risk mix varied most widely in the case of the two Warsaw Pact countries chiefly concerned, the USSR and the GDR.

For Moscow, once its initial suspicions had been overcome, opportunity was the dominant ingredient. Concerned about the USSR's continued lag behind the West in productivity, technology, living standards, and most elements of economic performance, the Soviet leaders recognized the potential benefits of closer links with Western Europe's strongest economy, one which was highly export- and technology-oriented. Worried about tensions with China in Asia, the Kremlin command also welcomed the prospect of greater stability on its European flank stemming from West German acceptance of the postwar territorial and political status quo in Central Europe—the promise held out to Moscow by Willy Brandt's government. Eventual dangers in terms of Soviet public attitudes that might flow from

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a change toward a friendly relationship with a state reviled for two decades as "revenge-seeking" were politically inconsequential compared with these and other opportunities inherent in *Ostpolitik.*

The mix looked quite different, however, from East Berlin. A closer association between the GDR and the Federal Republic was a highly unsettling prospect. *Ostpolitik* posed major security problems for the leaders of a state whose people were susceptible to the attraction of a common German nationality and of social democracy as well. There was also anxiety—perhaps legitimate in the early stages of *Ostpolitik*—that Bonn aimed to divide the GDR from its allies. Measured against such threats to East Germany's security, the economic benefits that could result from a closer relationship counted for less. The GDR did not need them. It already had the highest living standards and productivity levels of the Eastern economies. It also enjoyed, in the form of the long-standing special trade arrangements between the two Germanies, privileged and highly advantageous access to West German markets and quality products.

THE DIFFERING perceptions of the opportunity/risk mix put heavy strains on the Moscow-East Berlin relationship during the late 1960's and early 1970's. These strains led directly to Ulbricht's downfall in May 1971. In the first volume under review, Gerhard Wettig examines Soviet-East German relations during this period and pinpoints numerous instances of tensions and differences. As he shows, the Soviets seemed often to pull the East Germans, kicking if not screaming, into the compromises that Bonn's *Ostpolitik* required. Wettig's carefully researched, highly detailed, and admirably dispassionate account of the GDR-Soviet relationship during the *Ostpolitik* years provides an essential basis for further analysis of this vital axis of the Warsaw Pact structure.

Equally important and only somewhat less shadowy than this relationship is that between the two Germanies. The five other books under review concentrate on this problem. All of them were completed by 1972-73—an ideal point of perspective in many ways, close enough to the key events for a sense of participation yet far enough away from them for judgment. Each benefits from the fact that all of the documents and most of the Western negotiating positions were spread on the record, often as a result of leaks at crucial moments and notwithstanding a penchant for secrecy on the part of most of the key negotiators.

The books by Lowenthal, Ludz, and Birnbaum complement Wettig's in dealing with the political aspects of *Ostpolitik.* All three are unabashedly favorable to Willy Brandt's policy (indeed, no one has yet produced a counterbalancing criticism of *Ostpolitik* from other than a legalistic point of view). Lowenthal and Ludz were themselves involved as advisers to the Chancellor and his Social Democratic Party (SPD) on Eastern policy. Lowenthal's short history is a stalwart, scholarly defense of that policy as a way of bringing the Federal Republic into alignment with the détente policy initiated by its major ally, the United States. Ludz, who is undoubtedly the leading Western specialist on the GDR, characterizes his book as a "political essay," and it reads in several spots almost like an SPD tract. Birnbaum's account, which focuses on the 1969-72 period, adds some careful predictions about the course of West German-East German relations. Together with Wettig's meticulous monograph, these books provide an illuminating composite explication of Brandt's policy. In different ways, they also illustrate the separate angles of *Ostpolitik* mentioned at the start of this review.

Until the mid-1960's, West Germany's international political existence was passive and defensive. At the same time, it clung stubbornly to formal political and territorial claims in the East, maintaining that it was impossible to accept the GDR or to recognize the postwar frontiers of Eastern Europe, most importantly Poland's Oder-Neisse line. These positions —maintained for juridical, moral, and domestic political reasons— were by the late 1950's generating serious friction with the United States, which, for strategic and domestic political reasons of its own, was bent on reaching an accommodation with the Soviet Union in Europe.

As Ludz discerningly points out, West Germany has been able to emerge from its passivity as an influential and active major power on the world scene in large part precisely because it liberated itself from formal claims to being a power in Eastern Europe—claims inherent in its positions on the GDR and the Oder-Neisse line. Under Brandt, assisted by his special envoy Egon Bahr and his Foreign Minister Walter Scheel, the Federal Republic conducted a realistic and adroit policy. A first phase aiming at "change [in East Germany] through rapprochement" gave way after

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1969 to a more cautious phase, which Lowenthal characterizes as "security [for East and West Germany] through normalization." Artful linkages—the FRG-Soviet treaty with the FRG-Polish treaty, with the Four-Power Berlin Agreement, with ratification of the Soviet and Polish treaties, with the Basic GDR Treaty, with agreement to hold a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and to negotiations aimed at a reduction of military forces (MBFR)—kept Bonn tightly aligned during the whole *Ostpolitik* process with its often suspicious Western allies. These step-by-step developments also projected Bonn gradually but steadily into a leading role in East-West security negotiations generally. The whole was accomplished with the support of the German public, as virtually every election test showed (although throughout the period the White House tended to believe that *Ostpolitik* would split the West Germans dangerously).

A second outcome of *Ostpolitik,* the legitimation of the GDR, was probably the most welcome in Europe. It appeared to seal conclusively the division of the former Reich, a relief to Bonn's smaller and less dynamic neighbors. It helped to consolidate a regime in East Berlin whose precariousness was a source of apprehension to Communist governments elsewhere and to Moscow in particular. It also removed the constant and increasingly onerous and costly demand on West German diplomacy to cajole, bribe, and pressure allies and third countries in order to block acceptance of the GDR into international organizations and to stave off its diplomatic recognition. Moreover, the GDR was induced to pay a substantial price to win acceptance, in terms of a Berlin settlement that has damped friction in that tinder box.

At the same time, however, Eastern policy should be seen as a continuance by new means of the old antagonism between the two Germanies. Brandt and his government, which was more oriented toward Berlin and the East than predecessor administrations, always saw *Deutschlandpolitik,* the issues of the German question, as the heart of *Ostpolitik.* It was to get at the GDR, so to speak, that Bonn signed the treaties which explicitly accepted Soviet primacy in Eastern and much of Central Europe.

Each Germany is a rival for the Germany national tradition and purposes. Their rivalry penetrated deeply into the domestic politics of West Germany as well as those of the GDR. The East German novelist Stefan Heym perceived this well, if cynically: ". . . on either side of the fence the existence of another Germany . . . causes a proportionately larger share of the cake to be handed to the greedy masses. A competition is taking place; its prize: the German soul." [1]

While acceptance by Bonn of a second German state was a triumph of rationality in politics, it would be unrealistic to view this policy as a victory over national aspirations. The gnawing question remains for Lowenthal: If the Federal Republic is not the core of a German nation-state to be resurrected in the future, what is it, then? The national question also continues to bedevil the GDR, even though—unlike West Germany—it has constitutionally abandoned the objective of a unified nation-state. Its effort to cope with the national issue leads to such doctrinal absurdities as Ulbricht's attempt to differentiate between "the socialist German nation-state," the GDR, and "the capitalist-NATO state with limited national sovereignty," the FRG—or Honecker's between the "socialist nation" and the "bourgeois nation." As Ludz concedes, the West German parties have no politically valid national concept to offer in rebuttal. And the national feelings of Germans—last publicly demonstrated on the town square of Erfurt, when East Germans recognized Willy Brandt as a national leader six year ago—sometimes speak louder than doctrines and concepts.

The final aspect of *Ostpolitik* is seldom mentioned by the four authors. It is also little thought about by Americans, for whom distinctions between Social Democrats, Socialists, and Communists blur. The contest between Social Democrats and Communists in Central Europe has been deadly serious for more than half a century. Control of state machinery has increased each side's capability to influence, pressure, and suborn the other—a capability already highly developed as a result of experience, disciplined party organizations, ideology, and a sense of mission. Because both sides are in power, the classic party-political competition today represents a competition of particular intensity, and it is one which today preoccupies observers of communism in France, Spain, Portugal, and Italy, as well as in the two Germanies.

As Birnbaum observes, it is particularly important for West German Social Democrats to ensure fuzziness about the distinc-

[1] Stefan Heym, "Letter from East Germany," *The New York Times Magazine* (New York, NY), March 23, 1975.

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tion between social democracy and communism. The East German SED (Socialist Unity Party), for its part, has redoubled its efforts since 1972 to "delimit" (*abgrenzen*) its state from the perniciousness of "social democratism" and has aligned itself with the Soviet Communist Party more tightly than ever before.

One should not be surprised when Brandt's successor, Helmut Schmidt, insists—as he did at the meeting of Socialist parties in Elsinore in January 1975—that there must be no truck with Communist parties. Nor should one wonder why the SED assumed a leading role in promoting the CPSU's effort to align European Communists in a unified front that would countenance no cooperation with Social Democrats.

THE FINAL TWO books under review are studies of East-West German trade, respectively by Robert W. Dean and Siegfried Kupper. They are important to a rounded picture of German developments, particularly because the Federal Republic's trade and other economic relations with the GDR receive far too little attention in the Ludz, Lowenthal, Birnbaum, and Wettig studies.

Kupper's concise account of West Germany's trade with the GDR and Dean's broader treatment of its commerce with all the East European countries and the Soviet Union both focus on the interplay between Bonn's political and economic motivations. Kupper underscores the futility of past West German attempts to use the trade relationship directly for political leverage, at least with respect to the GDR. Even when economic conditions have favored expansion of inner-German trade, East Berlin has been careful to limit it to 10 to 11 percent of the GDR's total foreign trade.

By contrast, Dean discusses how and why West Germany's trade with the GDR's allies has grown rapidly (at least until recently). He shows that the FRG has long since outdistanced its Western competitors and has been able to regain and even exceed its prewar economic importance in the countries which today belong to the Warsaw Pact.

Perhaps crucial to the domestic success of *Ostpolitik* was a switch in the West German attitude on trade with the East that became apparent in the late 1960's. Under the influence of the Social Democrats and centrist Free Democrats, an approach was adopted that treated trade as a variable independent of politics, to be liberalized and expanded for economic reasons, in contrast to the attitude of the predecessor administrations of Adenauer and Erhard that viewed trade as an instrument of economic warfare to be tightly administered and curtailed for political purposes. An unwritten chapter of *Ostpolitik* may be the part this shift in trade policy played in assuring Brandt the support of West German industry, whose interests in bigger and more stable markets in the East coincided with the Social Democrats' political aims there.

AS A READING of all these books shows, Brandt's Eastern policy created a residue of potentially combustible material. The treaty-making was possible only because the West Germans and (in the case of the Berlin agreement) their allies, too, left deliberate ambiguities, entered into tacit East-West agreements to disagree, issued unilateral declarations, and foisted off letters and notes stating viewpoints which they knew to be completely unacceptable in the East. The West German-East German Basic Treaty, in particular, concluded under pressure of the West German 1972 elections, contained a host of unresolved issues. The oddity of divided Berlin also remains, with the Western sector serving as a constant irritant to the GDR.

More important, the two Germanies' objectives continue to be incompatible. They have reached —and continue to try to codify— a *modus vivendi*. But Bonn seeks, as a primary foreign policy objective, to open up the GDR to its influence, while the GDR seeks to integrate itself more tightly at all levels—state, party, and economic—into the "socialist community of states" (the 1975 Soviet-East German treaty is merely a recent demonstration of the latter policy).

Finally, the Soviet Union and the GDR interpret *Ostpolitik* as putting an end to the "German question." "Reunification" is no longer supposed to be an issue. But for the Federal Republic, the German question must remain open. The constitution obliges the West German government to keep it so. The highest court in the FRG in 1973 again reminded the government of its constitutional duty "to keep the claim of reunification alive at home and to be a steadfast exponent of it abroad."[2] A Final resolution of the "German question" is still a long way off—if indeed there can ever be a genuine convergence of Eastern and Western views on this sensitive problem.

[2] "Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Basic Treaty of July 31, 1973," reprinted in *Deutschland Archiv* (Cologne), November 1973, p. 1219.

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